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JANUARY-MARCH 1981

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
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INDIA RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

MAHARAJ K. CHOPRA

RECENT developments in the Middle East have thrown fresh light on the relationship between India and the Soviet Union. That these two countries have had ties of long standing is a well known fact of international relations—which is indeed one very good reason why analysts have now been closely watching the policies pursued by them in respect of the climatic events in a region close to both. Questions have been asked whether there has been any link between them, and if so, of what kind and where. Such questions are legitimate, for it is the periods of crisis which provide a litmus test of the depth and range of mutual ties. All the more so in the present case of the Middle East, which is a neighbouring area of both India and the Soviet Union. An analysis of the policies adopted by Moscow and New Delhi could be projected to wider spheres, for after all both the countries are big, one a global power and the other a regional power, so that what they do in one critical area is likely to have impact upon their behaviour elsewhere.

In the following discussion, we shall begin with the basic factors of history and geography—a powerful influence. Thanks to this factor, the Middle East has become a neighbouring region of both the countries, and, as might have been expected, has entered deeply into their security perspectives. This we shall note and then proceed to an examination of the relationship of India and Russia with local powers, with special reference to Iran and Afghanistan and Iranian-Iraqi war. Events in the Middle East have generated a wave of arms build-up on the Middle East periphery, in which India and Russia figure prominently, beside the USA, and we shall have a look at this. And then we shall assess the geostrategic attitudes of the two countries towards the Middle East and their wider significance in the extra-regional and global settings.

THE CRESCENT OF CRISIS

At the outset, what is the Middle East? A knotty question never precisely answered, so far as its geographical limits are concerned. For purposes of present discussion, however, a tentative definition is necessary, for that would provide a framework of the respective policy formulations.

We shall consider the Middle East to extend from Egypt in the West to Afghanistan-Pakistan in the east. It is true that Egypt is partly located

In Africa, Afghanistan is rather a part of Central Asia, and Pakistan is normally considered in the Indian subcontinent. But as things happen to be, they are all very much linked with the Middle East politically and geostrategically. In between these peripheral states there are Israel, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar and the Emirates—altogether 12 states. Even if one leaves the smaller ones, three of them perhaps, the remaining have each a distinctive identity and power status, a fact which does contribute to the great variety and complexity of the regional scenario.

That reminds one of a phrase frequently in use in the present geostrategic contexts—"The Crescent of Crisis". First used by the former US National Security Adviser it was taken up in a highly suggestive article by *Die Ziet*, April 25, 1980, which placed this region within parallels of 40-20 degrees North-South and 40-70 degrees West-East. If Somalia and Ethiopia are excluded, with which we shall not be concerned in the present discussion, then the entire Middle East would fall within the "crescent" (which incidently is the Islamic symbol and would designate the Islamic character of the region). "In all probability", said the paper, "the future of civilisation and the industrialised world will be decided in this area in the coming crisis decade". Needless to say that India and Russia must be included in this industrialised world and are bound to be profoundly affected.

IMPACT OF HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY

The influence of history, which in fact brought about the incidence of geography, may be divided into two periods in respect of both the countries.

If Russia's phenomenal expansion had halted by the end of the eighteenth century, it would have had no frontier along the Middle East. But it did not, and, after completing conquest of Siberia, it turned to Central Asia and by 1881 acquired territory that extended from the Black Sea to Sinkiang : three-fourths of the frontier thus acquired lay along the Middle East countries of Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. After 1881, for full one century, Russia was busy consolidating these conquests sometimes at the behest of war, till we come to the occupation of Afghanistan. In this historical perspective, the question is now being asked whether Afghanistan marks the next phase of Soviet expansionism.

Only a little before the Russian triumphs in Central Asia, the British had completed their conquest of India and thus Queen Victoria had become India's Queen Empress. This process was accompanied by a series of manoeuvres on the part of Russia and Britain which affected the Middle East, the upshot of which was that Russia was checked effectively on the Middle East frontiers, Afghanistan was neutralised, and a narrow strip

called Wakhan was interposed between the Russian frontier and the British Indian frontier.

This was India's first period of contact with Russia, but it was at the behest of the British imperial power. Then, in 1947, India became independent and thus began its second period of contact in which the name of the game was totally different. Between independent India and the Soviet Union there was no conflict of interests, no rivalry. At the same time India remembered that the Soviets had supported its independence movement, while Indians on their part had considerable admiration for the October Revolution and Russia's performance and suffering in World War II. Besides, the post-war power equation encouraged India to strike a course of its own in world politics.

It was within this framework that a new picture of Indo-Soviet relations emerged, and the die was loaded in favour of these becoming close.

Geographically, by virtue of its conquests, Russia became a neighbour of the Middle East. India, after independence, had to reckon with Pakistan; and the entire trend of Pakistani posture has been oriented towards the Middle East, from which it derives financial assistance, diplomatic support, aid for militarisation, Islamic inspiration, and, above all, an identity that separates it from the Indian subcontinent. With Pakistan thus verging to the west, India also becomes a neighbour of the Middle East, bringing it in line with the Soviet position.

Here then there are two major powers of the world set right along the Crescent of Crisis, and no wonder that their policies have semblences of close action-reaction, even though, as we shall see, they are not always in concert.

PRIORITY CONCERN FOR SECURITY

As might be expected, both India and Russia pursue their national interests in the Middle East. Such interests, peculiar to every state, are at once the driving forces and objectives of foreign policy. National security is at the heart of these motivations, especially when we are dealing with the border zones.

How does the Middle East figure in the policy postures of India and Russia in this respect?

The Soviet Union. The Middle East northern border constitutes about one-third of Russia's southern flank and may be rightly described as its underbelly. This sector is highly sensitive and vulnerable from several angles, and these angles are often changing. In consequence the Soviet tactics are also changing and are liable to become sometime too complex to be easily comprehensible. These are all designed to ward off whatever threats to security are perceived,

The principal framework for its operations is provided by the strategy of ousting the presence and influence of Western powers which alone are capable of causing concern, the local powers being too weak. Withdrawal by Britain from this area, which was once upon a time the only rival, brought Russia little comfort, for the United States jumped in. Finding itself pitted against Washington, Moscow employs a double-pronged assault. It seeks to demolish America's strongholds erected here—hence it rallied against the Baghdad Pact and then the CENTO, and presently it seeks to neutralise part of NATO's southern flank that lies in Turkey. America's moves to get bases in Egypt, Israel, Oman, Kenya and Somalia have all been roundly condemned, while the American supply of surveillance aircraft to Saudi Arabia during the Iraqi-Iranian War has been dubbed as gross interference in the conflict.

While condemning the West for building up presence in its borderland, Moscow has sought to do precisely the same thing for itself. Its friendship treaties with South Yemen and Iraq have been of long standing, to which has been added now a treaty with Syria and an important base in the Red Sea on an Ethiopian island.

Of all the connections thus built, that with India has been most enduring and rewarding, and, internationally, least subject to embarrassing criticism.

In respect of security the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 constitutes an effective instrument. Dealing with a wide-ranging mix of economic, political, and cultural subjects, it has also been an important means of strengthening India's defence base and of assistance in confronting the neighbouring adversaries; and, besides, it has often brought the two countries together on the wider geostrategic platform. Three provisions of the treaty bear specifically on security. By one, the two countries will consult immediately and go into action in the event of threat to either party: this provision is even more categorical than its parallel in the NATO Treaty which is hedged by the stipulation that the allies would act in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

By another provision, neither country can enter into alliance with a third party which is inimical to either party; and by the third provision, each country is forbidden to give bases to a hostile power. These provisions are of special relevance for the Soviet Union which is hemmed by the bases of its adversaries all round—in the Far East, in Europe, and in the Middle East. In the Soviet borderlands, the Indian sector is certainly the most secure of all sectors.

India. Contiguous with Pakistan and Afghanistan, India's border with the Middle East covers about the entire length of its north-western flank. For India, there is no other area more important than this, for it is through this that the country has been the subject of all major invasions of history. Since independence in 1947, it has been engaged in four major

armed conflicts and in respect of three of them (with Pakistan) the decisions have been made in this theatre. Today, this is also this theatre where a bulk of the Indian forces are deployed.

With the exception of Pakistan, India has rather turned a blind eye to history which witnessed armed incursions through Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. On the contrary it has persistently sought to befriend the region in parts as well in its entirety. By its non-alignment it has kept aloof from the cold war of major powers operating in the Middle East. By strict neutrality, it has kept aloof from inter-regional feuds. By its pro-Arab stand, it has always been on the right side of the countries who have oil and petrodollars. It has entered into a large number of collaborative arrangements with almost every country of the region. Indians are very much in demand here as consultants, engineers, doctors, artisans and labourers, who in 1979 sent back a hefty sum of \$700 million back home in foreign exchange. For India, the Middle East means both security and prosperity.

Security is of course the common factor in Indian and Soviet perspectives, but there are sharp differences in their tactics. For Russia the essence of security is of military character, the economic factor being subsidiary. For India the economic factor is highly important, remembering oil if nothing else, while security aspect is kept in low key. But such divergences of approach have not affected mutual relations.

INDIA RUSSIA AND THE REGIONAL POWERS

Within this framework of divergence of approach but convergence of interests, one may now examine relationships of India and Russia with individual countries. One notices an amazing array of contrasts.

In respect of Egypt, Moscow has drifted from friendly ties to strategic alliance treaty to sheer hostility ; while Indo-Egyptian relations have been consistently warm, even collaborative, because at one stage they undertook joint military and economic projects. In regard to Israel, Moscow has no diplomatic ties and, to say the least, no love lost whatever. India does not support Israel's policies, but is by no means vehement in its approach, and has permitted an Israeli consulate to be established in Bombay (but not in New Delhi). And as for Turkey, India's relations are friendly and straightforward, in sharp contrast to those of the Soviet Union which fluctuate between aid and olive branch on the one hand and warnings and threats on the other. Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq deserve special mention in some detail.

Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan. That the Soviets were deeply committed in Afghanistan for several years had been well known, but few bothered. Why then should it have thrust a hundred thousand troops into the country is not easily understood. Moscow has said little beyond asserting that a friendly country and a border state, with whom it has a

treaty, had become exposed to the machinations of the USA, China and Pakistan. That argument however has not washed with the world opinion.

Analysts do offer some explanations of course. Proceeding from their heavy stakes in this neighbouring country, the Soviets presumably found that, after the ouster of monarchy in 1972, stability had not come to Afghanistan. One puppet after another was tried and eliminated, till we came to Babrak Karmal, the President at this writing. But none could muster local support, and even the Afghan army was suspect. The regime had to be bolstered by Soviet military power.

Meanwhile the Soviet efforts to communise Afghanistan met with rough weather. Famous for guerrilla warfare, Afghan tribals rose in revolt and made things difficult for the invaders, though not impossible. Hence the Soviet bid to be entrenched further, may be with a view to prolonged occupation. Time and international situation are big factors. Embroiled in crisis after crisis, the world could forget Afghanistan; on the other hand if the Soviets meet with more troubles elsewhere, the grip over Afghanistan may have to be loosened. Possibly, Afghanistan is in for being incorporated into the USSR as another Islamic state, in which case the fears that have been expressed that Russian imperialism is on the march on an expansionist spree would have come true. If it is true, as has been widely stated, that Russia took advantage of weakness of the West, then the coming into power of a hardline US President such as Mr. Ronald Reagan might make a difference.

India and Afghanistan have had excellent relations throughout the post-war period. Despite the absence of direct communications—for Afghanistan is a land-locked country—mutual trade has been brisk, while there have been ample cultural and political contacts. Geostrategically, both India and Afghanistan have border disputes with Pakistan, and that has often brought them together on the same platform. Besides, Afghanistan has served as a buffer between Russia and India, and this India considers valuable and desirable even now during Indo-Soviet friendship; after all no friendships overrules the dictates of *real politik*.

India was one of the two countries—the other was West Germany—which got a short prior notice of Soviet troops marching into Afghanistan. Even then it was a shock, which sent a wave of sympathy for the Afghans and concern about the Soviet intentions. New Delhi called for the withdrawal of troops and pleaded with the Soviets through diplomatic channels, but without success. More openly, New Delhi toned down its resentment by suggesting that the Soviet action was in reaction to big power manoeuvres in the area and could not be condemned by itself; and it asked for a “political solution”.

But this attitude was to nobody's liking in the country. The question asked was why India did not call spade a spade and name Russia the aggressor. There were at least two important reasons for the Indian

acquiescence to the Soviet adventure. One was of course that India did not wish to spoil the excellent ties already forged, which touched much more vital matters of mutual concern. The other was almost similar to the approach of West Germany, to the effect that the struggle over Afghanistan was linked with global struggle between the super powers and should not be made to water down all the good work done through several years of *ostpolitik* in Germany.

And yet even this logic was unsatisfactory. The picture under the "roof of the world", always confused in the past, had become distressingly uncertain and did cause much heartburning in India. Behind Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's recurrent warnings that India's security was in danger, developments in the Middle East, triggered off in Afghanistan, could be discerned.

Especially in the long-range view, for the future possibilities of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan were most serious, remembering the critical geostrategic location of Afghanistan: it provides a springboard for thrust into Sinkiang, into Iran aimed at the Persian Gulf, and into Pakistan down towards the Indian Ocean. This last option would provide the Soviets a land route through Baluchistan to the Arabian Sea—the shortest to the warm waters, safer than the Iranian route.

Any such move was likely to break up Pakistan once again (after the creation of Bangla Desh) and that would create for India all but unmanageable situation of crisis at its doorstep. Only a gullible India, strategically blind, could swallow a development of this dimension, no matter how deep the ties with Russia.

Revolution in Iran. The Soviet stance towards Iran has been exhibiting striking fluctuations. After the Second World War, it hung on to the northern half till the United Nations pressurised it to leave. Under the Shah, it kept a wary watch over the country's alliance with the West, but it cultivated economic ties and even supplied some weapons. Under Ayatollah Khomeini, first it sought to turn the tide of Iranian revolution in its favour, cashing in on the misfortunes of the United States. But the revolution did not go its way. Then it fomented discontent among the minorities like the Kurds, aided by the Iranian Arabs around the Persian Gulf, and brought in East European and Ethiopian toughs for guerrilla operations. Khomeini, already fuming over the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, did not take long to see the game, expelled Soviet diplomats, and closed down one of its consulates.

After the interregnum of over two decades, Soviet troops were once again massed along the Iranian borders, partly to confront the United States and partly also to keep ready for a possible need to march into Iran once again.

And now consider India. Even under the Shah Indo-Iranian relations were friendly and cooperative—a joint shipping line was launched for

instance. Mutual trade was brisk and Iran requisitioned services of a large number of Indians. Khomeini's Iran turned out to be even closer, especially after the economic restrictions imposed by the Western powers, when Teheran turned to New Delhi for filling the gap. India continued to get Iranian oil till it had to stop during the war with Iraq. And Iranians tended to become even emotional: "If India is ever invaded Iran would place all its armed forces at India's disposal", said a Teheran broadcast. India, it may be added, was one of the half a dozen non-aligned states, acceptable to Iran for mediation during the war.

Islamic Revolution. Ignited in Iran, the fire of this cataclysmic event caused new flares in the Middle East. It boiled to something like this. Khomeini harked back to the primeval Islamic tenets and rejected the modern gloss, especially the gloss of Western civilisation. This ideal he pursued with fanatical ruthlessness which caused repugnance throughout the world. Projected into the political sphere, it meant attack on the Iranian old regime and dictatorial Islamic governments as well as a call to end domination by external powers. The revolution tore up old alliances among several countries, pressed regional as well as extra-regional states into altering postures, and made some of them to scurry for new ties. So far as the Islamic world was concerned, reactions were mixed. But Islamic fundamentalism was revived, at some places to the pitch of fanaticism. Those who had been riding the bandwagon of Islam to bolster their policies, like Saudi Arabia, became cautious, fearing that religion could be a double-edged weapon; others, like Pakistan, seized the opportunity to give a new kind of strength to their dictatorial rule.

However, it was a fact that both India and Russia were affected.

Russia has a Muslim population of 45 million, or one-sixth of its total. Most of it lives in its six republics from the Black Sea to Turkestan, three of which touch the Middle East. Historically, the Muslim belt was incorporated into Russia in the later nineteenth century after a number of wars. Their integration into Slavonic culture is not yet complete, but the Soviets have done a good job of work in regard to insulating them from the adjoining Middle East Muslim belt, inscribing the communist ethos and undertaking developmental programmes. Only during the last decade or so the Soviets have felt confidence about exposing them to the outside world, but Islamic fundamentalism has not been the kind of influence the heretical Russia would like its Muslim citizens to imbibe. It has been suggested that behind the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was the perception of the Islamic revolutionary ethos afflicting its own people of Islamic faith.

India has a Muslim population of 75 million, one-ninth of its total. India too has an Islamic belt in its Kashmir sector which lies athwart Pakistan and Afghanistan, and here the pro-Khomeini movement did produce its mark, when the Government had to send several militants to jail.

In the widespread communal disturbances which rocked India during the 1980 year fanatical challenges to authority were levelled, supported, it was alleged, by the petrodollars as well as the concepts from the Middle East. Thus, for both Russia and India, the Islamic revolution produced upsetting effects and both desired that Khomeini would desist from inciting outsiders behind his cult.

WAR BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN

In the Middle East Iraq has been one of the states well cultivated by the Soviet Union. Early 1970s saw the high water-mark of their links when a friendship treaty was signed. Russia provided arms and Iraq gave base facilities at the port of Umma Qasr on the Persian Gulf. But Iraq has not quite lived upto the treaty : it has been heavy-handed with the communists and even turned to the West (notably France) for arms and nuclear technology. Thus, Soviet-Iraqi relations have been rather marked by a certain amount of ambivalence. This has been in sharp contrast to the Indo-Iraqi relations, which have been consistently warm and collaborative, reinforced by the fact that both belong to the non-aligned movement.

The war between Iraq and Iran has highlighted the different attitudes of Russia and India towards the conflict. Both declared they are "neutral", but neutrality has had dissimilar implications.

For India it has meant equidistance between the two belligerents, genuine sympathy for both, desire for speedy end of conflict, and prospects of the resumption of effective collaboration. Above all it has meant resumption of oil supplies from both Iran and Iraq.

But Soviet neutrality has not been that simple and unmixed. Neither Iraq nor Russia has pressed for invoking their mutual treaty, which might have meant enhanced supply of arms and political support by the Soviets. But Moscow has shown its disapproval of some of Iraqi policies : it has permitted North Korea to ship spares to Iran, and, worse, has entered into a friendship treaty with Syria, Iraq's avowed adversary.

That Russia has declared non-intervention in the war is not so much a matter of principle, as in the case of India, as of strategy, and has been conditional upon the United States also remaining aloof. Any move on the part of Washington is likely to bring Moscow also plumb into the fray. For the Soviets therefore the problem has revolved round the maintenance of balance of power.

Within these parameters both Russia and India have watched the war with comparative equanimity. Judged by the fact that large forces and huge quantities of arms have been involved, the war has not assumed any frightful proportions and has not affected Indo-Soviet ties.

MILITARY BUILD-UP

The Middle East is now a militarily beleaguered area, more hazardously so even than Europe. For in Europe there is at least a balance of

forces which implies deterrence and restraint, while in the Middle East power balance has been in a shambles.

The disarray has been in the making for at least light years, since the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, when arms build-up in the region received a fillip. But after Afghanistan a new picture of the Middle East emerged : already bristling with arms within, it was now militarised on its periphery as well. The countries most conspicuously involved in this connection have been the USSR, the USA, China and India.

So far as the Soviet southern frontier with the Middle East is concerned, a massive reinforcement has been under way. According to one authentic report there have been 24 army divisions deployed here, to which may be added the five divisions in Afghanistan. New airfields in Afghanistan have come up, only 300 miles from the Persian Gulf. The Soviet domestic transport facilities have been oriented to carry heavy equipment to the trans-Caucasian road and rail networks. The Soviet air force has stationed two airborne divisions comprising about 900 combat planes in the two southern military regions adjoining the Iranian border ; and its airfields between the eastern seaboard of the Black Sea and Lake Baikal are sufficient to swiftly handle essential reinforcements and serve staging posts for airlift.

South of the Middle East the Red Fleet has been maintaining a permanent flotilla of about 35 ships in the Arabian Sea, including the aircraft carrier *Kiev* and several missile-equipped cruisers and missile destroyers. Soviet squadrons have anchoring facilities at Aden. The use of sea facilities in Ethiopia, South Yemen and Iraq are also available to the Soviets.

As for the USA, after quitting facilities in Ethiopia, it has now come back in force in the wake of the Iranian revolution and Afghan crisis. Base facilities have been made available in Egypt and Israel, as also, more recently, in Kenya, Somalia and Oman. The Diego Garcia base, centrally located in the Indian Ocean, has been upgraded and now houses a contingent of the Rapid Development Force. The USA and its European allies have around 60 ships in the Arabian Sea.

China has reinforced its position in Sinkiang along its border with Russia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Its defence modernisation programme, geared formerly to the northern frontier with Russia and to the Far East now embraces the line of contact with the Middle East, at the edge of which it confronts two powers, Russia and India, and where lie its important backdoor routes to the Indian Ocean, the Middle East and Europe.

India's defence renovation plans are conditioned by several factors. China's bid to enhance its military clout is of course one, and another is the endemic uncertainty of relations with Pakistan. But the Middle East has widened the security perspectives in perhaps four directions.

One is related to Pakistan which has embarked upon heavy rearmament with weapons obtained substantially from the funds made available

by the Middle East Islamic states. A second factor is the tension that prevails in the zone contiguous to the Indian frontier where a million refugees from Afghanistan have infiltrated and where India confronts three powers—Russia, China and Pakistan. Thirdly, India is concerned with the possibility of the Middle East conflict fanning out, in which case it must have additional clout to be effective as national interests demand. And finally, there is the concern about the transportation of oil from the Persian Gulf to the Indian coasts: this requires security of the sea lanes. In addition, India has also to look after the security of the oil infra-structure off its westcoast, which has grown into a vital source of crude.

Each one of these powers are of course building up postures on individual basis. But analysts would not miss the potential of a new line-up—for India and Russia have a mutual friendship treaty, while China and the United States have already developed something close to an alliance.

THE WORLD SETTING

While the Middle East is the focus of our discussion, it cannot be isolated from other regions, especially those closest to it, nor from the broader world context. In the former perspective, the Indian Ocean is most relevant.

The ocean (29 million square miles in area) has extensive seaboard in the continents of Africa, Asia and Australia, and the Middle East is a very small sector of it. And yet no other sector has been a catalyst of events such as this. Most of the fleet movements, the resurgence of the quest for bases, dangers of conflagrations, and big power confrontation is attributable to this sector.

Of the four big powers on the Middle East periphery, India is most concerned with the developments in the ocean, for it is an Indian Ocean maritime state with extensive sea interests. Its main concern is that the ocean remains a zone of peace. It has been a strong advocate of the concept of demilitarisation of the ocean. But events have moved quite the other way. Its exhortations to the super powers to curtail arms race in the area have borne no fruit. After a decade the super powers are back to square one, with all restraints upon arms build-up thrown to the winds.

In depicting this posture on the part of India, Western analysts are wont to allege that New Delhi rather leans towards Moscow compared to Washington, that New Delhi, while taking Washington to task for its flotillas and bases in the Indian Ocean, turns a blind eye to the similar operations of Moscow. The allegation is understandable, for it is a fact of life that New Delhi and Moscow have a treaty relationship which is effective.

Placing the Middle East in global context poses a vast dissertation with which we are not concerned. But one may take up the key issue. What are

Russia's primary motivations ? Is it only for its security and influence in the Middle East, a border zone ? Is the Middle East much more than this—providing “targets of opportunity” ? Does the Middle East form part of some Soviet global strategy ? Behind all this, is there a grand design ?

As for security and influence, a categorical answer in the affirmative can be given. This has always been the Russian objective. Peter the Great enjoined in his will published in 1775 “to fortify the Black Sea, approach near Constantinople, penetrate to the Persian Gulf, and then oust the English”. During the Second World War, Molotov told the Allies to accept the area from Baku to Baghdad as the Soviet sphere of influence. And Brezhnev has told Americans that the Middle East is a part of the Soviet security system. What the Soviets do not say but what is abundantly implicit is that they are changing the balance of power in their favour.

If now this is viewed in conjunction with the Soviet moves elsewhere, some light is thrown in regard to Russia's “targets of opportunity”. Africa where a new order is in the making has opened an excellent field in this connection, where Russia has managed to get footholds in the decolonised states of Tanzania and Mozambique ; and in Angola it has done even better, with Cuban assistance. This has been accompanied by Ethiopia, South Yemen, Indo-China and Afghanistan. In half a decade of the 1970s, the Kremlin has managed to set up a positive presence in several areas found to be “soft” and strategically important. There does appear to be some orchestration of endeavours made on such a wide scale : and the question is bound to be asked whether the Middle East offers yet another “window”.

It would be unrealistic to presume that the Soviets are anchoring their masts at so many key centres as a passing show. The rapid expansion and deployment of naval power of big dimensions is a relatively new instrument to function far and beyond the metropolitan frontiers. One remarkable effect of SALT was the confirmation that Russia is the “equal” of America ; a later analysis tended to show that in some respects the Soviets had outstripped Americans. No wonder the Soviet Foreign Minister could declare the other day that no world problem could be solved without Soviet participation. Analysts have also noted that the latest Soviet constitution, as amended, incorporates a “world role” for the Soviet people. The Soviets are convinced that they are a global power, even though they may not yet have all the global capabilities.

Few Indians have given much thought to this aspect of the Soviet moves and hardly contemplated that the Middle East is one of the rungs on the ladder the Soviets might be climbing. No country can of course have any sympathy with designs of this kind, least of all India which seeks to steer an independent course and would reject domination by any power.

CONCLUSION

Scanning the Middle East scenario from the perspectives of India and Russia one notices that the policies adopted and the goal pursued by the

two nations are different. The USSR has created powerful allies as well as irreconcilable foes, while India has full friendship ties with all except Pakistan. Russia has gone in for "conflict strategy", while India is for stability and peace. Russia is in rivalry and confrontation with Western powers, while India would like to be left alone vis-a-vis those powers. Russian objectives smack of global dimensions, while India's interest is almost wholly regional. In respect of the vital commodity, oil, India wants a climate of stability and normalcy in the area, while the Soviet Union would not be unhappy if the Western powers are deprived of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf.

Obviously, the two countries have different national interests in the Middle East, to be pursued by divergent tactics. But the most remarkable thing is that there is no collision between them, except different approaches over Afghanistan. But even these have for the time being been swept beneath the carpet, both sides hoping that in this respect also some mutual understanding would be found.

As Russia sat pretty in Afghanistan and Iran-Iraq war was on, the Presidents of India and Russia exchanged goodwill visits, a Soviet naval unit called at an Indian port, and the Soviets extended a credit of \$500 million for a single project. In an opinion poll taken as to which of the four countries—USSR, USA, UK and China—was the most popular in the country, the Soviet union was on top.

No wonder in the tension-stricken region of the Middle East Russia and India are on the same net. Some would call this a fine example of co-existence of nations otherwise so sharply different in ideology, power status and objectives. Others would say it is a supreme instance of *real politik* bringing two disparate peoples together. Whatever it may be Russia and India are likely to remain on the same wave-length for quite some time to come.

THE MILITARY THREAT

LT. GEN. A.M. VOHRA, PVSM (RETD.)

IN May last year, soon after China's 'punitive' action in Vietnam, Mr Jagjivan Ram was interviewed by a panel on the TV and questioned on the military threat to this country and the Government's nuclear policy. During the discussion it was suggested that the threat from China was greater than from Pakistan. Again in November Mr C Subramaniam's speech at the National Defence College was criticised in the columns of a daily newspaper for mentioning Pakistan as a possible danger. Following the recent developments in Afghanistan, there has been rethinking on this issue. Although the Chinese incursion into Vietnam may be a pointer and the situation in Afghanistan may considerably influence issues of national security, the question of the military threat is dependent on certain basic factors and geographic conditions, which should be analysed to get the correct perspective.

India has common land borders with Pakistan, China, Nepal, Bangladesh and Burma. The borders with Nepal and Burma have been quiet except for the movement of Naga and Mizo hostile gangs across North Burma on their way to, and back from the Yunan province of China. These gangs have also operated from bases in Burma. Since the 1962 conflict with the Chinese, the northern border, though sensitive, has generally been quiet. However, there was a war with Pakistan in Jammu Kashmir in the very first year of our independence. There have also been wars in 1965 and 1971. Bangladesh came into being as a result of the 1971 war and although our relations with that country have, by and large, been friendly, we cannot be complacent about the eastern border.

Topography

Our northern border was considered invincible for ages. In 1962, the major Chinese ingress in Kameng was of the size of only a division. The force level that came into Walong from Rima in Lohit was approximately a regimental group (a brigade). This force had no road axis and its operations on animal based/man pack logistics beyond Walong would have been extremely restricted. In between these two western and eastern

ends of NEFA, there were minor incursions. The Chinese ingress was also short lived. The Himalayas may not be invincible, but the size and scope of any operations mounted through this mountainous region would be limited. The long and tenuous lines of communications to Tibet from mainland China and the restricted communications through the mountains do not permit large scale operations. In the eastern Himalayas, apart from the somewhat restricted Kameng approach through Bomdila, it is only the Chumbi Valley in Tibet that provides a route of ingress into Sikkim through Nathu La. In the central and western Himalayas the ingress routes are even more restricted except through Nepal. The Karakoram highway has a significance which is more psychological than military. The best ingress routes for a major venture that China might embark upon are through North Burma (Ledo Road) and *via* Tamu. In addition, Yunnan provides a more convenient and administratively viable base for such operations than Tibet or Sinkiang. This is not to gainsay that the aims and objectives of China may be served by the restricted and short-lived operations that are possible through the Himalayas as indeed they were in 1962.

In contrast, our border with Pakistan from the Rann of Kutch to Pathankot and the line of actual control (LOC) from Madhopur to Akhnur is virtually open country which permits speedy concentration of forces and over which large scale operations by mechanised forces are possible. The Rann and the Thar desert pose restrictions of varying degree though manoeuvrability in the latter has been established during 1965 and sizeable operations are feasible. The LOC from Akhnur to Naushera-Punch-Uri-Tithwal and thence circuiting round to Kargil and Karakoram Pass is in mountainous terrain. However, a large part of this mountainous region is fairly well developed in respect of the infrastructure of roads and operations of a fair size are sustainable in many parts. The pace of operations would of course be slow.

The border with Bangladesh on all three sides is open plains, although in our territory, Meghalaya in the north east and Mizoram in the east are semi-mountainous. The peculiarity of this region is the riverine nature of the terrain which would affect the pace of operations during the monsoons.

Clash of interests

Our relations with our neighbours depend largely on whether a clash of interests exists or not. With China, we had a friendly start marked by the 'Bhai Bhai' era. China's compulsive requirement of a road to Sinkiang, our reservations about the Chinese course of action in Tibet and grant of refuge in India to the Dalai Lama with thousands of Tibetans, who came in the wake of his exit, as also our friendly ties with USSR are some of the factors which led to the souring of our relations with Peking. The dispute over the India/China border remains unsolved. Moreover, China visualises for itself a place and a role in South and South East Asia, (The

Shanghai Communique 1972 recognised these regions as falling under the influence of China). However, by virtue of their size and geographic location, both China and India count in their own right, provided they are internally stable. Our relative influence in the region need not bring us into conflict. The demarcation of the border with Tibet is an issue that need not defy a peaceful solution. The support of Naga and Mizo insurgents will cease if it suits the interests of the two countries to develop friendly relations. While the clash of interests with China have not caused any tension since 1962, the clash of interests with Pakistan are of a serious and explosive nature. At international forums Pakistan takes the stand that the status of Jammu & Kashmir is negotiable. Pakistan is also known to harbour a desire to avenge the defeat suffered in 1971. Since the bogey of the threat from India serves as an effective standby to distract attention from internal problems, it has suited Pakistan to inculcate the thesis that India has still not accepted the establishment of Pakistan. Instability in Pakistan has necessitated the fostering of this suspicion and distrust. It has also led to adventurism in the past and may do so in the future. Until a stable government is established in Pakistan and rational thinking prevails, normal relations will be difficult to achieve. The situation in Afghanistan is likely to add to the hurdles in the way of normalisation as our views on how to deal with the problem differ and a military build up of Pakistan is likely to make it intractable. Although the US support of the military regime in Islamabad in the wake of the developments in Afghanistan has given a boost to it, the development is potentially destabilising. The statement of Gen Zia ul Haq that he does not intend relinquishing the appointment of COAS as he draws all his authority from it, is likely to cause discontent among the expectant brass. US aid will *ipso facto* strengthen the army's political role also, and a perpetual Chief would not be acceptable to the politically minded soldiers. Insurgency in Baluchistan is likely to be supported from across the border in the same way as Pakistan is supporting Afghan insurgents. So we have a scenario of continuing instability and growing strength. Should the regime in Pakistan find itself in a tight spot, it is likely to resort to the stratagem of a war with India to divert attention ; Kashmir and the bogey of India out to dismember Pakistan providing the *casus belli*.

The question of sharing the water of the Ganga has still to be solved with Bangladesh. The fear of the big neighbour geographically surrounding Bangladesh on three sides geographically is natural. This can lead to suspicion which needs to be guarded against by developing a relationship of trust and confidence with a stable Bangladesh.

Foreign Policy

India's foreign policy aims at establishing friendly relations with our neighbours. The success of this policy would reduce the chances of war,

keep defence spending under control and improve scope for development in the poor countries of the region—India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Relationships with other countries are, however, a reciprocal business and we can have a friendly relationship only if the other party is also interested because of the absence of any clash of interests and the existence of confidence and trust. With the background of the distrust of India that has been fostered in Pakistan and the state of political instability inside that country, the task of normalising relations with Pakistan is far more formidable than with China.

We had a longish period of stalemate with China until 1976 when there was a thaw and diplomatic representation was raised to the ambassadorial level. Apart from the odd patrol skirmish, the border has been quiet since 1962. Although the Chinese came to the assistance of Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, they did not actively participate in the wars and the border was not transgressed. True, Naga and Mizo insurgents have been trained and provided with arms but even this activity has been on a low key.

Traditionally China has considered itself the Middle Kingdom ; the centre of the universe. In Mao's time the Peking Government was influenced by its inheritance of the mantle of leadership and it was suggested by China-watchers that its foremost aim was to become a super power. Since the breach with the Soviet Union, the leadership of the Communist world has also been suggested as China's objective. These objectives formulated in the early flush of the victory in the civil war in 1950s have been modified by their subsequent internal and external experiences. Peking's primary concern now is the threat to their security that they feel the USSR poses. China's relations with the USA have received a further boost by the situation in Afghanistan. This will almost certainly be utilised to isolate Russia. In South and South East Asia also rivalry with Russia will be a factor motivating Chinese activity in the region which once constituted French Indo-China. The Chinese military action in Vietnam should be viewed in the light of the geopolitical considerations in this region and the Sino-Soviet antipathy. There is no serious clash of interest between India and China. If it is in our interest to improve relations with China, we should persistently pursue this aim and ensure that our friendship with USSR does not stand in the way. In fact improved relations with China may, in the long run, help us play a role in reducing tensions between Russia and China.

The course of our relations with Bangladesh has not been quite smooth since the coup that eliminated Mujib in August 1975. Lately, the government of Gen Zia ur Rehman has acquired credibility and achieved some stability. The relations between our two countries have improved and need to be further strengthened by solving the problem of sharing the water of the Ganga and demarcating the undemarcated portions of the border in Tripura and elsewhere.

The Military Threat

Pakistan and China are the two countries that have posed a military threat to India in the past. China is a mighty military power with nuclear capability. It has strained relations with a mightier military and nuclear power. Russia is China's proclaimed enemy No. 1 with whom war is inevitable according to China. Apart from this primary concern, China is pre-occupied with internal economic and political problems. The present leadership is anxious to modernise China and build it up economically. Differences between India and China have existed since the 1962 conflict, but there have been no subsequent belligerent postures. Contacts with the Chinese over the mountains are rare and only restricted operations are possible across this border. The status quo does not point to the possibility of a war. The diplomatic environment thawed in 1976, but China's punitive action against Vietnam, which was launched while our then Foreign Minister, Mr Vajpayee, was on a visit to Peking in Feb '79, meant a set back. The situation in Afghanistan has given fresh grounds for disagreement. However, these are matters for our foreign policy makers to keep within manageable proportions in the overall interest of improving our relations with China so that the possibility of military threat from that country is eliminated.

Pakistan's military government has made it a point to stress its desire to improve relations with India. At the same time it has lost no opportunity to raise the Kashmir issue. At the Islamic Conference held in Islamabad (Nov '79), Pakistan talked of 'Occupied Kashmir' necessitating a walk out by our Ambassador. Pakistan's internal instability needs a standby to distract attention. The bogey of external threat provides this standby. The issue of Kashmir is, therefore, kept alive. The younger generation in Pakistan has been encouraged to develop a phobia towards India. There has been considerable accretion to Pakistan's armed forces since the war of 1971 when the strength of Pakistan Army was 11 divisions. It is now 18 divisions (2 armoured and 16 infantry) according to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London. With military aid in the offing from USA, China, Saudi Arabia and also from European powers as a result of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, there will be further increase in its order of battle. This aid will be spread over several years and during the foreseeable future, further accretion to its military power is likely to be made. The situation on the Afghan border will stabilise in due course and the aid received by Pakistan in the meantime will be available against India. So far Pakistan's military considerations have been one-dimensional. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan has given these considerations another dimension but in the long run, the second dimension may recede into the back ground. In any case the second dimension does not remove the Indian fixation and militarily the

threat from Pakistan is live and continuing even if strategically China is of greater concern.

Bangladesh had an army of three brigades in 1972 and is now building up a force of 5 infantry divisions. (According to the Military Balance, it has raised 5 divisional headquarters, 11 infantry brigades, one tank battalion and 7 Artillery regiments.) On its own it poses no military threat, but in a war situation with Pakistan when China is in support, Bangladesh can be a thorn in our side.

It is in our interest to improve our relations with China and Pakistan as also to strengthen our ties with Bangladesh. The military threat will be reduced to the extent we can achieve this. Against this objective, since 1972 we have had to be vigilant both in the West against Pakistan and in the North against China. Further, since 1975 we have not been certain how Bangladesh would react in case of a war with Pakistan in which China is supporting Pakistan. Our armed forces have been in an unenviable position of being militarily concerned with our borders with all these three countries. With such a task, the Services Chiefs would be failing in their duty if they did not ask for the wherewithall to meet a war situation on three fronts. Pragmatically, this makes no sense. With our economic constraints, the Government is in no position to provide the required resources for such a situation. The consequence is inadequate order of battle on all fronts incapable of showing decisive results and, in the worst case, inviting ignominy. The 1971 was the only war in which India achieved a definite, decisive victory. A helpful factor was that some of the forces in the Eastern theatre, normally located for the defence of our border with China in Sikkim and Arunachal, could be used for operations in then East Pakistan due to the proximity of the theatre of operations. This would not be possible if the major conflict is on the Western theatre until we improve our relations with China. The 'Military Balance' may show an edge in the overall strength of Indian armed forces and the number of field formations in comparison with Pakistan. However, this is negated by the present requirement of several formations for the Eastern theatre, leaving at best a state of parity in the Western theatre. This situation may worsen if our relations with Bangladesh are uncertain. It is, therefore, essential for our policy makers to pursue persistently a foreign policy (which ensures that we do not have to fight a war on more than) one front. We may be able to ensure a situation in which we do not face a military threat from China or have to worry about our border with Bangladesh.

The foregoing analysis highlights differences with our neighbours which have led to or may lead to a conflict. It also examines the topography to bring out theatres which permit speedy concentration and large scale operations by mechanised forces. However, the crux of the analysis lies in the conclusion that our foreign policy should be so conducted as to end confrontation on as many fronts as possible,

Since this analysis was carried out in January 1980 and its publication in The Tribune in February, 1980 there have been certain developments in light of which it should be updated before its publication the USI journal.

West Asia

The move in of eight Soviet divisions into Afghanistan has led to a new perception of the military threat by the NATO powers. It is felt that apart from defensive plans for Europe, there should also be the capability to meet military moves in the third world. Washington is particularly concerned about the gulf and has declared that should Moscow try to gain control of it, it will meet this threat by any means including military force. As a result of this new perception, the Americans have gone in for a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). It is reported that the first units of the RDF are already cruising in the Indian Ocean and that the Pentagon plans to build up a capability of deploying a force of 300,000 within 30 days.

Both the USA and the USSR are keeping a strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean. They are negotiating for port facilities and new bases : the USA in Oman, Somalia, Kenya and Egypt apart from developing Diego Garcia in a big way and the USSR in Ethiopia and South Yemen.

South East Asia

These developments in West Asia and the Indian Ocean on top of the chronic tension in Indo-China, where the Chinese continue to support the Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge against Vietnam, have produced a critical security environment in our region. Vietnam is suspicious of its big neighbour in the North and is anxious to weld a federation under its leadership with Kampuchea and Laos as the other two members. There is also the clash of interest over South China Sea islands in view of the oceanic oil potential. China occupied the Paracels in 1974 after dislodging Saigon forces. In 1975, Hanoi sent its troops to the Spratleys which China claims as part of its historical territories. As China has the support of Washington and Vietnam has the backing of Moscow, this is in fact an extension of the super power conflict in South East Asia.

Thailand is keeping on the right side of China as otherwise it would be faced with internal insurgency by pro-Chinese Thai communists. Should it come under the effective influence of China, China's reach would extend to South Burma and Malaysia

Long-term Super-power reactions

In spite of the crises in West Asia, the tension in South, East Asia and Washington's anxiety to minimise the Soviet threat in Asia-Pacific, which has led to the development of the Washington-Beijing-Tokyo axis, the super-powers cannot afford to abandon detente. Nor can they risk direct

hostilities thanks to the balance of terror created by the nuclear weapons. The RDF, the development of bases and negotiation for new ones, the sizeable presence of the super-powers in the Indian Ocean as also the development of the Washington-Beijing-Tokyo axis are precautionary measures rather than preparation for hostilities. Neither Moscow nor Washington will take any steps that might involve them in a war. A regional conflict as a result can also be ruled out. Factors relevant to our national security will therefore continue to be over relations with our neighbours.

Pakistan

The lack of trust and confidence in relation to India that is fostered in Pakistan has been brought out in the earlier analysis. Mr M.B. Naqvi, a senior journalist of Pakistan, who spent several weeks in India this year, wrote on his return, "A majority of the Indians are viewed as not having accepted the independence of Pakistan without mental reservations. It is suspected that the Indian leadership or at least a large segment of it, would be only too happy to undo what was then seen as vivisection of mother India". He concluded that 'Akhand India will now only benefit Indian Muslims. Pakistan can be assured of continued Indian support for their survival as a distinct Islamic entity'. Nevertheless the mistrust persists. After the July visit last year of Mr Agha Shahi, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, it was agreed that steps will be taken towards confidence building measures. Little is, however, being done in this direction. On the other hand, Gen Zia ul Haq convened a high level meeting on India's alleged communalism in the wake of mid-August riots in Morarbad. Anti-India Demonstrations were held in Pakistan and Pakistan foreign office expressed serious concern over the life and property of muslims in India. The lack of stability in that country necessitates diversionary tactics. Irrespective of this, it is in our interest to normalise relations. Pakistan continues to proclaim that settlement of the Kashmir problem is an essential pre-requisite. We should consider the permanent settlement of this issue on the line of actual control.

China

Although Beijing's offer of a package deal in respect of the border dispute confirms "its earlier stand on Aksai Chin, there are other indications of desire to normalise relations. It has, for instance, let it be known that the aid given to Naga and Mizo insurgents is a thing of the past. It is also taking the line that the Kashmir issue is for India and Pakistan to settle bilaterally. Its reaction to our recognition of the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea has expectedly been adverse. The postponement of Mr Huang Hua's October visit to Delhi may not entirely be due to this and may well have been caused by the major shake up in the government

and party leadership likely to be announced by the middle of September. Our reaction to this postponement has been appropriate to let probes and talks take their own pace for the formulation of policy for normalisation.

Foreign Policy

The consideration of developments in West as well as South East Asia show that concerned as we may be with the crisis in Afghanistan, the build up in the Indian Ocean and the continuation of tension in Indo-China, it is primarily the relations with our neighbours that influence our security environments. It is in our interest to pursue a course of detente with them to reduce tension and create an atmosphere in which war is not considered as an alternative for the solution of our bilateral problems. This is obviously not a one-sided affair and results will depend on the response of our neighbours. However, the approach is clear.

FUTURE SERVICE OFFICERS— NECESSITY OF ACADEMIC EDUCATION

Dr. H.K. SRIVASTAVA, M.Sc., Ph.D.
PRINCIPAL, N.D.A., KHADAKVASLA

IN his forward to Quincy Wright's book, "A STUDY OF WAR", published in 1965, L.L. Wright made a reference, in passing, to a curious ambivalence of our times. "At a time when individuals and statesmen," he wrote, "agree that war as an instrument of national policy is 'obsolete,' military budgets are of unprecedented magnitude and every year since the advent of the nuclear bomb has witnessed armed hostilities—civil, guerilla or international." Unfortunately, far from getting resolved, this duality in our approach to war (rejection of it at the individual, rational levels and acceptance at the governmental) has deepened with the result that the global situation over the years has remained basically unaltered. While hostilities have ended in some parts of the world, notably in Viet Nam, new conflicts have erupted in others, particularly in Africa and West Asia. What is worse, notwithstanding efforts of the UNO and periodic attempts at an East-West, or more accurately, a Russo-American detente, the old pockets of war have remained at best pockets of an uneasy, fragile peace, while all the time new areas of tension have continued to be created through an insidious play of diverse forces, which have tended to explode into a violence and bloodshed" "whenever there has been an overloading or breakdown of the controlling equilibrium."¹

Yet man's stake in peace today is greater than ever before. After stating that "the problem of preventing war is one of increasing importance in our civilization," "Quincy Wright (1965) explains that the problem "is essentially one of maintaining adaptive stability within the world community, only possible if larger sections of the public persistingly view that community as a whole". In other words, what is required to prevent governments from

¹ In this context Quincy Wright has developed a basic theory of war. According to him origins of wars is in effect a four-factor model. These four factors correspond to the technological, legal, socio-political, and biological-psychological-cultural levels of human life. At each level, conflict is likely, and violent conflicts becomes probable whenever there is an overloading or breakdown of the mechanism or arrangements that have controlled the interplay of actions and actors at any level and that previously have preserved some non-violent balance or equilibrium. See pp. xiii, "Quincy Wright's contribution to the study of war", by K.W. Deutsch, in "A STUDY OF WAR" by Q. Wright, Phoenix, Ed., 1965, abridged, The University of Chicago Press.

initiating wars, is a world organization serving the needs of the world population and backed by the will and belief of the people. The stress here, it should be particularly noted, is not so much on the commitments of the governments as on the commitments, and the authority successfully to honour that commitment, of the *people* of each world community to desist from any unilateral action in pursuit of its own specific interests if these interests happen to be at variance with the general and larger interests of other world communities. For the effective functioning of such an organization of the world communities, it is incumbent that the attitudes of the people on which their expressed opinions and commitments would ultimately rest, must, as a first and fundamental step, be resolved and modified. This obviously is the task of education. Attitudes are primarily given form by education, a process by which the culture of a group is developed and passed on to the rising generation. Education procedures address themselves to the individuals and seek to influence private attitudes, thus building the individual personality and the group culture into an organic unity. Therefore, to be attuned to and meet the imperatives of peace, education of every community must support and transmit the ideals of the rational man, which in our day should encompass not only an awareness of the many forces that generate war but also the need to keep these forces at bay to avoid war and maintain peace. To achieve this important though difficult objective, a study of war in all its aspects, particularly its deadly future impact, is urgently needed. Few indeed have a full understanding and grasp of future wars; it is necessary, therefore, that all people, for their own safety and that of the generations following immediately, should know and debate the nature and consequences of future wars.

To my mind, more than others, it is the service officer whom education (with the contents suggested above) must mould into a rational man, for the simple reason that one who knows the horrors of war can alone appreciate in real sense the comforts of peace. As war has ceased to be a game played on game theory, the service officers of today, beside knowing the purely operational aspects of war, should also know its other implications, its link with society, government, culture and man as family and community. Being the man who will actually face war as a front-line combatant, he has not only to understand war in its totality for his own and his troops' welfare, but he has also to be so educated as to be able to build his attitudes and form his opinion to prevent a repetition of such devastations.

WEAPONRY AND EDUCATION—A COMPARISON BETWEEN TWO GROUPS OF POWERS

To appreciate the role that continuous and progressive education has played in the advancement of weaponry, a comparison and a comprehensive survey of the invention, development, growth and renovation of new weaponry of the two super-powers, USA and USSR and of ISRAEL and

WEST ASIAN countries is attempted. The first pair of powers show what basic and advanced sophistications have been achieved through a highly educated manpower and the second pair of power indicates how fully advanced people and the scientific manpower of one state in relation to the other makes use of renovations and to the invention of new weaponry, especially when the initial military base is, more or less, identical amongst them.

If only one considers and takes into account the new weaponry and the total war potentialities of USA and USSR, the impact of this knowledge is staggering and becomes traumatic.

Both the USA and USSR are competing with each other to invent/develop new weapons. The USA is actively involved in the development of the Trident missile-firing submarine, Cruise missiles, MARV (Manoeuvrable Re-entry Vehicle) and a new small submarine, Narwhal. The Soviet has already developed a gigantic aircraft called the Great Sea Monster, which is the largest aircraft in the world, weighs 500 tons, has a speed of 350 mph, flies about 20-50 ft above water and makes 2-3 days flights extending as far as 7,000 miles. It may prove ominous to the US Polaris/Poseidon/Trident missile carrying submarines. This aircraft and the cruise missiles appear to be one of the factors for the breakdown of the SALT talks, their 'weapon-value' therefore is of a very high order.

To the above can be added certain devices that are computerised or electronically controlled and which are available in nuclear and non-nuclear forms. ADM (Atomic Demolition Munition) can make huge craters to block mountain passes, restrict communication routes, deny vital routes to the enemy or 'channel' enemy forces for attacking purposes with nuclear war heads. The "neutronemitter" device delivers a "neutron dose" to make an individual "very ill and incapacitated in a very short time". The dose will prove lethal within a day or so. According to R.D. English and Bolef (1973) the ground-based radars SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment) and BUIC (Buck-Up Interceptor Control) of the NORAD (North American Air Defence Command) are being replaced by AWACS (Airforce Warning and Control System) aircrafts, the latter will fly at 30,000 ft and can survey the sky from ground level to about 60,000 ft and have range double that of ground-based radars which have a limit of 200 miles due to the curvature of the earth. AWACS aircraft also have IFF (Identification : Friend or Foe) transmitter and receiver. The utility of AWACS is being enhanced by the development of a new long-range, ground-based radar, the OTH-B (Over the Horizon Backscatter). The OTH-Forward scatter radar is already in position in Japan, Taiwan, Philippines. Two units one "looking" east and the other west will generate signals which will be reflected by the ionosphere over the USSR and will be detected by the receivers. Any activity in the intervening atmosphere of USSR airspace, for example, the launching of a volley of missiles or a fleet of bombers, will produce an "OTH-Signature" on the signals and will be detected.

The attacking potentialities of the super-powers are now geared and hitched to MRV, MIRV, MARV, and SLBM, the abbreviations, in the order mentioned, stand for Multiple Re-entry Vehicle, Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle, Manoeuvrable Re-entry Vehicle, and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile. MRV's warheads are launched as a unit on a chosen trajectory to a single target, but they merely scatter war heads over the target area. MIRVs are aimed at separate targets or any one target on different trajectories. York (1973) states that it is better able to penetrate the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) system. It is an effective "counterforce" weapon and can destroy a large part of retaliatory forces if used in a surprise attack. It is most destructive to the strategic balance, can upset the "Balance of terror", and threaten the deterrent on which national security is based. Its "yield" (explosive power), "throw weight" (destructive effects), "blast over pressure" (circular area of specific degree of damage), and "circular error probable" (a measure of accuracy) are being refined to a high degree. MARVs are also launched into space aboard a post-booster control system, or "bus", but unlike the MIRV, once they re-entered the atmosphere, however, they would be able to change course repeatedly to avoid interception. According to Carter (1974) the MARV in addition to the manoeuvring mechanism would also require a guidance system in the warhead which will be capable of assuming the control of the weapon's trajectory after it had left the "bus". Two kinds of MARVs are evolved. The "homing" or the "True" MARV and a "Terminally Guided" MARV that would rely on a comparatively straight-forward, on-board sensor capable of acquiring an image of image of the target area or prominent terrain features. SLBMs are submarine launched missiles and are similar to MIRV in principle but carry many more warheads, the submarine Trident II, to 24 MIRVs.

This is not the end. Add to these such electronic devices as ECM (Electronic counter measure) which will give radar "a bad case of schizophrenia," and will fool enemy radar into "seeing" a plane in the sky some distance away from where it actually is. USA bombers and fighter planes were surrounded with 'electronic bubbles' to give them a high degree of protection against missiles and anti-aircraft fire in Viet Nam. Some 'Counter-counter measure' devices in possession of the Soviets deal with bogus echoes from an ECM-equipped plane. Recently in the Mediterranean a Soviet destroyer came so close to a US ship that the sailors on deck could see it, yet the electronic fog thrown by the Russian destroyer was so dense that the US radar was blinded. HARM (High-speed anti-radar missile) will have its own computers to enable it to ride the radar bases of such missiles as SAM-6s' ground-based control and home in on the launch sites. ELINT (Electronic Intelligence) gathers information without human intervention. The US navy has a world wide dispersed network of unmanned detectors that have "ears" so sharp that they can pick the hum of a submarine's propellers and pinpoint its location. Likewise, the "Big-Bird"

satellite of the US airforce circles the earth and constantly scans the surface below with radars, cameras, and electronic sensors that are so effective that they were able to follow the movements of individual tanks across the Sinai desert during the 1973 war. A battery of "Vela" satellites that carry infra-red, X-ray, Gamma-ray, and Cosmic-ray detectors can pick up the reverberations of a nuclear test anywhere on the earth, or the moon.

To the above should be added the laser-guided artillery, laser-targeting, and laser bombs. Every day new devices are being developed, like self-propelled AA missile system, Panavia 200 Multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) which can penetrate a 100-km wall of anti-aircraft fire, BL-755 cluster bombs, "Ptarmigan" communicating system enabling person-to-person telephone service between units, either stationary or mobile, anywhere in the combat zone through ultra high frequency and very high frequency radio-links. Many more radar devices have been discovered for a unit or a single soldier for purposes of enemy detection. LESB (Laser controlled electronic stimulation of brain) can evoke in selected areas of the brain centers joy, fear, hate, etc., without external stimuli or replacement of electrodes. LIDAR, similar to radar, detects and measures the distance between the targets. CL (Chemiluminescence) is a new device which converts chemical energy directly to light without heat. It can be used, in addition to other uses, to detect approaching vessels without electro-magnetic detectors. Electro-magnetic guns are being used to control insect pests lying buried up to 2 ft in earth. The day is not far when these can be developed for uses of defence and offence and would then obviate the use of the bullets.

Turning now to the relative weaponry of Israel and West Asian countries the whole impact of education on the overall state of the 'health' of the state in all its aspects—military, economic and industrial—becomes very, apparent. Merely possession of wealth and the purchasing capabilities by a state do not in any way give it any military advantage or cause an overall all-aspect development of it.

During the 1973 conflict, as per published reports,¹ it was presumed that the military equipment of both Israel and the West Asian countries was roughly equal in sophistication and destructive power, although the Arab's equipment was newer. It was also surmised by the strategists that Israel compensated for its numerical inferiority by the superior discipline, education, and training of its troops and expert maintenance of the equipment. Israeli pilots using US built F-4 Phantoms and Skyhawks and the French Mirages invariably and every time outmanoeuvred Egyptian and Syrian airforce using the Russian made SU-7 fighter bombers and MIG-21 interceptors. Moreover, Israeli troops used Patton and Centurian tanks more effectively than the Arabs using the Russian T-54 and T-55s. Surface-

¹ Time, Oct. 15, 1973, pp. 8.

Time, Oct. 22, 1973, pp. 13.

Time, Oct. 29, 1973, pp. 17.

to-Surface missiles were not much used but Israel did sink four of the Syrian's Soviet-built Komar missile boats by made-in Israel radar-guided Gabriel missiles proving Israeli mastery and skill in missile use by its navy. Israel was thought to have low-yield nuclear arsenal in the kiloton range that could be delivered by specially adapted Israeli airforce planes in case of extreme necessity. The SA-6 Soviet-built missiles used by the Egyptians were the nemesis of the Israeli airforce. In addition, Egypt also successfully employed Soviet built Snapper and Sagger anti-tank rockets against Israeli armour. Israel on the other hand had deployed the US perfected Sidewinder air-to-air heat-seeking missiles, an air-to-air missile called the Sparrow, the TV camera carrying Smart rockets, Maverick. Israel also used French-designed, Israel-modified, wire-guided missiles and simple bazooka-type weapons with warheads designed by Israelis.

Israel has moved towards independence by manufacturing her own war equipment. The Kfir (Lion Cub) plane has been dubbed as a "fighter pilot's dream". The Gabriel, a ship-to-ship missile; the Shafrir, an air-to-air missile; the Luz, an air-to-ground missile; the Zeev, a ground-to-ground missile; and the Jericho, a surface-to-surface missile are all Israel-made. Israel also turns out boats, the Reschif missile boat and the Dabur patrol boat are two such boats. UZI submachine gun, Galil all purpose assault rifle, several hundred types of ammunition, anti-aircraft guns, and the future 40 ton tank, Sabar, are all being or going to be produced by the Israelis indigenously¹. Their latest new mobile 155 mm gun, firing 4-5 shells a minute is reported to be the best in the world of its type. Israel is pushing its weapon production at a fast rate and has already added Anti-terrorist tank, laser fusion and laser isotope separation techniques for future defence purposes.

Israel, moreover, is well advanced in nuclear technology. Since the late 1950s, the atomic reactor at Dimona in the Negev desert is providing enough fissionable material over the past ten years to build at least one Hiroshima-size bomb annually. It is supposed that Israel has a nuclear arsenal of about 13 nuclear bombs. If Israel goes ahead with its ambitious plans for a Nuplex sea-water desalination plant, the PU-239 by-product could be used for more than 50 nuclear bombs each year.²

Egypt is seeking the help of USA to build a reactor which can produce PU-239 annually for about ten nuclear bombs. Their use, however, will depend on whether Egypt has the "firing know-how".

Thus one can surmise that the military weaponry of a country can only develop to a, or rather any, desired sophistication, when the country has reached a particular level of education of its people and in particular of service personnel as well. Wealth and purchasing capabilities can merely hire brains (as in the case of Saudi Arabia, Vinnell Corporation of Alhambra,

¹ Newsweek, April 28, 1975, pp. 26.

² Time, Sept. 9, 1974, pp. 9.

California, has hired trainers and instructors to Saudi armed forces) for a short duration without growth and development of a long-term impact on the state. What education has made Israel in achieving in such a short period of time is, and should be, an eye-opener and is a strong convincing evidence in this regard. The arms race is directly linked to the economic, industrial, and scientific manpower growths, and the maker, so to say, of the dream come true is "EDUCATION".

Conservative vs. Neo-Value of Higher Education : An Inhibitory Block

The reason for considering the academic education of the officer cadre is that defence forces more than any other organised body of men, need leaders, especially in difficult field operations where time and again it has been established that it is the leadership of the officer that has turned defeat into victory, howsoever small it might have been. The 1973 Yom Kippur war proved that there is no substitute for officers (hence leadership) despite the advances of technology and electronics.

The academic aspect of a service officer's overall training is viewed in different countries with different concepts. For most of the nations the academic education of an officer revolves around : (a) his ability to read, write, comprehend and communicate in a gentlemanly way, (b) his ability to draft reports and papers, and (c) his ability to understand for himself and explain to the men under him the instructions pertaining to and use of the equipment. Thus a minimum education, more or less, up to an undergraduate level, has been found sufficient for him. I shall call it the "MINIMUM USE CONCEPT." However, for all advanced nations academic education for the officer cadre has assumed distinct values. For them it is an essential and inescapable aspect of training : (a) to master the principles of basic and advanced knowledge of scientific achievements, (b) to develop skills and potentialities for "creating" knowledge, and (c) to create propensities for higher learning. I call this the "MAXIMUM USE CONCEPT". Under this, based on his sound graduate level knowledge, an officer is permitted, encouraged, and goaded to pursue higher or post-graduate level studies as a service officer, while under the former an officer merely undergoes professional-knowledge courses run by the services (mostly without a sound basic knowledge and background). The "minimum use concept" has been practised and perpetuated not because of dearth of capable men in the officer cadre but because of certain fears and acquired inhibitions in the higher military echelons covering, on the one hand, perhaps unconsciously, their own inadequacies which create phobias of an inevitable fall in discipline and a corresponding increase in back-talk, disobedience, etc., and, on the other hand, revealing a long habituation to a particular set of service mores and modes. To this in time have been added other notions, for example, ultimately a soldier has to fire a gun, so what good is a good education going to do him and, as a corollary to this, the belief that a well

educated soldier makes a poor soldier, only a fighting typesoldier can become a successful general and above. Also, an establishment of a clanship and a kind of tribal solidarity has come about by repeated brain-washing of the officer that he is far superior to his civilian counterparts and, therefore, must keep away from him—rather the “bloody” civilians. This cognitive reflex has harmed the services and the outlook of the service officer to a far greater degree and has been an impediment to his advancement, individually and collectively. However, of late the technological advancement in weaponry has caused an awareness of the absolute need for sound academic education and of the recognition that the profession of arms is linked intimately with the other professions of a country.

Hence, every nation, even the smallest, now aspires to create a military academy. The importance of a military academy was perhaps best recognised by the Americans. Washington, in 1797, in his message to the Congress,¹ said :

“The institution of military academy is also recommended by congenit reasons. However, pacific the general policy of a nation may be, it ought never to be without a stock of military knowledge for emergencies . . . (The art of war) demands much previous study, and . . . (knowledge of that art) . . . in its most improved and perfect state is always of great moment to the security of a nation...”

The US military academy has contributed to the national scientific growth. Henry Adams in his History of the US offers the tribute that American scientific engineering.....“owed its efficiency and almost its existence to the military school at West Point established in 1802”. Excellence of character and excellence of knowledge, the two integrating qualities of leadership, have been the motto of the American Academy and also of all others. Scholars have been produced by such academies. Albert A. Michelson, a Noble Laureate, was the product of the US Naval Academy, about whose work A. Einstein noted that inspiration for his theory of relativity came directly from Michelson's work. Profound writing on Sea Power by Mahan is still the world standard in its field. Astronauts Shepard, Schirra, Lovell and Stafford are all products of the US Naval Academy.²

In his article, “THE INDIAN ARMY ON A NUCLEAR BATTLE-FIELD”, under the sub-title, “New Types Of Officer”, Ravi Rikhye (1974) wrote that “a B.Sc. will come to be considered minimum degree for an officer. For promotion to top grades, one day perhaps even a doctorate will be required”. It is common knowledge that university students are privates in Israeli army. Naturally, therefore, before directing such a private, an officer has to explain the purpose, pros and cons of an attack to be carried out. Where the officer class is not used to justifying or

¹ U. S. Military Academy, West Point, Calender, 1967-68, pp. 3.

² U. S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Calender, 1967-68, pp. 3.

explaining their aims and believes in "you are not to reason why, you are but to do or die," in," troubles generally arise. To quote Ravi Rikhye (*ibid*) again the US army for Viet Nam had to draft B.A.s and M.A.s as riflemen. When the officer was stupider than his men, as was often the case, the men had a simple solution. Wait for the next fight and shoot him in the back."

It is time, therefore, that academic education for a future service officer be so structured that he may not remain stupider than the men he would lead. It is essential that the education of a future officer cadre changes from the "minimum use concept" to the "maximum use concept" and he is imparted, on the one hand, to meet the technological advances in weapons and the techniques of war, basic and advanced education in Physical, Earth, Life Sciences, Computer Sciences, Electronics, Astronautics, Mathematics and Behavioral Sciences, and at one stage or the other a comprehensive course in Engineering, and on the other hand, core and basic education in national socio-economical and socio-political systems and in international relations. Various permutations and combinations in this core list can be made and addition of electives and advanced courses within the academy and/or in association with the institution of higher learning of the nation incorporated. The major and main factor to bear in mind is that denial of higher education must never takes place at any one time in the career of the service officer. In the first eight years of active service, a service officer of the now developing countries must have at least one recognised M.A./M.Sc. level academic education in any field of his choice or interest, simultaneously with the advanced and purely professionally-oriented service training of his arm. In latter training, knowledge of associated or collateral disciplines is inescapable and can be given through "high frequency" courses as for foreign languages. This is nothing new. A Ph.D. student in the USA has to undergo basic and advanced courses related to the field of his research and unless he obtains above-average grades in these courses he is not allowed to submit his dissertation. Admiral S.N. Kohli, PVSM, former Chief of the Naval Staff of the Indian Navy, in his Graduation Address to the graduates of the NDA in 1973, mentioned that "in a nuclear submarine of the US Navy every hand is either an M.Sc., or a Ph.D". Therefore, there is no incompatibility between academic education, intelligence and the fighting ability. Even at the risk of repeating, the so-called fears of increasing indiscipline, back-talk, disobedience. etc., are a figment of the minds of a handful of military brasses who are still perambulating in the abyss of bygone military blissfulness prevalent under foreign domination. It is this legacy of the colonial British and French and the like that divorced the profession of arms from all other professions of a country and todate has prevented a true national integration of the services with other professions. The techno-electronic era, the nuclear weaponry and the shakyness of the military and the political leadership at different starta to meet the future

wars have, at last, brought about an awakening of oneness, and the indentification of inter-disciplinary approaches so necessary in all avenues and for all available men within the country without pride and prejudice.

Mechanics of Academic Education for the Services : A Conflict of Approach

Separate military academies have been established for the Army, Navy and Air Force for pure academic and service training in practically all countries. In India peripheral and preliminary core academic education is given to cadets of all the three services in one defence academy, and the advanced professional training of the respective arms in each of the three service academies. The Indian system of core academic education in one academy for all the cadets of the three services has been much appreciated. The period of academic training differs in different academies of different countries but minimum educational standards for entry into the academy revolves around 10/11 years of schooling.

It is not so much the duration of stay or the age of entry in the academy that matters but the qualitative and quantitative degree of courses offered and the extent to which the mental potentialities of a cadet are permitted to develop. The US Naval Academy has a core curriculum of 34 course plus a system of minor and major elective programmes totalling 250. The US Airforce Academy in addition to core subjects, offers 28 major elective programmes and the US Military Academy at West Point offers 20 elective programmes in addition to a large number of courses under Basic Sciences, Applied Sciences, Engineering, Languages and Literature, and National Security and Public Administration. In all the US academies the ratio of "Academics" to "Command & Military Training" to "Physical Education and Athletics" comes to about 7 : 2 : 1, and a cadet is engaged from 8 to 8½ hours (approx.) per day, Monday through Friday, in class or self-study.

If one surveys the courses available in the academies of the advanced nations one is amazed at their variety and catholicity. In addition to all the Natural Sciences, Literature of own and related countries, Foreign Languages, Sociology, Political Science, Philosophy, Fine Arts, History and numerous related subdisciplines, new and modern disciplines are added at each examination of the curricula and programmes of academics. It is indeed a pity that a rigidity of curricula is still practised in many academies of the now developing countries.¹ Had it been merely a case of finance, it could be understood. But, when it is only a case of obstinate adherence to a practice once initiated, it becomes depressing and disheartening. Knowledge can be imparted but wisdom is acquired. It is wisdom to become wise in time of the hard realities of the coming future, a future so well predicted and

¹In this connection the Educational Philosophy of the USA,

known. No country can "survive" unless it creates and generates within itself men and material for progress and its continuation and stability, and it becomes doubly important so far as military is concerned because a minimum of a decade is required for any kind of preparedness—men or material. Majority of nations still hesitate due to their customary approaches without realising that once the gates of knowledge are opened, the knowledgeable themselves will create avenues, ways and means for its proper application and absorption. As an illustration, one can draw inspiration and satisfaction from the fact that almost all the fauna and flora of India was documented by British service officers during their stay on active service in India and subsequently after retirement. Can one say that because of their interests in Botany and Zoology they were poor soldiers? Likewise anthropology, sociology, geology and other sciences owe a lot to service officers of the past for the base on which the advances of today have been developed.

Future Service Officer and People, Government and Peace

I do not think it is improper and out of place to call a soldier a kind of messiah. No state and its statesmen can do without the advice of its highest soldier. The role that the highest soldier plays in moulding the affairs of a state is not acknowledged in public—an unfortunate but necessary fundamental governmental process and convention. But the misfortune is that quite a few statesmen do not realize and comprehend how important an actor the highest soldier is in the drama of state affairs and why he must be an expert in knowledge through books and wisdom, through practice and experience. It is therefore considered desirable to explain at some length and in detail the role of the highest soldier and why ultimately his pre-commission and post-commission academic training is inescapable and essential and has to be *par excellence* in many disciplines. I have here taken only one aspect, 'Balance of Power' because it is so commonly talked about but there are many aspects where the esoteric knowledge of the highest soldier is required in the affairs of the state as well as of the military.

Earlier it was stated that because a service officer is well-acquainted with war, he must also be well-versed to link up war and its impact on society, government, cultures and communities. Who can better advice the statesmen of the country regarding 'Balance of Power' and 'Policies for war and peace' than the senior soldiers of the state? All the states of the world are now actively involved in maintaining a 'Balance of Power' and are evolving their policies to it, even at the cost of the welfare of its people. Wars are blamed mostly on the imbalances in the 'Balance of Power' between the states. In the static sense, a 'Balance of Power' is a condition which accounts for the co-existence of independent governments in contact with one another. In the dynamic sense, a 'Balance of Power' characterises the policies adopted by governments to maintain that condition (Q. Wright,

ibid). The term 'Balance of Power' is based on two assumptions. One, that the relative political power can be measured and observed and, second, that governments have a tendency to go for increase of power ostensibly for self-preservation. Just as change in wealth is evidence of change in economic power, transfer of territory is the most significant evidence of change in political power. When motivation of self-preservation keeps in bound the desire for increase of power, all governments continue to be independent. Any departure from this equilibrium tends to institute and accelerate the process of conquest. The latest proclamation of the USA of the shift of their foreign Policy with respect to distant states thus assumes tremendous significance, because now the USA will practise 'Balance of Power' policies according to the regions and the states present within that region. In other words, a dynamic 'Balance of Power' approach will be practised. USA being a democratic nation cannot carry out many of its activities overtly while practising dynamic 'Balance of Power' policies but a totalitarian country has never, and will never, hesitate to create situations where one country next to the other in a small region may cause a major upsetting of 'Balance of Power'. The underlying basic and significant issue involved here is where does power lie? With the people or with the Government to enable nations to pursue certain policies. There are conflicting opinions about this. Oppenheim believes that real power lies with the state and its military strength. Charles E. Merriam, David Humes, A. Hamilton, Lincoln, H.D. Lasswell and Machiavelli believe that it lies with the people. How important thus becomes the proper education of a service officer. Can a service officer educated with the "minimum use concept" possess the genius and acumen of analysis to evaluate such subtle differences and such important factors for the state as mentioned above?

The entire drama of Israel-Arab conflict and the role of super-powers (in not only preserving their interests but also augmenting their relative power) is based on 'Balance of Power'. Thus when the probability of war or peace at a given moment depends upon the stability of 'Balance of Power', who but the well-read, best-educated general can understand the assumptions upon which such an equilibrium depends, namely motives and capacities of states, the measurability of their power and separation, and the intelligence of the statesmen? It is he who will guide the statesmen, basing his judgement on the analysis of the relationships between variable factors of the 'Balance of Power' and certain conclusions drawn from the analysis. It would be naive, therefore, to presume that a statesman alone, without the correct and carefully arrived advice from his military advisors can assess the full implications of military, political and social problems. Where they do or ignore the advice, the country goes to doom, as was the case between Rommel and Hitler in the last war. But can military advisors give sound and correct advice unless they are well-versed in the affairs of arms as well as political futurology? Who but the military advisors can guide the statesmen of their country about the

futility of pursuing 'Balance of Power' policies after the advent of nuclear weaponry and development of intercontinental missiles? It is a military advisor's responsibility to advise that a government cannot at the same time behave according to the Machiavellian assumption of the 'Balance of Power' and the Wilsonian assumptions of international organization and this they can do only if the military has men who understand wars and world affairs and can derive logical conclusions from them. Only the best educated military advisor can understand that the "underdog" policy tends towards the perpetuation of 'Balance of Power', the "discriminatory" policy towards collective security, the "bandwagon" policy towards the absorption of all in a universal empire, and the "isolationist" policy may encourage aggression. Presumably the large and decisive contributions of the learned generals of this country in policy making has lead India to adopt the "neo-neutrality" policy, partially to abandon "non-alignment," to refute impartiality and passivity as the essence of neutrality, to determine to remain out of the "collective psychosis" of war and to slide down even from the partial non-alignment policy. The basic issue is, can India and like countries still survive in future in a progressive techno-electronic atmosphere (or on today's international status) by persisting in current approaches and practices in the education and training of the future service officers of the armed forces? US Airforce Academy has aptly engraved on the pedestal of its emblem the eternal message for its men which reads "MAN'S FLIGHT THROUGH LIFE IS SUSTAINED BY THE POWER OF HIS KNOWLEDGE".

For India to survive as a democracy it is highly essential that its future officers of the services are academically educated to the highest level and through the most progressive methods and outlook within the resources of the state, so that they may not only advise the statesmen in war and peace but also be able to equip themselves through experience and training in the affairs of the world, state and humanity at large.

Education and Defence : A View Point

So far my efforts have been to lay a foundation about the necessity of academic education of the future service officers from various aspects. The comparison between the two super-powers and between Israel and West Asian countries showed how the overall economic, industrial, military and scientific manpower of a country depends on education and how the latter can bring about tremendous transformations within the state. Why a service officer has to have education entirely different from that is normally imparted to his fellow countrymen. What ultimate role a service officer has to play.

It is, therefore, now essential to examine what changes in values and concepts in military, political and social thinking have come about due to modern techno-electronic civilization and does the academic education of

future service officers need a recasting in a now developing country—both from future survival and future international status point of view? Also, is it not essential to revamp the academic education of the future service officer to meet the challenges of the future defences which have ceased to be only purely military?

It has become a common knowledge these days that country after country is going with a begging bowl to arms supplying nations. Also, the leaders of less developed countries have through speeches and writings created an atmosphere of necessity for acquisition of weapons.

The insatiable desire to possess weapons has not evolved without any reasons. The techno-electronic civilization has simultaneously changed its time honoured values and concepts in military, political and social thinking. However, the ultimate drives to war have not changed, only augmented, and new techniques have widened the gap between the objectives of the leaders and the attitudes of the people. Therefore, we find today that the stronger the nation, the more warlike the state, the greater the size of the armed forces, more human and economic cost to war preparedness, both absolute and relative to the population, increased belief in the shortening of wars, and in the proportions of war years to peace years. There is also an increasing trend towards an increase in length of battles and the total number of battles, as well as increase in the belligerents in a battle.¹

The first few decades of the 20th century also have brought about a cumulative change in the development of military techniques. With the development of new weapons, professionalization of armies first took place, and it led to capitalization of war, and since 1914, to totalitarianization of war. Thus we find today that every nation is indulging in mechanization of war machinery, increasing the size of armed forces, militarization of population (the armed forces have ceased to be a self-contained service apart from the general population), and nationalization of war efforts. As a result, the modern view has veered to a total war (with greatly increased destructiveness of all modern weapons and the breakdown of the distinction between the armed forces and the civilians in military operations), on intensification of operations in time and their extension in space. If Machiavelli expounded the art of using superior preparedness, a reputation for ruthlessness and threat of war for bloodier victory, the present war lords are practising it.

The general concept of war, according to some writers on modern strategy, is no longer to disarm the enemy by destroying or capturing his fortifications and armed forces but to evade them and to strike directly at

¹ In this connection Chapter III "Modern Warfare" and Chapter XXIV "The Prevention of War" from the book of Q. Wright may be referred for a better and greater exposition, and also the various writings of Clausewitz and Vernon Kellogg.

the government, economic nerve centers and morale of the enemy. Advocates of "finite deterrence who threaten the enemies cities, and those of "Counterforce strategy" threatening only his retaliatory capacities, argue the same points in the nuclear age but with the difference that the object is said to be deterrence of war rather than victory in war.

The anthropologist Malinowski wrote even before the atomic age that, "...modern warfare has become nothing but an unmitigated disease of civilization". To check the unmitigated disease from running its course through the civilization, prophylactic measures in the form of defence are conceived of, proposed and made to become 'required' by governments and their spokesmen but without any comment upon how not to enter into a war. Defences are, therefore, inescapable. But then what defences can there be in this age ?

In a classical sense DEFENCE IS AN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE DENIAL OF TERRITORY TO AN ATTACKER. This is perhaps the most classical, though incomplete, in the modern sense, concept of defence. The techno-electronic era has added many dimensions to defence and the concept has grown much larger than the classical concept—it has reached a state where any particular definition would fall short for a puritinal mind. Be that as it may, two new factors of this age in relation to defence have become very vital without excluding the various purely military factors.

Of these factors one is that it is not always necessary to physically attack for gains of territory, yet the purpose of winning a population can be achieved. Political enslavement, ie, the conceptual winning of the people of a land to a political concept is pursued as a policy by a few states. Each and every nation today erects its defences against this as well. In addition to defence for territory and politico-philosophy, the second new factor, the migration of population, against which defences are yet to be devised for all future years to come, has already achieved draconian dimensions. This new concept, the migration of populations, which is a natural phenomenon¹, has gained recognition in very recent times

¹ Migration of populations and its impact on war has been considered but without derivation of guiding principles so far as conduct of war is concerned. The zoogeographical LAW OF DOMINANCE is based on population dynamics and migration of animals. It has been scientifically proved to be universal in occurrence. In a nutshell the Law of Dominance implies that the population living within a particular territorial boundary commences migration after a particular population density factor has been reached within the original territory, in addition to extreme environmental and climatological factors. The migrants are always and invariably endowed with characteristics in variance with original population of its own territory in certain respects and therefore *capable of adaptation* in the new territory, and capable of *leaving a progeny* in the new territory. If the migrants have characteristics and genetic endowment better than and superior to the population of the adopted territory, the migrants and their progeny flourish in the new territory and given the time slowly, but surely, replace or complete

only, perhaps due to population explosion and mostly due to internal disturbances in a state or states leading to migration of populations. Since migration is instinctive and is linked to 'SURVIVAL,' it will remain. No defences are known up to date against migratory alien population. A nation has to erect defences to guard against eventualities. Incidentally, racial discrimination by countries is entirely different and has no relationship with the migratory phenomenon mentioned here.

The defence of geographical boundaries is well known and well established as a science. The defence against an invasion of politico philosophical doctrine is, however, still in an embryonic state and is without well laid and established principles. Once erosion by another political doctrine starts within a population, it slowly permeates it making, like a wood borer deep inroads in a solid block of population and suddenly the entire

annihilate the original population of that territory. This cycle repeats itself, ie, progeny after progeny of the original migrants replacing the original remaining population. Thus we find that every niche of the earth is populated by some kind of living organism. Man is an animal and this basic and inherent trait of migration has not been eradicated from his genetic endowment inspite of agricultural, spiritual, cultural, and techno-electronic revolutions and it is doubtful if even bio-engineering will succeed here.

Quincy Wright (*ibid*) did consider survival and population in his "A Study of War" but without one of the basic conditions of Darwin, the capability of a species of leaving a progeny and his emphasis on Malthusian conception of survival is not now accepted. With the rise of 2.5% of world population per year, population migration will become a normal phenomenon in a few years to come and its impact on the future wars is bound to be positive and definite. In addition to it, rapid increase of population, in a small country in particular, causes numerous internal disturbances and conflicts within the state as well as between Military Academy is worth studying. This philosophy should act as a guide for every country. The philosophy, in excerpts, is given below :

".....Since it is the only institution of higher learning, its philosophy of education is unique. The Military Academy must produce enlightened military leaders of strong moral fibre whose minds are creative, critical, and resourceful. The academic curriculum and military training encourages logical analysis, clear and concise expression of considered views, and independent thought and action along with a readiness, developed within the frame-work of military discipline, to carry out orders without reservations once a decision has been made".

"The total curriculum is designed to develop those qualities of character, intellect, and physical competence needed by the officer who is prepared to lead the smallest combat unit or to advise the highest governmental council . . ."

"... The increasing complexity of the world scene requires constant adaptation by the military profession and by the institutions which prepare its leaders. But while adapting itself to the changing world, the Academy must continue to emphasize the devotion to Duty, Honour, and Country

¹ The neighbouring states and, as a result, a large-scale exodus of population to neighbouring and distant states takes place (East Pakistan, Viet Nam, Laos, etc. are some recent examples). In years to come both these factors will assume significant dimensions, and there is likelihood of more and more "Bush Wars" or "Proxy Wars" in place of world conflict or violence.

population becomes so plastic that it not only overthrows its original popular government but readily installs a new government dominated by the new political thought which was completely alien to it till then. Recent times have shown it happens in more than one country. Hence it will be naive to ignore the defence preparedness against invasion of alien political philosophy and it is desirable that the evolution of right principles, after a serious and deep thinking, takes place at the earliest.

“War is a necessary evil,” wrote Ruskin, and per se defence is, therefore also a necessary evil (for survival) for a population for a given territory “National defence/security is freedom,” says AVM M.B. Naik, the last commandant of NDA, which in other words is survival. DEFENCE THEN IS AN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF TERRITORY TO AN AGGRESSOR, ESTABLISHMENT OF IMMUNITY TO AN ALIEN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, AND A BARRIER TO MIGRATORY ALIEN POPULATION.

Since defence is for the survival of a given population of a given territory, it devolves upon both the population and the government of that territory to evolve a policy based on empirical factors to devise and erect its defences. Naturally, therefore, defence acquisitions will depend upon a few main factors, namely, close neighbours, distant neighbours, internal resources, the socio-political climate, economy and the manpower of the country. Nevertheless, there are certain basic factors which each and every country and its government has to have if defence is (as it must be) erected or evolved either as a “counterforce” or “finite deterrence” or in some other form and purpose.

For the techno-electronic age J.R. Schlesinger “Counterforce” programme, though a heatedly debated issue, carries the basic formulations for MILITARY DEFENCE programme for a country. For politico-philosophical and for migration of population nations have to plan according to their geographical locations and other political relations on the outline skeleton given below :

A. Defence Against Military Invasion : (An adoption of J.R. Schlesinger “Counterforce” programme).

1. A capability of an assured, large, multi-variant, and survival capacity to neutralize a massive surprise attack.
2. A capability to tear through enemy defence with an ability to maintain, at all times and for a long period a destructive reserve.
3. A capability of ‘warning’ and ‘alarm’ system to safeguard defence facilities, and also the capability of ‘command-control’ direction of defence and counter offences.
4. A capability to enable the warlords a wide range of options, including retaliatory, in response to actions of the enemy.
5. A capability of offensive and defensive nature that the enemy may

- perceive and realize as equivalent to, if not greater than, his own.
6. A capability to pursue for a long extended period of time dynamic defence programme in a controlled and selective fashion.
 7. A capability to establish a reputation that nothing is developed, created, or acquired with an aim of first-strike disarming attack.

B. Defence Against Politico-Philosophical Invasion

1. A capability to raise a well literate mass of population.
2. A capability to erect sound base of fiscal and agricultural economy.
3. A capability to establish a well balanced industrial foundation.
4. A capability to maintain a programme of politico-philosophical concept voluntarily acceptable to the population, without monolithic overtones.

C. Defence Against Migration of Population and Alien Migratory Population

1. A capability to absorb the brain-power within the national limits.
2. A capability to absorb the emigrants without disturbing the gene flow of the natural population of the nation.
3. A capability to maintain a liberal but balanced eugenic programme.

One may question how the three kinds of defences relate to the education of a service officer ? If education is considered in the narrowest sense, the responsibility for politico-philosophical and population migration defences devolves upon the statesmen of the state. But can there be a successful military defence if the military chiefs remain ignorant or divorced from the socio-economic and socio-political atmosphere prevailing in the state as well as outside it ? Obviously the answer is no. The three defences are inter-linked and interdependent and therefore educating a service officer for military defence, irrespective of the theory on which a state may plan its military defence, also involves educating him for the other two defences as well.

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ARMED FORCES IN CIVIL AID/SOCIAL SERVICE

MAJ. M. SUMAN

"Military forces have always constituted a drain upon the human and material resources of a nation. They produce nothing, consume much and make no direct contribution to the progress of the national community."

Maj. Robert L. Burke

"The idea of soldiers doing farming is repugnant to the principles of soldiership, destructive to the Service and disgraceful to those who indulge in it".

Gen. James Wilkinson

INTRODUCTION

The above two statements reflect two dynamically opposite schools of thought. The present day wars are short and intense. Every nation has to maintain large standing armed forces. There are long periods of peace in between the wars. The armed forces utilize these periods to train and prepare themselves for the next inevitable bout.

A large number of people feel that the expenditure on armed forces during peace is a waste of scarce national resources and a drain on the exchequer. They suggest constructive participation of the armed forces in productive and development work. Others, however, feel that the armed forces should be left alone to fulfil their primary role.

"Every army is but a part of its own people", said General Guenther Blumentritt. No army can stay away from national activity. It has to participate. But the question is—"What can be the system and extent of this participation?" The aim of this paper is to critically analyse the scope and extent of the armed forces' participation in civic aid/social service. Counter insurgency and maintenance of law and order, though inherent to all armed forces, also have a bearing on civic action activities.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Ancient Period

Armies have always been expensive. Maximizing their utility, minimizing their cost and keeping their soldiers gainfully occupied in times of peace has always been a problem, even for the Ancients.

During the Chandragupta period (321-297 BC), examination of roads, bridges, wells and rivers was the job of the army. The Nubians in the army of old Egypt built some of that country's most time honoured monuments. The Incan Army put down roads, irrigation systems and colonies in old Peru. A major portion of the Great Wall of China was built by three lakh soldiers under General Meng Tien.

The US Army performed engineering, scientific, medical, road building and agricultural activities of use to civilians during the early settlement of their West.

The Present Times

In present day China, Mao's dictum, "There is no profound difference between the farmer and the soldier," is prevalent. During the summer, whole formations move out to help with the harvest and for a few weeks in the year, over half the regular army is so engaged. Many formations spend more time on productive labour than on field training. In 1964, army run farms reportedly accounted for 20 per cent of the total grain output of Sinkiang Province.

In Russia, soldiers take direct part in general production; they build houses, bridges and roads. The civic action programme is controlled through 'Shefstvo'. Its work falls into three general categories ie agriculture, technical assistance and miscellaneous.

Israel has specialised in civic action to an exceptionally high level and is presently imparting training in civic action to a large number of Latin American and African countries.

In India

The Indian Armed Forces of the pre-1947 period had very little to do with the society. They were far removed from the normal day to day life of the masses.

Considerable changes set in soon after the Independence. Overnight, they were transformed from an imperialistic tool to an instrument of national defence. They acquitted themselves very well during the partition. The largest refugee camp, a city of tents, providing shelter to nearly a quarter million, was laid out and run by the Army at Kurukshetra.

The partition had left the State of Assam isolated from the rest of the country. The army worked ceaselessly, ignoring the heavy monsoons, and built embankments and river bunds, and thus, made it possible for 145 miles of railway line to be laid.

The Indian Army did commendable work in the amelioration of the condition of the people of Jammu and Kashmir after the massacre carried out by the tribal marauders.

The IAF and the IN have always helped in locating and rescuing the distressed civil shipping and fishermen. In June 1953, 200 fishermen were saved by them. Areas inaccessible by land have been visited by the mercy

planes of the IAF, in order to bring hope and succour to the stranded people.

The Army and the IAF come out every year to help in flood relief. It involves :

- (a) Rescue of civil population.
- (b) Provision of tented camps, food supplies, radio communications and medical aid.
- (c) Protection of national and individual property from flood waters.
- (d) Anti-flood protective measures.

The Army helped the Damodar Valley Corporation in its preliminary work, too. In July 1953, at the request of the Rajasthan Government, the IAF conducted a novel experiment of sowing seeds from the air. In 1951-52, the Army gave valuable help in carrying out anti-locust operations in Punjab, Delhi and Rajasthan. The army participated in the Grow More Food Campaign, right from its inception. In the first year of the Campaign, the Army brought 8,688 acres of land under cultivation. 'Van Mahotsva' evoked equal interest.

The armed forces are doing yeomen service in the eradication of illiteracy. Sainik Schools are amongst the very best schools in the country. The Army extends valuable help in the organisation of Kumbh Mela.

In addition to the counter insurgency operations being carried out in North Eastern India, the armed forces have come out to maintain law and order many times. Their conduct, while dealing with the misguided fellow citizens, has earned them praise from all quarters.

The Border Roads Organisation has done immense work in constructing roads in the inhospitable and inaccessible areas of the North. This brought economic gains to the hitherto backward areas. The armed forces are often called out to aid civil power to maintain essential services.

WHAT IS CIVIC WORK

In the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have defined civic work as, "The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training public work, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation and others contributing to economic and social development which would also improve the standing of the military forces with the population".

Lieutenant General Alberto Ruiz Novoa, the former War Minister of Colombia clarified it further by saying, "Military civic action is based on the premise that the use of military means to accomplish programmes of economic and social welfare will awaken in the benefited population trust and sympathy towards the Government and the military forces".

President Kennedy called civic action, "an indispensable means of establishing a link between the armed forces and the population".

Before discussing the scope of any civic action programme one must analyse its effects on the civil population and the armed forces.

IMPACT ON CIVIL POPULATION

"The links between the armed forces and the entire military organisation, on the one hand, and the country's economic, political and cultural system, on the other, and their interdependence have grown very much close in the present-day conditions," runs the official Russian view.

Social Impact

National Integration. The armed forces are ubiquitous, the recruit men from all parts of the country. It is national in its symbolism. Its members learn to rise above the fissiparous tendencies based on narrow religious, regional and caste feelings. They reflect the image of a integrated and unified body. It acts as a beacon of light to the other segments of population for social and emotional integration. Frequent contacts between the population and the armed forces help in the emotional unification of the nation.

Sense of National Pride. The armed forces are a device for developing a sense of identity—a social psychological element of national unity—which is especially crucial for a nation which has suffered because of colonialism and which is struggling to incorporate diverse ethnic and regional groups in itself. Some people have gone to the extent of saying that the "military operates as a source of self esteem and ego enhancement for the population at large".

Modernising the Society. Che Guevara felt that the army should "spearhead the drive to achieve well formulated social aims". Others feel that the armed forces organisations in societies under-going modernisation will become major ladders—perhaps the major ladder—of social mobility. The contribution of the military by social participation has been universally accepted.

Spread of Education. There can be no doubt that the military has the capacity for education in fundamental literacy and in aspects of citizenship training. In India, the armed forces are the single largest educational institution. Basic education in health and sanitation will be useful to the villagers.

Economic Impact

According to President Kennedy, "the armed forces participation in civic programmes is an indispensable means of strengthening the economic base of the country".

The armed forces help the population for their economic betterment in the following ways :

(a) **Provision of Expertise.** The armed forces have acquired a great

deal of expertise in certain fields. It can place such expertise at the disposal of the community for various projects.

(b) Participation in Economic Ventures. The armed forces can have agricultural farms and economic projects. In some Latin American and South East Asian countries, the armed forces manage economic enterprises to meet their own requirements, or for the needs of society. In Burma, the armed forces maintain a large number of economic ventures, which range from manufacturing plants to department stores. The Sudanese military was effective in stabilizing the production, allocation and sales of cotton.

(c) Training in Vocational Trades. The armed forces serve as a training ground for technical and administrative skills. The armed forces' contribution in this field is two fold :

(i) By training soldiers in various vocational trades before their release, so that they become a useful component of the society.

(ii) By imparting training to suitable civilians in nearby areas in basic vocational trades. In this field, mention must be made of a highly successful experiment in Mizoram. The State Government was so impressed with the results that it stepped in to sponsor the experiment with financial help.

(d) Communication Network. Construction of roads in inaccessible and under-developed areas opens new vistas of economic boom to the local population.

Adverse Effects

People Start Expecting Too Much. Frequent civic aid by the armed forces raises the hopes of the population too high and, stage comes when it starts expecting and demanding such aid. The US Army learnt this the harder way in their Alaskan programme. The people of Ballia (Bihar) expect the Army to come out every year with boats to help them out—irrespective of the flood danger.

People Become Lethargic. Frequent help from the armed forces makes certain segments of the civil population lazy and dependent. This has been the unanimous opinion of the Latin American countries.

Other Agencies Are Looked Down Upon. Whatever the armed forces do is always the responsibility of some other civil agency. If the armed forces carry out vaccination in a well organised and efficient manner, the civil population tends to compare it with the performance of the local health agencies. This leads to a lot of heart-burning and misunderstanding. Many state agencies in the United States have complained about this.

Denial of Employment Opportunities. Agriculture and other such labour intensive projects by the armed forces result in reduction of employment opportunities to the civilians. There is no shortage of manpower in India. It is the jobs that are lacking.

EFFECTS ON THE ARMED FORCES

"Let a soldier not boast of his success as a tiller of the soil, but be encouraged to pride himself on his advancement, in the knowledge of the proud science in which he is an elected professor".

Operational Efficiency

"Rely not on the likelihood of the enemy not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him," said Sun Tzu.

The future wars are going to be short and intense. There may not be enough warning of the hostilities. Pre-emptive action has come to stay. Every nation has to keep its forces ready at all times. Every unit should be capable of being inducted into the war at a short notice. No unit which is busy doing construction work can switch over to war effort at a short notice.

Operational efficiency is not simply getting your troops together and leading them into the war. There is much more to it. Operational fitness is the sum total of troops being mentally and physically prepared for war, weapons and equipment being fully serviceable, full amalgamation of all arms and services and the high state of training and leadership. Lieutenant general PS Bhagat wrote, "It is often argued that a certain amount of army effort could be diverted to production work. The People's Army of China is cited as an example. On the face of it, seems a reasonable proposition, but, if the problem is analysed, it will be seen that any diversion of effort will be at the cost of fighting efficiency." Even the Chinese do not neglect their fighting efficiency just to construct roads. While encouraging army units to do construction work, Mao Tse Tung warned, "The army is still a fighting force, and in this respect there must be absolutely no relaxing : to relax would be a mistake".

Psychological Effects

A British General has said that unpreparedness in a nation is of three kinds-moral, material and mental. The last is the most dangerous. It is from the mental unpreparedness of war that conditions for the other two generate. As Clausewitz has said, "Condition of the mind has always the most decisive influence on the forces employed in War." A soldier has to be mentally attuned for war. It is from this mental preparedness that confidence, determination, *esprit-de-corps* and the will to fight generate. Preparing a man mentally to face battle is a difficult and intricate phenomenon. Every leader requires time for it. Intensive participation in civic action programmes diverts the attention of the troops from their primary duty. They become 'soft and easy going.' Even the Chinese find it necessary to resort to massive propaganda dose before the civic action units are put back on military duty.

Welfare of Troops and Morale

"The human factor is intangible, it is made up of intangible qualities ...How a soldier is looked after in peace will determine how he does in war". The troops which are involved in civic action have perforce to be strung out in small parties. Who will look after their welfare? How will effective command and control be exercised. A field unit comes back to a peace area after a busy and tiring tenure in an operational area. The troops need this period to stay with and look after their families. What will be the effect on the morale of the troops if they are denied this short stay with their families? As it is formation and unit exercises, aid to civil power and help during natural calamities take up a major portion of a units peace tenure these days.

Training

"Better a soldier goes into battle with old equipment but well trained, than with new equipment and ill trained." Every army utilises peace period to prepare for war. Training is a continuous process. Training has to be carried out at individual, subunit, unit and even formation level. All these activities are covered in each annual training cycle. And this training cycle must go on unhindered. To quote Lieutenant General Bhagat, "If the cycle is broken for production work, there will be an inevitable gap in the training process, which will take much longer to rectify than the actual break in process. A year's break may mean three years disruption."

Sense of Participation

Keeping, in touch with the society helps the troops to know and to understand the changes taking place in it. The troops do not remain cut off from the society which they have to defend. Participation in communal services and activities aimed at the general development of masses is bound to give creative and contributive pleasure to a soldier.

However, too frequent a contact can result in the troops getting too involved in local affairs. This also results in the politicalisation of the armed forces. Most of the Latin American countries have learnt this lesson at a great cost.

GENERAL EFFECTS

Improves the Image of the Armed Forces

Lieutenant General Alberto Ruiz put it very aptly when he said, "Military civic action gains support of the populace for the armed forces. It also helps to prove the usefulness of the army and to counter the attacks of those who see in military expenditures only a useless drain of public funds, and who deny the importance of the mission of the armed forces within the State".

After Independence, the armed force have started endearing themselves to the general public. Their image has been gradually improving. However, a lot needs to be done in this field. The armed forces are even now quite isolated from the public. Civic action will bring them closer to the population. The benefits will be mutual. As Professor Edward Bernard Glick says, "Military civic action illustrates that military involvement in social and economic development has been a prime factor in good soldiering for centuries".

Emperor Haile Selassie told his armed forces, "Your participation with the community in building schools, drilling wells and clearing roads will gain you honour and respect".

Cost Effectiveness

The armed forces are not geared to undertake any large scale-development work. They have no expertise in this field. It has been established the tasks carried out by the armed forces are high in cost. The armed forces are simply not cost effective in such jobs. Moreover, it costs more to the exchequer to employ a soldier on a job which can be done by a hired civilian labour.

NATURE AND SCOPE OF PARTICIPATION

It is obvious from the above discussion that both the extreme view points have their drawbacks. There is no denying the fact that the basic duty of the armed forces is the defence of the nation. There can be no compromise on this score. On the other hand, no one can refute the usefulness of civic action. Where do we draw the line then ? What should be the scope and nature of such civic action ?

The Guiding Principles

From the discussion above it emerges that the following basic principles should always be kept in mind while deciding the armed forces' participation in civic action :

- (a) It should not affect the operational efficiency of the unit in terms of :
 - (i) Training.
 - (ii) State of equipment.
 - (iii) Morale and welfare of troops.
- (b) It should not be in a field in which better or even equal capability exists with other agencies.
- (c) It should not try and replace the functions of a legally constituted body.
- (d) It should be biased towards inaccessible and under developed areas.
- (e) It should be of short duration so that the units do not get tied down and the troops can see the results before moving away.

(f) Stress should be laid on the active participation of the local population in all such projects.

Scope and Flexibility of Recommended Civic Action Programme

Bearing in mind the above guiding principles, one can safely rule out the armed forces' participation in :

- (a) Large scale agriculture.
- (b) Large scale animal husbandry, dairy and poultry farming.
- (c) Large scale participation in economic enterprises and constructionwork.

The recommended activities, therefore, for civic action are as follows :

(a) **Development of Inaccessible Areas.** Large areas of inaccessible and inhospitable parts of North India are without any civil development agencies. The people are without present day development facilities. This is one field in which the armed forces can really do a great deal of work without affecting its own efficiency. The work should be biased towards :

(i) Construction and development of bridges, roads and tracks. Border Roads Organisation and earth moving equipment of the engineer regiments can be used. Infantry soldier can be used where manual work is required.

(ii) Provision of water supply to villages by army engineers.

(iii) Construction of small sized buildings for schools, hospitals and so on. These can be made by using local resources by army soldiers. Construction of a 'basha' poses no problem.

(b) **Education.** Every unit has a certain percentage of well educated personnel. There should be no problem to spare a few such personnel during evening hours to conduct classes for the local population in certain basic subjects. Educational programme costs nothing and achieves results out of all proportions. Sainik schools must be continued.

(c) **Vocational Training.** Unemployment is a major problem in India. Imparting vocational trades training to suitable local unemployed youth would facilitate their finding a job for themselves. All technical units can run some such cadres in basic trades. This can also be done in conjunction with the State agencies.

(d) **Health Services.** Provision of medical and health services to the local population, especially in areas where such civil facility does not exist, must be done. Every units can spare its medical officer for such programmes. Mass immunisation is another important field.

(e) **National Programme.** Planting trees under 'Van Mahotsava' will have no adverse effect on the armed forces,

(f) **Consultancy Services.** The armed forces have acquired certain expertise in some fields. It must make its expertise available to the local agencies eg survey and air photo interpretation. Border Roads Organisation can advise local construction agencies in alignment and construction of hill roads.

Counter insurgency, flood relief, maintenance of law and order; and maintenance of essential services have to be carried out, as being done at present.

CONCLUSION

According to Field Marshal Wavell, "War is not a matter of diagrams, principles or rules." There is much more to it. Preparing for war requires detailed planning, dedication and a concerted effort. It is a full time task. It is 'impossible' to divert attention to large scale civic action projects and still be always ready for war. And as Edwin Boring has said, "To attempt the impossible persistently is to live inefficiently." And any inefficiency in the armed forces will put the defence and the very existence of the nation in peril.

Machiavelli, in his chapter entitled, "Money is Not The Sinews of War, Although is Generally so Considered," concluded that, "it is not gold but good soldiers that ensure success in war." And good soldiers are produced by intensive training alone.

"The best form of welfare for the troops is a superlative state of training, for this saves unnecessary casualties," runs the famous dictum of Rommel. To achieve this superlative state of training, the armed forces have to utilise each and every day available to them.

Extensive participation in social service and civic aid adversely affects the operational efficiency and morale of the troops. Their welfare is neglected. They also tend to get involved in local partisan affairs.

On the other hand, no one can deny the benefits that accrue due to the civic action. The nation must utilise the energy, discipline, training and technical capacity of the armed forces. The armed forces can contribute towards the socio-economic development of the community. Frequent contacts with the armed forces will inculcate a sense of pride, emotional integration and a feeling of oneness in the population. It shall improve the image of the armed forces.

A modern army must reflect the entire complex of the nation's activities, its general efficiency and social integration, the discipline of its political life, its scientific progress and industrial strength. In fact today the army is a nation in arms.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The armed forces must participate in civic aid and social service. However, this should never be at the cost of their operational

efficiency. There can be no compromise on the basic function. "I wish Project Amar could save us from the ignominy of Sela", an opposition Member of Parliament commented ironically in early 1963.

The armed forces should participate in the following fields :

- (a) Helping local agencies in development activities in inaccessible and under-developed areas.
- (b) Aid in medical, health, hygiene and sanitation.
- (c) Eradication of illiteracy.
- (d) Vocational trades training to suitable civilians.
- (e) Provision of consultancy services in specialised fields eg weather forecasting, survey, air photo interpretation and so on.

Suitable civic staff should be posted at appropriate formation levels.

It is imperative that proper tact is used to ensure public interest and participation in any civic action programme. It will be better if the suggestion for military civic action is made to come from the affected public.

Finally, it will be prudent to remember what President Kennedy, an ardent believer of military-civic action, said, "The armed forces should participate in military-civic action projects which do not materially impair performance of their primary military mission".

BORDER GUARD OF INDIA

MAJOR P.C. KATOCH

RECENT reports that the Union Government has cleared at the highest level the amalgamation of the Para Military Forces (PMF) like the Border Security Force (BSF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), Uttar Pradesh Special Police Force (UPSPF), Assam Rifles (AR) etc. into a new force 'Border Guard' is a long awaited welcome decision which fully implemented will go a long way to strengthen the solidarity of India against outside aggression and internal disturbances. Only a month earlier newspaper reports had indicated that the Government had decided to raise another 13 BSF and an equal number of Central Reserve Police (CRP) units. More recently, it had been announced that the Railway Protection Force (RPF) would be further expanded. The British had left us a legacy of raising the PMF at adhoc basis for different tasks as and when the necessity arose. A peep into their histories would indicate that while some of these forces were raised for the suppression of dacoits and rebellions others were even raised for petty tasks like collection of levy by the British. That apart, one wondered whether in continuation of such a legacy this latest expansion is coming merely as a sequel to the ugly trouble brewing up in Eastern India. In fact, it was difficult to visualise upto what limits these organisations would be expanded individually in the absence of any cohesive and collective measures encompassing all such forces. The announcement of the Border Guard plan has helped dispel these doubts.

It is obvious that such a decision has been debated for long and many spoke must have been put forward to delay the decision for the sake of vested interests. Even now many an apprehension and fears are being aired in public to delay its implementation. There are arguments that such a force should be under the Home Ministry and not under the Ministry of Defence (MOD). Surprisingly no such hue and cry had arisen when three years back the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) had been raised and placed under the latter. However, this much is for certain that even if the Border Guard (BG) is placed under the Home Ministry, the inevitable tussle as to who should be at the helm of affairs would continue. Should it be the BSF since they are the largest PMF body or the AR since they are more defence oriented or some other force for whatever reason. It is obvious that such infighting would defeat the very purpose of such a force.

What has been reported regards the Border Guard plan so far is that it would have four wings : (1) Pakistan ; (2) Western Tibet ; (3) Eastern Tibet ; and (4) Burma and Bangladesh. They are to be officered by army officers on deputation while the rank and file will include retired and released army personnel. Against the BG plan, certain PMF officers who have chosen to remain unidentified for reasons best known to them, have shown considerable resentment based on the following arguments : (1) The border police must retain its police character and the role assigned to it. At the same time, the concept that the Army should not be involved in minor border incidents till this becomes inevitable should not be lost sight of. (2) The border police force should handle itself, or with the help of its reserves, minor skirmishes and incidents of firing across the border. Whenever such an eventuality arises, very close liason with the local army authorities should be kept to ensure quick deployment of the Army before major clashes. (3) Even when the Army is in operational control, the normal functioning of preventing crime, smuggling and infiltration with full sense of security to the border population should continue to be performed by the border police force. (4) Placing the BG under the Chief of Army Staff runs contrary to the aims of PMF. (5) The force under an army officer cannot discharge the functions of border police and thus would not be acceptable to the border population which expects police protection during peace time. (6) Present PMF are well equipped and trained to face any eventuality in case of war. (7) Lastly comes the apprehension regards the future of the present cadre of officers of the PMF. An analysis of the situation would, however, indicate that these fears and apprehensions are without cause.

On the eve of independence, the British left us with the infrastructure of a wide variety of PMF ranging from the Assam Rifles, Central Reserve Police Force, Railway Protection Force to the armed police of the provinces, besides others. Sufficient expansion has taken place of the PMF since then. There have been new raisings like the ITBP, BSF, Jammu & Kashmir Militia (J & K MILITIA) and the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF). A recent significant development has been the creation of the Indian Coast Guard (ICG). However, till todate little thought had been given to stream line and integrate the PMF into the overall defence set up of the country ; both internal and external. A portion of these forces are presently assigned with dual tasks of police duties and border defence for which they are ill-equipped and inadequately trained. In fact, those opposed to the BG plan who are stressing so greatly on the mere retention of the police character of this force do really need a study into the contribution of these forces towards border defence upto now. Aside from the fact that some of them are assigned dual tasks, these tasks are not quite clearly defined. Regular forces are called upon for internal security too often and the transfer of power is untimely. The PMF is not even fully geared to meet the natural calamities and regular forces have to keep

looking back over their shoulder ; a situation hardly conducive to national security. Without casting any aspersions, all this has resulted in duplication of effort, one-upmanship, ambiguity of command and control, lack of cohesiveness, and indiscipline resulting in an ill-equipped, inadequately trained force incapable of producing results commensurate with the efforts involved in their upkeep. The erstwhile PAC troubles in Kanpur and Behrampur where full fledged military action had to be taken right in the heart of the country and the CRP troubles of yesteryear just show upto what extent things could go and did go wrong. This is despite the fact that Government has been spending enormous amount of money on the upkeep of these forces. Talking of those years of the seventies, when there had not been much thought on the modernisation and expansion of the PMF, the combined expenditure on the BSF, CRPF, ITBP, AR and CISF in the year 1975-76 alone was approximately Rs. 18028.75 lakhs while in 1977-78 it had risen to approximately Rs. 19551.45 lakhs. It would also be interesting to note that last year (1979-80), the expenditure on the modernisation of police forces and police housing in the states has been approximately Rs. 703 lakhs and Rs. 800 lakhs as against Rs. 700 lakhs and Rs. 725 lakhs respectively a year earlier. By no means can this expenditure be rated as exorbitant but the nation would certainly expect a better law and order situation and better safeguards of security, both internally and externally.

The political ecology of Asia dictates that if India is to face aggression it will be either from Pakistan or China. This is a brutal fact we have to live with. Whether Pakistan would attack through the deserts of Rajasthan or whether China chooses to strike down towards Siliguri with a simultaneous pincer through the Lido Road axis in Northern Burma in a bid to cut off Eastern India is a matter of conjecture and for the military minds to analyse and deal with. Our foreign policy as also contenders of global power politics would endeavour to ensure that India has to deal with only one aggressor at one time but can we risk to discard a joint aggression altogether or for that matter pressure tactics by one while the other attacks ? Once this fact is taken into account, it would be apparent that our armed forces are not too large a force. The contribution of the PMF in such an eventuality would have to be gigantic. On the other hand if the Army has to fight with one hand behind the back, this would certainly be a dicy predicament. The diplomacy of violence and the manipulation of risk have taken on a special significance in the military age. High intensity short mobile wars aimed at crippling the opponents war effort coupled with the necessity to grab maximum territory, to occupy and bargain later at the conference table, points towards a different type of PMF for the future. The ITBP was raised in the aftermath of the Chinese aggression of 1962 while the BSF was raised in 1965 to cope with the Pakistani infiltrators. The concept of warfare has since undergone and is still undergoing considerable change due to the increased mechanisation

and the resultant mobility. The warning periods that hitherto had been quite adequate are diminishing day by day and it would not be inconsiderate to say that in certain areas the PMF may have to suffer the first surprise blows of even the regular armed forces of an aggressor and if not so than at least an equivalent foreign PMF. This fact should be seen in the light of the fact that Pakistan army is trained and rehearsed in direct launching into the battle area from their cantonments. When our own PMF, especially those assigned the task of border defence, are viewed against this back-drop, the complexity of this precarious situation begins to unfold. It is in the light of this perspective that I had mentioned earlier, though some may still call it audacious, that our PMF are ill trained and ill-equipped. Can they take on anything like mechanised infantry, tanks or for that matter regular army units on foot? The fact is that they do not have weapons to meet such eventualities and are neither trained for such a job. They have little idea of mine warfare; a necessity for border defence units. In fact when we compare our PMF in earnest with the Pakistan Rangers or Mujahids or for that matter the Chinese Militia, it becomes apparent that our PMF require much improvements.

The border defence units of our PMF have really not been tried out in war except for the BSF in isolated cases. They have played a limited role in the insurgency affected areas. The peace time deployment of the PMF units amounts to isolated pockets where in certain cases they are holding frontages five times than what an equal bodied regular infantry unit would hold. All these PMF units come under the Home Ministry which is not geared to train them for war. Though they are to cover the deployment of regular forces, even in the plains of Punjab they are not holding anti-tank weapons. How can they then be expected to hold the enemy for any length of time? Their lines of communication are poor and so is the fire support available to them. Even in those areas where regular forces are closely located, their administrative back up is separate which is a duplication bringing undue strain on the national exchequer. All the same due credit must be given to the BSF for whatever actions they have fought. However, it may be pointed out that in future wars; friendly forces like the Mukti Bahini may not be available to ensure the success of our own PMF. It would be pertinent, once again to emphasise that this article is not aimed at any reflections on the PMF as their present state is not their own doing. They now require an overhaul since the situations under which they were created have since changed.

Today there is a requirement to understand afresh the role of the PMF in our context. There should be two basic requirements: (1) Police duties and international security. This would include anti-smuggling, prevention of illegal crossings and the like. (2) Military duties of border defence to deal with border disputes requiring the thin balance of application of appropriate military force; beyond the capability of the police and

too premature to deploy the regular army. This task also envisages tactical deployment of PMF units to cover the deployment of the regular army and thereafter fight the battle in conjunction with the regular troops where considered necessary or provide protection of rear areas. It is obvious that when the Army assigns military tasks to the PMF, they would have to bear in mind the organisation, equipment, weapons and the state of training of these forces.

There is a definite requirement to adopt a completely new approach to the rationalisation of the PMF. Consideration of various factors would prove that we must integrate these forces into the first line of defence. Once this fact is understood, it is easy to realise that such forces must be equipped and trained on the same lines as of the Army. Obviously the Home Ministry is not geared to provide this sort of training. The Government, therefore, is rightly bringing these forces under the Ministry of Defence and placing them directly under the Chief of Army Staff. In no way would this be contrary to the concept of the PMF. Those who debate otherwise should peep out of their shells into the organisations of foreign PMF. It must be understood that these forces are essential not only for anti-smuggling and police tasks in peace time but as a first line of defence. Keeping in view our policy of non-aggression and in pursuance of global peace, this is necessary to avoid premature deployment of army and thus prevent uncalled for escalation of war. There are numerous countries who are maintaining Border Guards (they may have different names) who are quite heavily armed and have armoured, artillery and even helicopter support available to them. The best individual to control and coordinate this entire gamut is essentially the Chief of Army Staff by virtue of his appointment.

From what has been discussed so far, it would give the impression that the major job of the PMF is the first line of defence. Those who are opposed to the PMF coming under the Chief of Army Staff would say that this new concept is merely assisting the Army. However, this is only half the story. Their one major job would also be to reduce the burden of the Army to the minimum in assisting the PMF in international security and then to assist the Army in external defence. While reviewing the fresh role of the PMF, I had brought out the first basic requirement as police duties and internal security. The Border Guard plan has apparently played this important issue at a low key unless further announcements proclaim otherwise. India has a wide variety of PMF. This multifacet force can be brought under two divisions. First would be ones assigned the task of border defence like the BSF, ITBP, AR, ICG, etc., who are rightly being brought under the Border Guard plan. The second division should be those assigned police duties and most important internal security. Without delving into semantics, the term internal security should encompass: (1) Policing. (2) Anti-Riot. (3) Counter insurgency at a low scale and (4) Disaster relief, to mention a few. It is here that we need to develop

and organise an altogether new force which could be termed 'National Guard'. What the Border Guard provides against external aggression, the National Guard should provide for internal security and protection. The Home Ministry should get on with organising this force on a war footing rather than lamenting the loss of those units which have gone under the Ministry of Defence under the Border Guard plan. This force will have to be a gigantic organisation considering the length and breadth of the country and the socio-political and geographic variations. Now is the time that sufficient thought be given to this issue. The National Guard could be created by the amalgamation of the CRPF, Armed police of the states, CISF, RPF, TA and such like forces. Later on even national organisations like Home Guards, NCC and the like should be amalgamated into the same. This force should also be capable of dealing with natural calamities and disasters, small scale insurgencies and internal protection of the nation. Such a force would relieve the Border Guard and the regular armed forces from all internal pressures. When such a set up has been established, India will be able to confidently take on any aggressor(s). The clear division of duties and the reduction in command and control set up including the administrative elements and training establishments would save the national exchequer enormous sums that could go towards development.

Coming to the apprehensions expressed due to the announcement of the Border Guard plan, following can be said without recourse : (1) Placing the Border Guard under the Ministry of Defence would in no way be contrary to the concept of PMF. In fact it would amount to keeping abreast with the PMF of the developed countries. (2) The contention that the force under an army officer cannot discharge the function of border police and as such would not be acceptable to the border population seems to be out of context. On the contrary, the opposite is prevelant which can be seen by the large number of ex-army officers who are performing well in the BSF, CRPF and such like forces. It also seems to be forgotten that it is the Army which is called in when the police and PMF have failed and is very much acceptable to the peace abiding citizens whether in the border areas or in the heart of the country. Moreover, an army officer is definitely less prone to departmental pressures leading to biased dealings which plagues the civil administration so much. An Army officer on deputation is more liable to be just in his dealings as he has nothing to gain or lose. On completion of his deputation he reverts to his job. (3) The contention that the present PMF is well equipped and trained to face any eventuality in war needs no further discussion as this has been thrashed out in detail in preceding paragraphs. (4) Present cadre of PMF officers have no cause to worry on the issue of induction of army officers on deputation into the PMF. It is unthinkable in a democratic country like ours that their interests would not be looked after. It is obvious that their seniorities,

ranks, promotion avenues etc. would be protected. They certainly should not expect to be compulsorily retired or released from service.

There have been recent statements on the modernisation of our police forces as well. It is time that the normal police of the states should also be organised into sub-units/units and not resort to mere picketing. This sub-unit/unit should be considered as a brick and should be capable of deploying tactically when required. The superstructure should then be built up brick by brick. Obviously the number of bricks per state would differ and would depend on various factors like size, population and the like. The basic brick should, however, remain common on a national basis. The internal and external security of India will therefore rest upon the four pillars of: (1) Armed Forces; (2) Border Guard; encompassing the Indian Coast Guard. (3) National Guard and (4) Police.

Another sphere of speculation is Civil Defence. This aspect is not being given due importance. Civil defence problems could take gigantic dimensions overnight if in a future war the enemy resorts to low yield nuclear weapons or for that matter chemical or biological warfare. We could be caught napping and incapable to cope with such an emergency. Such a contingency cannot be considered utopian any more. This then could be a duty assigned to the National Guard which, as in the case of Border Guard, could have various wings *e.g.* (1) Counter Insurgency. (2) Disaster Relief. (3) Civil Defence. (4) Internal Security. (5) Industrial Protection. (6) Railway Protection and the like. The PMF of India have a tremendous potential to boost the defence set up of the country. It is in India's interest that the Border Guard plan be brought into effect at the earliest. Correspondingly due thought and action should be taken to form the National Guard to take on the internal defence and protection of India. Without this the reorganisation of our PMF would be incomplete.

A STUDY OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR A PRACTICAL MODIFICATION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE PROPER UTILISATION OF THE TERRITORIAL ARMY

BRIGADIER ML WHIG, MVC, FRGS

Introduction

The Territorial Army was evolved to impart a military orientation to gainfully employed persons so that a military reserve could be available in time of need. It also aims at inculcating a sense of discipline amongst able bodied young men and women of the country by enrolling them as members.

It is worthwhile examining to what extent this aim has been achieved in the last three decades or so, which is an adequate period on which to base our evaluations and identify the successes or problems areas of this concept.

When the Territorial Army was raised after an Act of Parliament, the strength envisaged was 1,37,583. This comprised various units some of which are not now in existence though they were originally raised, (such as armour, artillery and EME companies).

Concept

WITH the reduction in units over the years there has also been a decrease in manpower. Even the present manpower ceiling is under subscribed. Where as the non-departmental units are nearly upto strength, the departmental units are much below. This is not in consonance with the present concept that Territorial Army personnel should be gainfully employed. Gainfully employed persons are not forthcoming to the extent required inspite of considerable incentives. If given further concessions, they may be available in larger numbers but it would appear that the present concept suffers from inadequate motivation and publicity. It will, therefore, be seen that the concept of gainfully employed persons joining the Territorial Army is contraproductive unless they are adequately compensated over and above their emoluments. This drawback would appear specially applicable to departmental personnel. Gainfully employed persons are not prepared to accept additional duties without substantial benefits. Their demands may be justified as they lose some departmental gains, like overtime and for this they feel they should

be compensated over and above the concessions they presently enjoy on embodiment. Much of this sentiment stems from a lack of national identity or pride, and a spirit of service, which has yet to be fostered in the Nation as a whole.

As far as non-departmental units are concerned, except for some gainfully employed persons who are not interested in pecuniary benefit, the majority need to be paid for the period of their embodiment. This is unexceptional as these persons have their social and family obligations, in the context of the present day cost of living.

The view that the Territorial Army should enrol persons who are already gainfully employed would appear impracticable for the following reasons :

(a) Government servants already gainfully employed in departmental units would like to be compensated over and above what they are at present getting whilst serving in the Territorial Army. Such Government servants who can afford to join the Territorial Army without much thought of financial gain, are on the other hand, somewhat 'status conscious' and it would appear, are willing to join if given a rank which would, in their view, befit their 'civilian status'.

(b) Leading figures in the National and Public image who are well off and who can afford to join the Territorial Army and thus set an example are few.

(c) The employment situation in the country is not encouraging at present.

It is therefore evident that National pride and the desire for service, though they exist, are not paramount in the minds of the people, and they have to be encouraged by financial reward, if unemployed and by financial or 'status' concessions if they are already gainfully employed. As military ranks are restricted to a hierarchical pattern in a small organisation, it is difficult to meet the requirement of those who would like to improve their social status, nor are such personnel all suitable to be given high ranks in a military organisation whatever their civilian appointment, without some years of military training. The concept of the Territorial Army is difficult to implement if individuals feel that to start in the Territorial Army with a lower military rank is not appropriate to their present status, quite forgetting that the soldier is a respectable citizen and the most important member of the army organisation.

Modification of the Concept

We must, therefore, accept that the concept of the Territorial Army as formulated earlier on has not fully fructified. It is, therefore, now pertinent to examine whether the existing organisation be dispensed with or that our concept be suitably modified.

It is obvious that the Territorial Army should not be done away with. The large number of para military organisations raised in the

country since independence, can be likened to the Territorials, embodied for a protracted period at the expense of the Territorial Army. It therefore follows that the concept should be modified, at least in practice, to include 'persons gainfully employed' as well as those 'under-employed and un-employed'. This will open up the Territorial Army to people from all walks of life whether already employed, or otherwise, enrolling in the Territorial Army in appointments for which they are eligible. It is felt that in a country where unemployment and under-employment are widespread, the present concept of the Territorial Army as a Citizens' Force need not seriously mitigate against un-employed or under-employed persons joining the force, till such time as avenues towards full employment improve.

Effective Utilisation

Having clarified the necessity of a practical modification to the concept the utilisation of the organisation needs to be examined in some detail. The '*raison d'être*' of the Territorial Army is to supplement the Regular Army as no country can afford to have military forces large enough to meet its likely war commitments during 'no war' situations.

The role of the Territorial Army is—

- (a) to relieve the regular Army of static duties and to aid the civil power in dealing with natural calamities and maintenance of essential services in situations where the life of the community is affected or the security of the country is threatened ; and
- (b) to provide units for the regular Army, if and when required.

It follows that when the regular Army needs a supplementary effort to cater for operational requirements it should preferably have recourse to the Territorial Army unless fresh regular units can be raised to meet this requirement, and this actually happens in the case of departmental (TA) units, such as railway engineer groups. Regretfully, this fundamental fact has been lost sight of in the utilisation of non-departmental TA units, possibly because government policy on the retention of these units was previously uncertain. This has since been clarified and it has been decided that infantry battalions (TA) will stay.

Now that the continued existence of the Territorial Army is an accepted fact, in order to refurbish its image every effort should be made to place the Territorials in their correct perspective as citizen soldiers available to their uniformed brethren if necessary. Psychologically, a Territorial would take pride in having rendered some field service during peace time and being awarded a medal or clasp as a result. The basic human urge for recognition would be satisfied. This can only be achieved by a selective rotation of embodied Territorial Army units rendering service for say one year, in various theatres.

Deployment of Troops

Over the years, the deployment of troops in various sectors has had

to be augmented to meet operational requirements. Some raisings have taken place to cater for the shortfall of regular troops. However, this shortfall has more often as not been made up, not by recourse to the Territorial Army which is designed and meant to supplement the regular Army, being a vital adjunct and an integral part of it, but by the induction of BSF formations, units or sub units and other police units of the Home Ministry for operational tasks under Army control, for protracted periods. No Territorial Army unit has been thus employed, to the detriment of the importance and concept of the Territorial Army. The resultant mix of police and regular Army elements has been a melange of Army and Police units in field formations deployed on operational tasks with diverse channels of Command and Control.

Suitability of the Territorial Army Infantry Battalions for Operation Tasks

The Territorial Army is a vital adjunct and an integral part of the regular Army with the ability, after suitable modification, to augment the regular Army. The commonality of officering, training, equipment and organisation, render it most suitable for rapid integration in the Army's operational deployment when so utilised. No other para- or quasi-military force is capable of such instantaneous dovetailing of roles unless it is placed and completely merged with the Army. Tasks such as protection of static installations and less threatened sectors in border areas could appropriately be given to Territorial Army units raised from the same region. This will also provide benefits to a large number of rural unemployed and enrol them to serve the Nation and improve their physical and mental qualities. The costs involved to the State would also be lower than those involved in raising new regular or para-military units.

It is, however, recommended that Police formations, units and sub units presently co-opted with regular Army formations be replaced by infantry battalions (TA) progressively. As a beginning, two selected infantry battalions (TA) could be tried out in areas presently held by Border Security Force units. The Border Security Force units thus released could revert to a reserve role, available to the Army in a war situation if so required.

Conclusion

A concept is only as successful as its implementation. In the case of the Territorial Army, implementation of the concept, underlying its role, has been sadly lacking, thereby relegating the Territorial Army to a tinsel pseudo second line of defence or reinforcement for the regular Army. This state of affairs requires urgent attention and restoration, if the Territorial Army is not to degenerate into a redundant loss to the exchequer yielding no worthwhile results when related to the costs involved in keeping alive a concept.

LET US REORGANISE OUR LOGISTIC SERVICES

COL GURDIAL SINGH, PSC, LDMC

Introduction

LOGISTIC services in the Indian Army were organised during the World War II when it was part of the British Armed Forces controlled by the War Office in London. In World War II, Indian Army fought in the North African desert, jungles and mountains of Burma and Malaya. The logistic services were understandably designed to meet the war time requirements of operations in under-developed areas removed from logistic bases located thousands of miles away.

There has been considerable increase in the troops not forming the teeth of the Army since World War II, though efforts have been made in the recent past to bring some balance in the tail to teeth ratio in the Army. According to present reckoning, the divisional slice (total strength of the army divided by number of divisions) of Headquarters and supporting troops is about 25,500 men *vis-a-vis* 17,500 men in Pakistan Army. Even in a division about 18 per cent belong to the logistic services, which do not really fight with the enemy. This is quite a high percentage in the context of present day conditions. This is a legacy of the past. Over insurance for administrative support was perhaps inevitable in World War II when Field Marshal Wavell's command extended over 11 countries stretching from Libya to the eastern frontiers of India. There is little justification in maintaining such large overheads in our present context during peace time. The ratio of 'fighting troops' (Armour, Infantry, Artillery and Combat Engineers) *vis-a-vis* 'supporting troops' is comparatively low in our Army.

An organisation is created to cope with specific tasks. These have to be spelt out for achieving optimum efficiency. Logistic services in the case of our Army have expanded almost by the rule of the thumb as and when there has been increase in the number of infantry, armour and artillery units. Such increases have not taken into account the industrial growth and improvements in communication facilities. Unlike the pre-independence Army, the present Army in India does not have to defend colonies spread

throughout the world. The primary task of the Army now is to safeguard the territorial integrity of the country. International borders are defined and are served by a fairly reliable network of communications. The growth of industry and agriculture to sustain war machinery is also an important consideration for deciding the size of our administrative services. The aim of this paper is to discuss the reorganisation of logistics services to achieve maximum economy without affecting the fighting potential of the Army.

Limited Wars

There is a change in the conduct of war all over the world. Formal resort to war duly declared and openly conducted is perhaps gone for ever. To achieve national aim, use of force may be unavoidable but only for a limited period till international pressures are brought to bear for cessation of hostilities. Therefore, future conventional wars are likely to be short and sharp lasting for a few days or weeks. In these circumstances, there is need for maintaining regular, fully trained and highly motivated fighting arms in a high state of readiness. Certain amount of adhocism is necessary and must be accepted in the logistics service to keep the defence budget low. Service troops should be experts and skilful in their trade and they can practise their trade best in civil jobs. Their fighting skills should be adequate for self-defence and passive air defence as they would rarely be given a mission to 'close in' with and destroy the enemy.

Supply and Transportation

Army Service Corps (ASC) is responsible for supplying rations, fuel, lubricants and ammunition to the troops during war. At present there is a static supply depot in all stations where field formations are housed. At the same time there is a supply company in ASC Battalion of each division which has no commitments except during the training exercises. Thus, there is duplication and consequential under-employment. To achieve optimum use of manpower resources all the supply depots should be operated by supply companies of ASC Battalions. When the formations move out for operations, a few personnel may be left behind to cater for troops in the rear. ASC Battalion mobilisation scheme should cater for this eventuality. If a Supply Depot has to be expanded into a Base Depot for provision of supplies to troops operating ahead, it should be possible to do so by getting officers and JCOs who are on ERE or in schools of instruction. At present a large number of regular Army personnel remain merely 'on-lookers' sitting in far off places in NCC units and training institutions during actual hostilities. They must be employed appropriately in the battle zone.

Indian Army made good use of civil infrastructure in the field of road transport by impressing civil trucks for military duties in the rear areas in Indo-Pak conflict during 1965 and 1971. Our military logistics set up

should cater only for day to day peace time needs. In support of each field formation, should be a commercial road transport organisation which can be activated during war and made use of. Thus, the strength of 'third line' transport units can be drastically cut down. There is a requirement of maintaining the existing level of leaders (officers and JCOs) as they would be responsible for pressing the civil trucks and organising them for proper use in battle zone. Similarly the strength of mechanical transport companies in divisional ASC Battalion may be reduced depending upon the specific operational and training commitment of that formation. Changes, if any, can be catered for from the civil resources during active operations. Alternatively the transport companies should carry civil supplies during peace so that Army drivers remain in a high state of training.

Evacuation and Treatment of Battle Casualties

The primary role of the Army Medical Corps in forward areas is to provide first aid to the casualties in the battle field, undertake limb and life saving surgery and make them fit for evacuation to the base hospitals where proper medical facilities are available for treatment. The concept of digging in the Advance Dressing Stations and Field Hospitals for treatment of casualties appears to have become outdated. Medical organisations in the field formations should cater to give first aid by the Regimental Medical Officer, do life saving surgery and evacuate the casualties to the Base Hospitals. Due to the development of helicopter, VTOL/STOL aircraft and a good network of railways and roads along our border, the transportation of casualties has become much easier.

Most doctors in field formations are under-employed whether they are on staff or in medical units. During peace only one medical adviser is adequate at divisional headquarters and above and the connected staff work should be handled by A Branch. At present the medical officers on the staff are under-employed and do not get 'on the job' professional training. It would be prudent to integrate civil hospitals in the likely area of operations, in the overall scheme of evacuation and treatment of battle casualties. Army doctors should be posted only in the units and Military Hospitals. On mobilisation most of them should man the Mobile Surgical Teams and evacuation centres in the battle Zone. Their places in Military Hospitals should be taken over simultaneously by doctors from the civil hospitals.

Evacuation and Treatment of Animals

In India with its varied terrain and climatic conditions it is not possible to have a standard divisional organisation. It has to be on 'as required' basis. This aspect brings into focus the necessity of maintaining certain number of Animal Transport units and Sick Animal Treatment and Evacuation Units. Here again on the analogy of hospitals, Veterinary

Surgeons from civil hospitals should be appropriately affiliated. A few vehicles with Animal Transport units should be adequate to evacuate the sick animals to civil veterinary hospitals. A rough calculation would show that maintaining numerous mobile veterinary sections in peace are not cost effective. Civil veterinary hospitals in the likely area of operations should be made responsible for treatment of sick animals and should be given necessary increment of veterinary surgeons. Army Veterinary Hospitals could either be disbanded or these should also treat the sick animals belonging to the locals.

Provisioning, Issue and repair of Stores and Equipments

One of the basic requisite of an efficient organisation is the single point of responsibility and accountability. The organisation which has a well defined system of responsibility and accountability is conducive to higher production and elimination of inter branch conflicts. At present if the Chief of the Army Staff wants to know the state of radio equipment, he cannot get all the answers from one individual. Corps of Signals is responsible for first line repairs, EME for second line and base repairs and Ordnance for provisioning and supply of spares and feeding in the repairable radio sets to the base workshops. An organisation with such multiplicity of responsibility neglects the principle of clear distribution of responsibility and accountability. Such divided responsibility results in infructuous paper work, inertia and inter-departmental rivalries. Instead of producing the desired results, every branch tries to keep its own slate clean (mostly by writing letters) and has a tendency to shift blame. The best man to understand the problems of equipment management is the user. As such there is a strong case of giving the responsibility of carrying out all field repairs of radio equipment to the Corps of Signals and all base repairs to an organisation like Bharat Electronics Limited, which would also supply all the spares required by Signals. Corps of EME and Ordnance in consequence should be divested of this responsibility.

In almost all organisations dealing with manufacture and repair of technical equipment, the Materials Manager is invariably an engineer because he has a better comprehension of the end use of various components coming out of production line. In earlier days there was a scarcity of engineers and, therefore, the provisioning and management of spare parts was given to a relatively non-technical Corps like Ordnance. After 1947, numerous Engineering Colleges were established and now there are unemployed engineers. Due to the changed conditions and the fact that an engineer is better qualified to be a Materials Manager to support a repair organisation, it would be better if the provisioning of spare parts for all Technical equipment is handed over to the Corps of EME.

The normal experience of a user is that the actual 'off road' state of vehicles is much higher than given by the OC of Workshop EME. This is

invariably due to non-availability of spare parts which is the responsibility of the Ordnance branch. Thus there is divided responsibility and as such no direct accountability. Each branch has a point to prove that they have done their best and probably concentrate on highlighting the deficiency of the other. To enhance efficiency in repair of equipment and reduce infructuous paper work, it is essential either to merge the Ordnance and EME or EME be made responsible for provisioning and supply of spare parts required for the repair of the technical equipment.

There have been tremendous advances in the field of technology since the forties. Reliability and maintenance of the equipment is taken into account at the design stage. However, our system of repair and evacuation of the Army equipment in the field remains unchanged. It is based on the lorry units and rifle units as it was in the forties. The old concept of first, second, third echelon and base repairs should be replaced by Field and Base repairs. For example, if a tank cannot be repaired in the field workshop, it should be evacuated straight to Heavy Vehicle Factory which should have a wing for the overhaul of tanks. This would cut out the third echelon and Base Workshops and the inventory of spares maintained at various levels. During World War II, disabled tanks from the battle of Stalingrad were sent to Germany, a distance of more than 2,000 miles, for base overhaul. On the same analogy whatever cannot be repaired in the field by the Signals should be sent direct to the Bharat Electronics Limited.

The present system of having station workshop EME where field formations are located has resulted in duplication and wastage of EME resources. The repairs of equipment of all local/area units should be carried out by the field workshops which could leave a detachment to look after the station units when these move out for operations. All station workshops should be disbanded. In the past Base Workshops EME were raised for a particular task e.g., overhaul of engines, but now these are kept going by allotting them adhoc task. The necessity of the Base Workshops should be examined from the angle of cost effectiveness. If Mahindra and Mahindra can overhaul an engine at a lesser cost, there is no necessity of doing this job in a Base Workshop. All the Base Workshop EME should compete with private sector organisations and if these are not cost effective, these should be disbanded and the job parcelled out to civil agencies. The accommodation vacated by various types of workshops would result in saving of crores of rupees.

Army Education and Pioneer Corps

There must be optimisation in the use of public funds. This implies that output of every organisation must be related to the expenditure incurred in maintaining it.

Though Army Education Corps (AEC) does not form part of the logistic services, its officers and personnel have no role during actual

combat. They are given odd jobs and many a commander could cite examples where he used the education staff very effectively during war. Notwithstanding individual cases of effective employment, it would be rational to post permanently all personnel of the Education Corps including officers to various arms and services depending upon their qualification and aptitude. These personnel should have dual trade. During peace time they would teach unit personnel and during war, perform their combat role depending upon their trade. For example, an education instructor in an armoured regiment or Infantry battalion would be assigned a suitable responsibility and he would do well because of higher education and better comprehension. The AEC officers at various Headquarters could be employed as normal staff officers. As it is, most of their time is spent in organising formation sports and other extra-curricular activities.

The primary role of Pioneer Corps is to provide combatised labour to the Army. It has been experienced that a Pioneer Company with a strength of 236 all ranks provide a working party of about 125 men. Assuming that an Other Rank (OR) costs the exchequer about Rs. 600 00 per month, a pioneer costs Rs. 36 00 per day taking into account the expenditure on the overheads required to manage the pioneer company. These figures illustrate that there is no check on the cost effectiveness of an organisation once it is sanctioned. There should be continuous check on cost effectiveness and as soon as the returns from an organisation are found to be diminishing operational utility, it should be reorganised or scrapped, if necessary. The jobs that the pioneers are doing can be done by any army unit. As such it would be beneficial to convert all pioneer companies into infantry battalions which would be able to do the pioneer tasks as well.

National Mobilisation Scheme

India and possibly Pakistan are perhaps the only countries which maintain large regular Armies. While it is essential to have regular, full time fighting arms (armour, infantry, artillery and engineers and signals), there is no necessity of maintaining the logistical services at full war establishments during peace. High technical competence should certainly be expected from individuals whose peace time job (truck drivers, vehicle mechanic, electrician, doctors, veterinary doctors) are identical or similar to their military equivalents in EME, AMC, RVC etc. Thus there is a necessity of having a national mobilisation scheme for war during which necessary rear service personnel and vehicles can be pressed into the Army at short notice. Personnel from ERE and various schools of instruction in the Army, can take over actual combat duties in units, depots, workshops and hospitals. A national scheme to assess the state of readiness of the armed forces can thus be drawn up and practised every year. Any short-coming noticed during such practices should be eradicated with appropriate

modifications in the Government orders. This would result in optimisation of national resources.

Conclusion

To maintain the vitality of an organisation, critical examination and reappraisal of its activities is necessary. Over the years each arm and service has become a power oriented organisation with rigorous hierarchies, where empire building seem to have become important than demands of the situation. While it is necessary to maintain a certain number of tank, artillery, infantry, engineer and signal units to safeguard national integrity, there is an urgent requirement of reorganising the logistical services required to support these during peace and war. Those units whose military duties are identical to equivalent professions in the civil, should be kept in skelton only during peace. These should be completed on mobilisation, as laid down in the National Mobilisation Scheme. There is always the usual resistance to change. Therefore, sharp reaction is expected to these suggestions which would probably have been examined by each service from their point of view. Defence forces are taking a large chunk of national budget. Let us reorganise the logistic services and use the savings to create an Army with a greater deterrence.

WAVELL : SCHOLAR, SOLDIER, STATESMAN— GOOD AND A GREAT MAN

“JOE”

“Let us now praise famous men” Ecclesiasticus xliiv, 1.

SCHOLAR

HE was born on 5 May 1883 and came from a family of distinguished soldiers. Both his grand-father and father had risen to the rank of a Maj Gen. The former had an exciting, varied and unorthodox career ; serving in India in the Bengal Army of John Company days, then in the Spanish Army in the Peninsular War and from there to the Chilean and Mexican Army in South and Central America. The latter served in the Zulu war of 1879 and then in the Boer war. He became the Governor of a Johannesburg in the Transvaal and after that, Chief of Staff to His Royal Highness the Duke of Connought, Commander-in-Chief in Ireland.

His early education was at Summer Fields but later he went to Winchester, the oldest of the great English Public Schools, as a “Scholar”. Scholar remains to this day a class apart, living in the very buildings designed for their forerunners of 550 years ago. A student of outstanding merit, he decided to join the Army class which brought a protest from the Head Master to his father. “Since I believe he has sufficient brains to make his way in other walks of life”.

Having been a “Scholar” with a sharp intellect and a retentive memory, during his four years in India he passed the Higher Standard of Hindustani ; the Higher Standard of Pushtu, and the Lower Standard of Persian. He had rare powers of concentration and detachment at the same time and hence he could do two things at one and the same time. One day, a brother officer entered his room on a very hot day to find him reading a French novel and a “Munshi” droning away in a corner. Asked why he was wasting his money by paying a man to come and teach him Urdu and then spent the time reading a French novel, he replied “Reading a French book is the only way I can keep sufficiently awake to take in what he is saying”. He later on took up Russian and having obtained a first class in it, was appointed by the Army to be the official interpreter in that language. He, of course, knew French well. He was a linguist in his own right.

From his childhood, he had a liking for poetry and the habit of memorising it. This gave him, what can be truly called “Photographic

Memory", which was to stand him and his staff into good stead when he became a Higher Commander. A story is told of how once when an ORBAT was misplaced and work came to a stand still, in desperation the matter was referred to him by his Chief-of-Staff. Undeterred, he sat down and recomposed the ORBAT which when later checked up, was found to be correct to the minutest detail—a memorable feat. Later on, he was to compile an anthology of verse—Other Men's Flowers—241 poems in all which he could one time or other recite by heart—a phenomenal effort.

He had a profound knowledge of military history and what Liddel Hart describes as "innate literary talent". As a middle piece officer he wrote for a military competition an essay : War and the Prophets, which was rejected by the judges as too visionary for practical purposes but was subsequently published in 1930 in the RUSI Journal. He wrote : The Palestine Campaign, an authoritative work widely acclaimed by military critics as a standard textbook for that campaign. He re-wrote FSR Vol 2, Strategy. He lectured at the RUSI on Higher Commander and later delivered the Lees—Knowles Lectures at Trinity College, Cambridge. These were subsequently published under the title of, Soldiers and Soldiering and acclaimed for, their brilliancy of phrase and depth of learning, enhancing his reputation both as a professional soldier and as a man of letters. He also wrote the biography of F.M. Lord Allenby—Allenby : Soldier and Statesman. A book that was praised in The Times Literary Supplement for "his mastery of simple, forcible and dignified English".

At the instance of Liddel Hart he wrote for the 14th edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica : The Growth of Armies—1870—1928. He toyed with the idea of an appointment as Chichele Professor of History of War at Oxford University which he said he would accept provided a war did not break out in the immediate future. His other publications were : Generals and Generalship, Speaking Generally, The Good Soldier. He did not live to write his memoirs but had he lived longer he may have. As he confined to Bernard Fergusson, his one time ADC, the title he would have liked to give it was : Reasons in Writing, and showed him some longish passages which he had already committed to paper. He read voraciously, wrote frequently, lectured occasionally. Some of his maxims and opinions are given below :

"Oil, shipping, air-power, sea-power are the key to this war, and they are interdependent. Air-power and naval power cannot function without oil. Oil, except in very limited quantities cannot be brought to its destination without shipping. Shipping require the protection of naval power and air power. We have access to practically all the world's supplies of oil. We have most of the shipping. We have naval power. We have potentially the greatest air power, when fully developed, Therefore we are bound to win the war".

"Each strategical problem must be dealt with on its merits as a problem in geography, in time and space calculations, in organisation, and above all, in human nature".

"My experience is that our staff system and system of command is too cumbrous and over elaborated and needs revision. We have lost the merit of simplicity".

"It is part of soldier's training to understand the ways of politics without being involved in them".

"Heavy butcher's bill not necessarily indication of good tactics".

"The leader who can hold on longest in spite of all difficulties is the man who wins battles and wars".

"All plans in the dubious hazard of war must haverisks ; the great commander is he who has both the courage to accept them and the skill to minimise them".

"When things look bad and one's difficulties appear great, the best tonic is consider those of the enemy".

"In battle, a last ounce of optimism is a better general reserve than a large body of men".

"A little unorthodoxy is a dangerous thing—but without it one seldom wins battles".

"A bold general may be lucky, but no general can be lucky unless he is bold".

"A knowledge of humanity, on whose peculiarities, and not those of machines, the whole practice of warfare is ultimately based".

"The relationship between a general and his troops is very much like that between the rider and his horse. The horse must be controlled and disciplined, and yet encouraged he should 'be cared for in the stable as if he was worth £500 and ridden in the field as if he were not worth-half-a-crown'."

SOLDIER

On 8 May 1901, three days after celebrating his eighteenth birth day, he was commissioned in 2nd Bn The Black Watch, which his father had once commanded. The battalion was in South Africa (Boer War) and he saw active service in it for six months before returning to England. The battalion then came to India and he did a stint of peace time soldiering in Ambala followed by a spell of active service in operations in the Zakka Khel Country on the N.W. Frontier of India. Getting bored with the hum-dum of peace time soldiering, he thought of going to Somaliland for big game shooting by volunteering for service with King's African Rifles. However, this was not to be and he appeared for the Staff College entrance examination and passed out at the top, securing 85% marks.

At the age of twenty-five and only a Subaltern, he was perhaps the youngest student who had ever entered the portals of the Staff College at Camberley. There he came under the influence of two outstanding Commandants, Wilson and Robertson, both to become Field Marshal and hold the appointment of CIGS. He passed out from the College getting

the coveted 'A' grading, awarded to only two students on this particular course.

Immediately after this, in 1912, he joined the War Office as GSO 3 in the MT Directorate and later on was transferred to MO and I Branch. Soon the Great War broke out and he went to France as GSO 2 at GHQ but in a few months got the posting of his heart's desire as BM of 8 Bde. In this appointment, he was wounded in June 1915 losing an eye and was awarded the MC for gallantry. Back home for convalescence, he was appointed GSO 2 of a Division in Scotland for a short while and then went back to France as GSO 2 to GHQ.

Being an expert in Russian language, his next appointment was as a Liaison Officer to the Grand Duke Nicholas, C-in-C of the Russian Army of the Caucasus with the local rank of a Lt Col. At the age of 33, he was made a Brevet Lt Col. It seems that he had made a mark as a tactful, sober, loyal and understanding Liaison Officer in Russia and soon afterwards he got a similar appointment as a Liaison Officer between the CIGS at War Office and the C-in-C in Egypt. From this appointment he was pitch forked to join the staff of the Supreme War Council at Versailles in France, and remained there during its short existence.

In March 1918, he returned to the Middle East, a marked man and a budding officer. After some preliminary miscalculation, in 1918, when he was barely 35 years old, he was appointed BGS of 33 Corps Commanded by Chetwood and from there moved up as BGS at GHQ in Middle East under Allenby.

After the war, he dropped for very short period to his substantive rank of a Major (and Brevet Lt Col) and served with his Regiment in the Rhine Army in Germany. Back home, he was posted in the rank of Col as AAG in War Office and then transferred after a while to the MO & I Branch. From there he went as GSO 1 of 3 Division in 1930 and later took over one of its brigades; 6th (Experimental) Infantry Brigade which had been specially selected for experiments in tactical organisation and training and was mechanised. In 1934 he was promoted to the rank of a Maj Gen and attended course for Higher commanders at the French Staff College at Versailles, popularly known as Ecole des Marechaux (School of Marshals). He next commanded 2 Division in 1 Corps which was meant to go overseas in case of war. Soon he was offered but declined the post of Director of Military Training at War Office. His next appointment was GOC in strife torn Palestine where he took over from Dill who later became a Field Marshal and CIGS. In 1938, he became a Lt Gen and was appointed GOC-in-C Southern Command, the most important command in the UK and holding Mobile Division later re-named as Armoured Division.

On 28 July 1939, he became GOC-in-C Middle East. Militarily his new command covered a vast area; 2,000 miles from East to West, 1,500 miles from North to South and totalled 30,00,000 square miles. He was to

exercise general control over the land forces in Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Cyprus, Egypt, and the Sudan. He was also responsible for the employment of land forces in British Somaliland, Aden, Iraq and shores of the Persian Gulf. Politically, his duties included keeping a close touch with senior officials who represented the British Government in this vast area ; he was on basis of equality with them, he was not under their authority nor were they subordinate to him. They included the Ambassador in Cairo and Baghdad, High Commissioner in Palestine and Trans-Jordan, the Governor General in the Sudan and the Governor of Cyprus. Perhaps no other Commander of the past nor of the future has been given such stupendous (or hopeless ? or impossible ?) task. In October 1940, he was promoted to the rank of a General.

During his tenure he fought nine campaigns (in the Western Desert of North Africa, in British Somaliland, in Eritrea, in Italian Somaliland, in Abyssinia, in Greece, in Crete, in Iraq and in Syria) five of which were successful and four were failures. He fought these campaigns over vast and widely dispersed areas with paucity of manpower and poor equipment always in short supply. He seemed to be the master of the principle "Economy of Force". He was driven all along to make "bricks without straw".

In the desert he inflicted a crushing defeat on the Italians who had 2,00,000 men and the British only 50,000 men. Within two months of the start of campaign, the equivalent of 9 Italian Divisions has been ripped to pieces and the bulk of the Italian forces surrendered. The British captured 1,20,000 prisoners including 19 General officers. The Italians lost 1,416 guns and 400 tanks. The British losses were only 500 killed, 1,373 wounded 55 missing.

In Italian East Africa, the results were no less brilliant. In four months, an Italian Army of nearly 2,20,000 was destroyed with whole of its equipment and nearly a million square miles occupied and the Italian C-in-C, Duke of Aosta surrendered.

The campaign was an outstanding example of operations on "exterior lines", the main columns being directed from the Sudan eastward and from Kenya northward and starting over 800 miles apart. The manner in which he swung his scanty reserves between the Libyan and East African theatre was masterly and as Rommel later remarked, showed, "his great and well balanced strategic courage".

He had successes in Syria and Iraq but failures and disaster in Crete and Greece. Then came Rommel in the desert at the most crucial and least expected time and the British suffered a major defeat in Libya. He was pushed back to the place from where he had started, to fight his battles all over again. He, however, took a bold and wise decision to drop a garrison at Tobruk during the retreat with the intention of it being a thorn in the side of Rommel in his advance to Egypt. Rommel invested Tobruk

and tried his best to reduce it but failed twice and succeeded only in 1942, but by that time there was a new C-in-C in the Middle East.

Perhaps these major reverses in the Western Desert would not have occurred but for the intervention in Greece. Aiding Greece was not only a military decision but political and moral as well and on which leading statesmen, famous Generals and renowned military critics have aired different views*. Churchill now decided to replace him and his only comment was : "The Prime Minister is quite right. The job wants a new hand and a new eye". His successor, was nevertheless able to open his first despatch with this tribute :

"On taking over command of the Middle East Forces on the 5 July, 1941, I found the general position incomparably better than it had been a year earlier on the collapse of France. This improvement was entirely due to the energy of my predecessor,....., and to his vigour in seeking out the enemy wherever he was to be found".

On 11 July, 1941 he assumed the appointment of C-in-C India, the base and bulwark for operations against Japan and on 28 Dec., 1941, three weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, it was announced that he had taken over the defence of Burma also. On the recommendation of the American Chiefs of Staff and at the instigation of President Roosevelt who thus paid a unique tribute to a British soldier, on 4 Jan., 1942, he was appointed the first Supreme Commander of the war and given another thankless and hopeless task. His new designation was Supreme Commander, South West Pacific Area. The new command ABDA (American, British, Dutch and Australian forces) hastily created to meet a desperate emergency was of necessity under-staffed and its forces were entirely inadequate for the tasks placed upon it. In the short six weeks of its existence it did not have a chance to fulfil its proper functions. It was the first unified command of the war and provided a pattern, however rudimentary, on which the combined Allied Commands in North Africa, South East Asia and Western Europe were later modelled. It was in distances, if not in strength, even larger than the Middle East Command. It embraced Burma, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Malaya, the Netherlands, East Indies, the Philippines, Christmas and Cocos Islands and the North West coast of Australia. It covered 5,000 miles from East to West, 3,000 miles from North to South. Although he formed a staff and moved to Java, the command never functioned in the sense of establishing effective control and making an entity of the scattered and ill-equipped forces of diverse nationalities. The Japanese, gave him no respite and after the loss of Malaya, the fall of Singapore (which Churchill described to Roosevelt as "the greatest disaster in our history") and the first landings of the Japanese in the Netherlands East Indies the command was wound up.

It was an unenviable command, which many a man might well have hesitated to assume, a command which offered little chances of success and seemed likely to end in defeat and even disaster. He, however, being

the man he was, accepted it without a demur. His dry and witty remark was : "I have heard of men having to hold the baby but this is twins !". On 25 Feb., 1942 he wound up ABDA command. Back in India as C-in-C, he took over what Slim describes as : "the most difficult command in the world—India and Burma". On 1 January, 1943, after forty-two years in uniform, he was made a Field-Marshal.

The last of his ten war despatches, Operations in the India Command, includes these comments among its concluding paragraphs :

"This despatch marks the end of my active military career. During the present war, in just under four years, from September, 1939 to June, 1943, I have directed some fourteen campaigns : in the Western Desert of North Africa, in British Somaliland, in Eritrea in Italian Somaliland, in Abyssinia, in Greece, in Crete, in Iraq, in Syria, in Iran, in Malaya, in the Dutch East Indies, in Burma, in Arakan. Some have been successful, others have failed.

I should like to express my admiration for the general strategy of the War Cabinet and for the bold and imaginative use made of our limited resources during these first four years of war. I have always been placed during these years at the far end of the supply line, and have always been short of troops and equipment and airforces for the tasks I have had to undertake ; but I have always been conscious that everything possible was being done to support me, that my lack of resources was due to a general shortage, that my difficulties were sympathetically understood and that I was being given all possible help and encouragement. For this I am most grateful.

I regret to have one exception to make. During the operations recorded in this despatch I received neither encouragement nor help nor understanding of the difficulties, only criticism for the failure of a bold attempt to engage the enemy with inadequate resources, in hazardous circumstances. That my plans were not unsound is, I think, shown by the fact that the plans adopted by the South-East Asia Command for the winter 1943-44 have been practically same as those I laid down for the previous winter ; and that the Long Range Penetration Groups which were initiated by Major-General Wingate under my direction have been adopted and extended as a result of the experience I originated. That I had considerable difficulties to encounter is shown by the fact that in spite of greatly increased resources and another year's training and experience, progress in Burma in the campaigning season 1943-44 has been little, if any, greater than in the corresponding period of 1942-43."

The sword was sheathed.

STATESMAN

On 19 June, 1943, he was appointed Viceroy and Governor General of India and on 23 July 1943, he was created a Viscount. His three and a

half years of Viceroyalty were as strenuous, as difficult, as frustrating, as fulfilling and as disappointing as his war time appointments of C-in-C Middle East, and Supreme Commander, South West Pacific. In fact, he said that he had never worked longer hours in his life, not even when he was C-in-C Middle East.

Within a week of taking office, he came to famine ravaged Bengal and took prompt and decisive action to bring the situation under control and to halt a great tragedy from becoming an utter disaster. He created for the first time the post of Member for Re-construction in the Viceroy's Executive Council. Progress was made at his instance in the preparation of plans for India's post-war economic development and they became the main substance of India's first Five-Year Plan. As he remarked: "Full bellies must come before full minds".

As Viceroy, he was not prepared to sit like a "Buddha under a Banyan Tree" as was expected by Churchill. Extracts from a letter he sent to Churchill are worth reproducing: "I am bound to say that after a year's experience in my present office, I feel that the vital problem of India is being treated by HMG with neglect, even sometimes with hostility and contempt.....If India is not to be ruled by force, it must be ruled by the heart rather than by the head". He took the first initiative to break the political dead-lock which he found in India and his political experiments were carried out vigorously but with honesty of purpose so rare among politicians of any country. Indeed, once Sir Stafford Cripps said of him in exasperation. "The trouble about him is that he is no politician". A remark which Viceroy took as a compliment. In fact his stirring virtues—honesty, integrity, loyalty, dedication—made him unsuitable for the office of Viceroy. He was blunt in the fact of deviousness and was naive enough to think that everyone should be as honest as himself and was pained that political leaders both in the UK and India should be thinking of themselves rather than the good of the common people of India. It is for this very reason that Muslim League despised him, Congress mistrusted him, Churchill was annoyed with him and Attlee criticised him. Truly it can be said that his was a naivete of a great human being. About Churchill, he noted in his Journal: "I am pretty sure that when he (Churchill) appointed me Viceroy it was with the intention and expectation that I should simply keep things quiet in India till the war was over. I should have saved myself a lot of trouble and should perhaps have served my interest best, had I done soBut I doubt whether I could have accepted this role. My instincts are for action and not to sit still over a problem, and my tendencies are progressive. I undoubtedly shook Winston by my proposals". And to Attlee he wrote: "If I am to return to India.....to undertake the very serious responsibilities there, with no settled policy after three weeks at home, I feel I should have your personal assurance on certain points.....

(a) That HMG does recognise that we must make arrangements with a view to transfer power in India not later than 31 March, 1948,

(b)etc.”

In June, 1945, he once again took the courage to call a political conference in Simla to break the dead-lock that existed between the major political parties in India and nearly succeeded in breaking it. Failure he characteristically blamed on himself—not for the first or last time, either in war or in politics. Gandhi (who was no admirer of the Viceroy as the Viceroy was no admirer of Gandhi) said in a letter to him: “This time you have taken the blame on your shoulders. But the world will think otherwise. India certainly does”.

He was closely associated with the Cabinet Mission of Lord Pethick Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and Mr. Alexander and the plans which it produced owes much to his sagacity, wisdom and integrity. The Mission failed and he commented : “.....the root of the failure lay in the fact that HMG and the delegation never had any basic plan ; and so could never keep the initiative.....we showed ourselves much too eager to make a bargain, almost at the price of honour and peace”.

Twice he contemplated resignation. Once in 1944 when he cabled HMG regarding urgent food imports for India which he was not getting and warned HMG that they were risking a catastrophe far worse than the Bengal famine. He ended up the telegram by stating : “They (HMG) must either trust the opinion of the man they have appointed to advise them on Indian affairs or replace him”. Again in 1946 he contemplated to resign when there was serious difference of opinion between him and the British Government at the time of the Cabinet Mission. What he particularly objected to was the unofficial contact maintained by some members of the Mission with non official members of the Congress in official matters. This tantamounted to going behind the back and over the shoulders of HMG's representative in India and this he was not prepared to accept.

In September 1946 a Congress Government was formed and few weeks later he had his greatest political success when he induced the Muslim League to join the Government and thus achieved the aim he had set before himself from the beginning of his Governor Generalship. He passionately believed in the unity of India and in his broadcast to the Indian people on 17 May 1946, he ended up by quoting these lines of Longfellow from *The Building of the Ship* :

“Thou too, sail on, O Ship of State,
Sail on O you Union, strong and great ;
Humanity with all its fears,
With all the hopes of future years,
Is hanging breathless on thy fate”.

Contrary to popular belief, the two most fateful decisions—grant of independence within 18 months from the date of announcement by HMG and partition of India were taken though not implemented during his

tenure of office. He strived whole-heartedly for the first and accepted most reluctantly the second, as the only way out of the impasse, although he openly proclaimed that "You cannot alter geography.....India is a natural unit".

The coalition between the Congress and the Muslim League in the Government was fragile and frustration and disappointment mounted in India and Britain. In the UK, the Labour Government rejected his demand for fixing a date and decided to dismiss him from the post of Viceroy. The seeds for his removal, unknown to him, were however sown far back in August 1946 when Gandhi sent the following telegram to Sudhir Ghosh, his special emissary in the UK. "Gandhi says Viceroy unnerved owing Bengal tragedy. Please tell friends he should be assisted by abler and legal mind. Otherwise repetition of tragedy certainty". This was shown to Cripps, who not only promptly agreed but also went a step further and said he would try his best and get the Viceroy replaced. His proposed successor however, made two specific demands and would not agree to take office unless these were granted. In the words of Lord Listowel, the Secretary of State for India : "Soon after the election there followed a momentous meeting in Downing Street between Attlee, Cripps and Mountbatten, at which Mountbatten indicated his willingness to serve, but only on his own terms..... The first of these was fixing of a terminal date for British rule, the second a grant of plenipotentiary powers which in fact meant taking the power of decision away from the Secretary of State and the Cabinet in Whitehall. This was some thing unique in British history. Other Viceroys, including Lord Curzon, who had resigned on the issue, had asked to be allowed 'free hand' but it had always been refused by the home Government." What followed was *volte-face* by Attlee and his colleagues. The Government had to capitulate and quite happily took credit for a decision that had in fact been forced upon them.

The coalition government in India was wrecked from within and just could not function smoothly because it did not want to function smoothly. This led to his re-call and replacement by Lord Mountbatten and the shattering of his dreams by the partition of India—with senseless slaughter and horrible holocaust. Partition of India resulted in about a million casualties and five to six million refugees. Long ago he had been apprehensive of this and had noted in his Journal : ".....the reasons impelling the Government to an early settlement were understandable, but did not justify action that might throw India into chaos and turmoil".

On 4 Feb 1947, he received Attlee's letter dismissing him at a month's notice. As usual he took the news unperturbed and sent a firm, frank and dignified reply, an extract from which is worth reproducing :— "You are causing me to be removed because of what you term a wide divergence of policy. The divergence, as I see it, is my wanting a definite policy and HMG refusing to give me one.....Whether my conduct of my office.....

has deserved dismissal at a few week's notice is for others to judge". As Sudhir Ghosh writes in his book : "The removal.....was a case of genuine dismissal. It was a very grave thing for the British Government to remove from office a Viceroy who had done nothing wrong". The Labour Government merely made a bland statement that a "war-time appointment was being terminated" and the Viceroy, as was his habit, never publicly commented on the issue.

On 28 March 1947, at the request of Attlee, he had his last meeting with the India Committee. When questioned by the Secretary of State for India, his parting advice was ".....to make a last effort to bring the Parties together.....". Shortly afterwards the Prime Minister bowed him out without one single word of thanks or commendation. It seems that he was deeply hurt by this for he noted in his Journal : "He is a singularly ungracious person.....it was not a good exhibition of manners".

Thus ended his three and a half years of Viceroyalty during one of the most critical and tiring periods in Indo-British relationship. He summed it up thus : "Continual hard work and almost continual failure. No rest, no success".

IN RETIREMENT HE KEPT HIS SILENCE AND HIS GREATNESS

A GOOD AND A GREAT MAN

"In the British Army to day there is only one good General, but he is incomparably good. The others have no proper conception of the direction of mechanised war, but this officer, from 1928 onward, has studied the subject and may well prove the dominant personality in any war within the next five years." Gen (later F.M.) Keitel 1939. "The only one who showed a touch of genius was Wavell."—*F.M. Rommell*.

"Gen Wavell, the British C-in-C, by good fortune very highly gifted both with judgement and with coolness, moved in the midst of multiple contingencies, many of which had only an indirect relation to strategy..... To many difficulties accumulated round Wavell, there was added that of interference.....In short, Wavell exercised his command only through all sorts of political trammels. I must say he suffered them with a blone serenity."—*De Gaulle*.

"I had admired the composure and firmness of mind with which Wavell had faced the cataracts of disaster which had been assigned to him with so much formality and precision. Some men would have found reasons for declining or asked for impossible conditions before accepting a task so baffling and hopeless, failure in which could not but damage the reputation with the public. Wavell's conduct has confirmed to the best traditions of the Army."—*Churchill*.

"He held at that time the most difficult command in the world-India and Burma. Yet, it gave one confidence to look at him. I had seen him at the height of dazzling success, and he had stood and looked calmly and

thoughtfully at me in the same way as he looked at me now."—*F.M. Slim.*

"Few people have a clear conception of the magnitude of task that confronted Archie Wavell during his periods of command in the Middle East and the Far East, nor of the complexity of the problems connected with this task.....To have gone from the Middle East to the Far East at the period he did, was from a military point of view, a case of stepping from the frying pan into the fire.....his initial brilliant success, achieved against greatly superior numbers both in the Western Desert and in Abyssinia, were never in any way tarnished by the subsequent handlings of the forces under his command in desperate conditions and faced with inevitable disaster. On the contrary, these later episodes in his period of command, enhanced his station as a man and as a commander.....the true stature of this very great manbe fully appreciated, and that adequate feelings of gratitude may be engendered for the immense services he rendered to his country under conditions of appalling difficulty."

—*F.M. Alanbrookes*

".....for among the war leaders of our time he (Wavell) deserve a special place of his own. And again, like Lord Allenby, he has not only been a great soldier, but also an outstanding administrator, whose fame as a constructive statesman may yet come to rival his achievement as a soldier."—*F.M. Smuts.*

"No blow, fair or foul, military or political, ever got past the shield of his integrity.....We may doubt whether any other General could have scratched his crop of victories from the barren soil of Middle East with such scanty seed. Later, it fell to others to reap where he had sown, with resources which he never had, both there and in South East Asia ; and he was always whole-hearted in his admiration of the reaping."—*Bernard Ferguson, Wavell's ADC (later Lord Ballantrae).*

"I have never doubted Lord Wavell's sincerity and desire to serve India's interest. He has carried a heavy burden and has worked hard. I have a high regard for him and shall be sorry in many ways to part from him."—*Nehru.*

"Some failures are greater than success."—*Nehru to Wavell.*

"I cannot help a feeling of regret that Lord Wavell, who was the initiator of a new chapter in the history of relations between India and England, is retiring from the scene.....when I met Lord Wavell, I experienced a sudden change of mind. I found him a rugged, Straightforward soldier void of verbiage and direct both in approach and statement. He was not devious like the politician but came straight to the point and created in the mind an impression of great sincerity which touched my heart.....I am confident that India will never forget this service of Lord Wavell and when the time comes for the historian of independent India to appraise the relations of England and India, he will give Lord Wavell the credit for opening a new chapter."—*Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad,*

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*A FEW COMMENTS ON INTERVENTION IN GREECE

Fuller : The final point to note is that this campaign, so far as the British were concerned, was purely a political one. It should never have been fought, for though the British had pledged her word to support Greece, to do so with a token force in order to "save face" in the eyes of the world, was in no sense fulfilment of her pledge and in every sense a betrayal of General Wilson's Army.

Smuts : I was a convinced supporter of his (Wavell's) strategy and have vivid recollections of those sombre conferences where it was decided upon. But it was not all loss. Honour was saved and a given pledge kept. These are not small things in world affairs. But even more was achieved. In the six weeks during which the enemy was held up in Greece the position against his further advance was secured. His advance to Asia Minor and eventually to Iraq and the Persian Gulf was prevented. How much was thus saved—perhaps the whole future of Allied cause in the vital Middle East theatre : Nor was this all. The revelations of the Numberberg have at last cleared up the far reaching significance of that move to Greece. We have now on record the confession of the Chief of the German General Staff, that the six weeks that Germany lost in Greece delayed the campaign against Russia for that all important period and with the winter coming on, the delay finally rendered the capture of Moscow impossible and thereby lost Germany the war.

Montgomery : I have always considered the British intervention in Greece to have been a strategic error ; it weakened the British front south of Bengazi and in the end British Forces were driven out of Greece, and Cyrenacia,

Churchill : They said that I was wrong to go to Greece in 1940. But I didn't do it simply to save the Greeks. Of course, honour and all that came in. But I wanted to form a Balkan front. I wanted Yugoslav and I hoped for Turkey. That with Greece would have given us fifty divisions. A nut for the Germans to crack. Our intervention in Greece caused the revolution which drove out Prince "Palsy", and delayed the German invasion of Russia by six weeks. Vital weeks ! So it was worth it. If you back a winner it doesn't really matter much what your reasons were at the time. They now say that I went to Greece for the wrong reason. How do they know ? The point is that it was worth it.

Wavell : It might have been more prudent to let Greece go and concentrate on holding Crete and our gains in Libya.....But undue prudence has never yet won battles or campaigns or wars, and from the political point of view it would have been.....unthinkable. Our assistance to Greece cost us Crete and placed us in great difficulties in the Mediterranean but that, we took the right, the only decision, I have no doubt.

Liddell Hart : In three weeks, Greece was overrun and the British thrown out of the Balkans, while the reduced British force in Cyrenacia was also driven out by the German Afrika Korps, which had been enabled to land at Tripoli. These defeats meant a damaging loss of prestige and prospect for Britain, and only hastened the misery that was brought on the Greek people. Even if the Greek campaign was found to have retarded the invasion of Russia, that fact would not justify the British Government's decision, for such an object was not in their minds at the time.

Roosevelt : I think the feeling in America is that the effort which your country made to stem the tide in Greece was a worthy effort and the delaying action which you fought there must have greatly weakened the Axis.

OUR NATIONAL CHARACTER AND ITS VALIDITY

COL. Y.A. MANDE

VERY often and rightly, we attribute our failures to National Character. But, what exactly is our National Character? Here, we display vague knowledge which is not entirely off the mark. This is understandable as an average man is not and cannot possibly be a student of people and cultures.

We become conscious of strength and weaknesses of our character when we compare ourselves with others. Ralph Linton rightly remarks that a dweller of deep sea will become aware of his own culture only if he comes up on the surface and comes in contact with others. In the modern age of communications, commerce and cultural exchange, people living in economically backward regions are very likely to introspect and blame their national character.

In this article, we will examine our National Character : its origin, strength and weaknesses, and validity for the future. As leaders of men, it is desirable that we have some knowledge of our National Character.

It is true that no two individuals show identical character traits but that does not mean that we cannot arrive at a national character. Due to similarities of attitude and behaviour, it is possible to generalise a character-type. We can thus distinguish Indian character from others say American, Russian or Chinese. Similarly, within our own country, we can distinguish regional characters such as Punjabi, Marathi, Bengali etc. While we deal with national character, it is hoped that one does not commit the blunder of syllogism of proving pre-concluded ideas such as—Indians are lazy, Rama Krishna is an Indian, and, therefore, Rama Krishna is lazy. In the individual character assessment, we should never conclude particular from the general.

National character is product of cultural heritage and total environment. Faith, belief, values and attitude are passed down from generation to generation. These elements govern social character. To understand our National Character, we will have to go back to history—to the times which have left traces of influence on our present day character.

GENESIS

We know our National Character. On the positive side, we say that Indians are peace loving, tolerant, God fearing and contented people. On

the negative side, we say that Indians are custom-bound, fatalist, lacking pride, steeped in individual ethic and reconciled to living in sloth and slumber. How did we acquire such character traits ?

'Satkaryavada' is a dictum of Indian Philosophy which postulates that nothing comes from nothing and every thing must have a cause. Our present day character bears influence of ancient Indian forest culture somewhat modified by successive ages.

The bases of Indian culture can be traced back to the life and ideology evolved in Ashrams. The Ashrams were independent institutions, scattered in the various parts of the country, and exercised tremendous spiritual and cultural influence on the neighbouring localities. Their influence was like universities exercising control on all educational institutions within the region. In those days, when knowledge was restricted and life governed by forces of nature, people lived by faith and belief. The rishis and munis were held in high esteem, and both—the ruling classes and the ruled, looked to them for guidance. The Ashrams were seats of learning in the broadest sense. Here were laid the foundations of all our subsequent works on religion, metaphysics, sciences, mathematics, astrology, warfare, music and dances.

Another important factor which has influenced our character formation is village life. We were blessed with abundant plain and fertile land. Population never posed a problem, and to the agricultural community if ever land or food fell short, all that was needed was to clear forest and thereby probably create another village. The villages were self-contained and self-administered entities meeting all the needs of people. Movement was and self-restricted ; people generally lived and died in the same village. In due course a very stern code of agricultural morality was developed. The life in the villages was not very much affected by political changes in rulers or wars. As long as the villages paid the revenue, which they did, rulers never interfered with village life. The life in the villages was static. An Indian village 50 years back was same as it was 500 years ago, and not very different from the villages of vedic age. No wonder, Panicker remarked that Buddha born today will recognise this country as his own.

Caste system is a feature peculiar only to our country. Some say that caste system was introduced by the victorious Aryans who apportioned the upper three caste to themselves and imposed fourth caste on the natives. Others maintain that the origin of caste system was a necessity for division of labour to carry out social functions. We are not discussing merits or demerits of the caste system, but we must note important influence of the caste system on character formation. The rigidity of caste system provided social stability but at the same time developed diverse character formation depending on the caste.

The three factors viz teachings of Ashrams, village life and caste system have influenced Indian character formation. It is also a product of stable life and agricultural vocation.

We go back to 'Satkaryavada'. Nothing begets nothing and every thing must have a cause. Can we account for some of the traits of our National Character ?

Indians are tolerant. This is easily explained. We do not have a single book of scriptures or version on God or religious practices. The rishis interpreted God in different ways. 'He is one, people see him differently'; 'He is the goal, there are various paths to reach him'. Some of the rishis were honest and bold—'who has seen Him ?, who knows whether He was there at the time of creation ?'. There is no rigidity in our thoughts and practices. No wonder, we have a large number of cults and sects. No wonder, we are tolerant and accept others view point. Although, the interpretations are diverse, there is a unity in diversity which gives national feeling to people living in various parts of the country.

Indians are peace loving. Our culture was evolved in the land of plenty. There was never a population explosion ; epidemics, diseases and natural calamities exercised control on population growth. We were blessed with natural barriers and did not see frequent wars. We faced few invasions and did not indulge in any aggression. Warfare was restricted to only one section of the society—Kshatriya. Our peace loving attitude is also a result of individual ethic. The goal of life was individual salvation—Moksha. Till to this date, an average Indian says : "Why bother about others, think of your own actions and its fruits". The caste system tamed aspirations and attuned people to live according to their status in life.

Indians are God fearing. Gods had every reason to be most powerful when human race was ignorant and living on the mercy of dark forces of nature. In our country, God and religion continue to exercise a dominant role even to day. Unlike in the West, there was no clash between the Church and temporal authorities. Even atheist Buddha did not mind God. Shankara refuted the existence of pantheon of Gods, but nevertheless wrote beautiful verses on Siva. God and religion in our country have never been tyrannical to cause anti-thesis.

Indians are contented people. We acclaim those virtues which control passion and desires, lead to simple life and even renunciation. Our reverence still goes to rishis, sadhus and gurus. The Kings that we admire are of the kind of Buddha, Ashoka and Bhoga. The glamorous film stars and industrial magnets do not leave impression on the minds of people.

Indians are fatalists. The caste system keeps people in perpetual bondage. Mobility is restricted in stable societies. Our fate in this life is governed by past Karma. Jagat is Mithya and all objects of this world are not worth acquisition. One must accept destiny.

We can thus account for our character traits. A point to note is that it is exceedingly difficult to classify a particular trait either as good or bad. Any character trait when taken to extreme is subject to objections. Our classification of good or bad would depend on situation. Thus tolerance, humility and contentedness are good under certain conditions.

At any rate, the extreme set i.e. meekness, lack of pride, sloth and slumber cannot be considered as good. Also, the determinants of character traits can lead to diametrically opposite results. For example, belief in rebirth can lead to active work in this life, but it can also lead to renunciation.

THE WESTERN MODEL

As already stated, we become aware of weaknesses of our national character when we compare ourselves with the West. The present Western character is based on confidence, individualism, nationalism, mechanism and militarism.

The West relied upon benevolence of almighty God for improvement in human affairs as much as we did. The divine power was used both by Church and the Kings to further their individual interest : they joined hand when it suited them, they clashed bitterly when it did not. On the whole, decline in the Church was caused by the excesses of the clergy. The exodus of Greek intellectuals, scientific discoveries and industrialisation gradually eroded belief in the omnipotence of God. Instead of relying on miracles and mysteries, they turned to empiricism and science. Men and women developed confidence in managing their own affairs. With science and technology, they made a rapid progress and a new industrial culture was born. They learnt to control their population ; plan their health and hygiene services ; organize and control public utilities. With industrialisation and education, emancipation of women was completed. With total change in environment, a new character was born whose features are confidence, adventure, individualism, competition and industry.

ANALYSIS

We are now in a position to answer certain questions on national character, which we commonly ask.

Is there a thing called National Character ?

Yes. National Character is based on similarities of belief, values, attitudes and responses. History, geography, cultural heritage and environment are factors which govern national character.

Is National Character constant or subject to change?

National Character changes with time and situation. The Western Character has changed considerably. The signs of change are visible in Indian cities and amongst the elite. The present changes are due to science and technology.

Can we classify character trait as good or bad ?

Regrettably no. Life situations change ; what was good in the past cannot be good for the present and what is good for the present cannot be so for the future. Our classification should be based on problem solving.

Individualism is good but, if it affects harmony within the group, it cannot be called as good.

We should note that the question begging term is not character but 'good'. Good is a precarious term not easy to define. The ethics as a subject faces enormous difficulties in defining Good.

Is Character dependent on familial or racial inheritance ?

Very commonly we talk about transfer of character qualities owing to parentage and race. The genetic studies reveal transfer of certain characters. The study of identical twins reinforces belief in the influence of heredity. But the influence of environment cannot be denied. Heredity vs environment or Nature vs nurture is an unresolved problem. It would be advisable to remember that whatever heredity can do, the environment can also do. Scientists admit that staggering number of chromosome combinations undermine reliance on heredity ; a dullard has equal chance to procreate a genius. As far as races are concerned, no pure races are left except for few tribals. A thoroughly mixed up race as in UK have achieved marvels.

Will one world produce one character ?

Internationalism has already set in. Frontiers of nations no longer hold good in view of present system of commerce, transportation and communications. When cultures come in contact, they shed some of their features and borrow from others. An educated Indian has already shed some of the styles of his culture and has absorbed Western pattern in many respects. Habits govern our thinking and actions. If the world lives in peace for a long duration, the internationalism will prosper. The possibility of one world character cannot be denied.

But, this will take a long time—several centuries. Presently, we are still in the stage of nationalism. The cultural residues are strong enough to maintain national pride and differentiation. McIver is right when he says that in the process of development, cultural changes are extremely slow, while scientific and technological developments take place at a fast pace.

Does situation change National Character or National Character changes situation

We are apt to blame national character for the prevailing situation. I hope, by now it is clear that it is the situation which moulds national character. Humanity is highly adaptable and adjusts to situation, otherwise survival would not be possible. Man is a creature of circumstances. Events like Black Death in Europe gave labour a new place of dignity. Suppose by a chance event, the population of India is reduced to half, the entire shape of the country including its national character will undergo a phenomenal change.

Are we so helpless, can't we control the situation ?

Although we say that man is a creature of circumstances, it does not

mean that he is helpless. Man is also the master of his destiny. The progress has occurred by the conquest of nature and controlling situations. Those who attribute laziness to Indian tropical climate should remember that West has conquered cold. Indeed it is a two way traffic—situation changes man and man changes situation.

What can we do to change National situation and character ?

It is a subject by itself. Here we can only say that situations can be changed by concerted efforts of the people, resolved leadership and chance events. We have little hope unless we control population and increase production. Meanwhile elite, who show better understanding, should develop a proper philosophy of work.

VALIDITY

How far is our National Character valid to meet the present situation ? How does it fare for the future ?

The most important feature of our character is that it is a product of culture which is most conducive to stable life. Humanity looks forward to an era when life will be free from hunger and strife, materially comfortable, free from wars—where social groups will cooperate with each other and arts will flourish. Every Utopian concept of philosophy contains an element of stability. Future world, if it wants to lead the life of peace, plenty and cooperation will have to develop Indian Character. Peaceful existence is not possible unless people learn tolerance, content, eschewing of pride, non-violence and control on passions and desires. Although one does not advocate the rigidity of caste system, we should note that Huxley in his design for Brave New World goes back on the caste system for inculcation of qualities necessary for stability and solidarity. His division of society into Alfa, Beta, Gamma & Epsilon is most rigid, achieved by laboratory control on birth and intense psycho-therapy during childhood. Bertrand Russell, having analysed all factors, falls back on to two hereditary division of his Scientific Society into governors and workers. We should remember that arts and religions flourish in the environment of freedom. Society can never reach stability if it looks for guidances to industrial magnets, administrators, political leaders or voluptuous film stars. For a stable life, the social ideal must be intellectuals—a new brand of rishis who lead a very simple life and ask nothing for the selves.

But, peace and stability is only an ideal—far from being a fact of life. Life so far has been a flux, a series of changing situations, a struggle for existence and domination. In such situations, the qualities which lead to success are price, ambition, confidence, competition, mechanism, militarism and nationalism. The Western character is product of struggle and strife. The character formation of the West could not possibly have taken place in the absence of long confrontation between the church and kings, frequent wars and colonialism. Now that the wars are becoming rare, and at any

rate it is no longer a profitable game, the West will have to readjust. The West will have to imbibe those very qualities of the Orient which it has been despising. Peace is not a function of armed parity and cold war is not a permanent substitute for hot wars. Stability cannot be achieved by one nation maintaining a steady growth rate at the cost of others. It can only be achieved by sacrifice and genuine good will. Pursuit of self-interest inevitably leads to clashes and seldom reaches the level of enlightened self-interest as Mills thought.

We can genuinely be proud of our National Character. We however, fail to understand one important aspect. The formation of our character was based on a culture evolved in the days of peace, plenty and material abundance. Our character is no good in the face of poverty, unwanted population and chronic shortages. It is completely out of tune with the prevailing situation and hence our misery. Unless, we check our population and learn to work hard, the conditions will never improve. The desirable aspects of our character are a liability.

Man is a product of situation. Our prosperous and successful man are those who exploit situation: but they lack vision and philosophy. What can we do? As stated earlier, environment planning is a subject by itself. Hard and honest work can improve situation. As elite, we can spread a sound philosophy of work.

A little observation and reflection will reveal to us the gross inequalities in the world. The inequalities exist in dead and live objects; we can see it in vegetable life, animal world and human species. Life is full of vicissitudes, pain is real and tragedies strike human beings in most diverse manner from birth to death. How do we account for these?

In our culture, we believe in the laws of Karma. Karma is not a mere theism, it is an integrated philosophy which can be verified by observation and experience. There are two tenets of Karma which are generally not understood or ignored. Firstly, once the Karma has started, Gods have nothing more to do; they are helpless. Secondly, to reap the fruits of Karma one has to work first and make a deposit into the Bank Account of Karma. 'Karmaphal' is a total result of all actions performed, in this and previous lives. In this World (Karmakshetra), one cannot be greedy seeking fruits of action without making adequate deposits. There is nothing fatalistic about the philosophy of Karma, it is positive in approach. It enjoin us to work inspite of all odds. Albert Schweitzer hand charged Indian Philosophy for fatalism; Radha Krishnan defends—how can a philosophy which believes in Rebirth and Karma can ever be fatalistic.

One may not believe in the philosophy of Karma. Indeed, there are genuine reasons to doubt. But, if philosophy of Karma does not explain inequalities and tragedies, nothing else in this world does. The sciences and theism fail to offer any cogent reasons.

Those who crib about our National Character ought not to rest content with mere criticism. They must work. Those who work only for

themselves are animals. Good actions are those which are meant for others. We will do well to explain philosophy of Karma to people but explanations are not good enough, people follow examples of superiors. However, if only we can check our population, nothing else is needed.

CONCLUSION

To sum up, National Character is generalised traits of similar behaviour displayed by a community. It is acquired through prolonged situation under a certain set of circumstances. While retaining the good traits of our National Character, we can change situation and thereby eliminate weaknesses in our National Character. We can do so provided we are resolved and put in concerted efforts.

“Everything has a cause and nothing begets nothing”.

CHANGES IN THE PATTERN OF CO-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES AND LEISURE TIME PURSUITS OF THE NDA CANDIDATES IN THE LAST 30 YEARS

MD SHARMA & RP GAUTAM

PSYCHOLOGISTS

SELECTION CENTRE EAST, ALLAHABAD

Introduction

"The bio-social study of the Candidates Appearing Before SSBs for Admission to NDA Pune" (Gautam and Sharma, 78)" reveals the pattern of regional ethnological and social strata of the NDA candidates along with their personal, parental and educational background. It also indicated the changes which took place in the composition of the NDA population region wise, age wise, economic status wise, religion wise etc in the last 28 years since the first study was made by the Directorate of Psychological Research.

The present study is an attempt to see the pattern of co-curricular activities and leisure time pursuits of the NDA candidates with the same hypothesis that the improvement in the country's lot in the last more than 30 years of independence and planned development, must have brought changes in the pattern of games, hobbies and other extra-curricular activities of the young boys. As these activities make important contribution to the personality development, their study may also throw some side light on the selection of the candidates.

Sample

The sample for this study consists of 870 candidates of the (60th NDA course who appeared before the Services Selection Boards (SSBs) in 1978. The same sample which was used for the Gautam and Sharma's study referred above was utilised for the present study.

Tools for Study

Personal Information Questionnaires used at the SSBs, giving the personal particulars and bio-data of the candidates, we analysed and tabulated on a separate sheet and statistics were worked out as given on the subsequent pages.

The Findings

Co-curricular Activities

Certain activities which are strictly speaking outside the orbit of the academic course have found permanent place in the overall activities of

school after the aim of the education was declared to be the balanced development of the personality of the students. These activities have been honoured by renaming them as co-curricular activities in place of extra-curricular activities. The activities are important for developing certain aspects of personality eg cultural development and development of literary and scientific aptitude etc.

The analysis of these activities in respect of the present sample gave the following pattern. The findings of the PRW Study (1952) are also given for comparison :

TABLE I

S. No.	Activities	No. of Boys	Percentage	Percentage as per PRW Study (1952)
1.	NCC	590	67.88	—
2.	Debate	285	32.85	22.36
3.	Cultural Activities	263	30.00	6.30
4.	Quiz Contest	108	12.48	—
5.	Essay/Poem Writing	61	7.24	—
6.	NSS	37	4.26	—
7.	Organising Exhibitions/Tours	36	4.25	—
8.	Painting/Draw ing	30	3.44	—
9.	Literary Activities	21	2.33	9.04
10.	Scouting	—	—	34.50
11.	First Aid	—	—	3.97

NCC appears to be the most popular activity as it has been taken up by two-third of the boys. The apparent popularity, however, may be due the fact about 55% boys hail from Sainik/Military Schools where NCC is compulsory. Young boys may also have the impression that NCC being akin to military service, may prove advantageous in getting entry into NDA. Debate and cultural activities come next, which attract about one-third boys each. These activities also appear to be part of the Public, Sainik and Military Schools life from where a good majority comes. Quiz contest and essay writing are other activities which attract total about 20% of the boys. NSS and organisational activities are not so popular, as these important activities attract only 4% boys each.

When compared with 1952 study, the changes in the pattern are striking. In those days scouting was the most popular activity taken up 34.50% boys but scout movement appears to have died down completely now-a-days. Debating has maintained its position as the second most popular activity but the percentage of participants has gone up by 10%

Literary activity was popular with 9.04% boys in the past but the percentage has gone down to 2.33 in the present. Its place has been taken up by Quiz Contest which found no place in 1952 study. Cultural activities are more in the lime light now-a-days as 24% more boys are attracted by them. No other activity was prominent in those days except dramatics which attracted 5.30% students. In the present study cultural activities cover this activity in a modified form but it has lost its separate entity. First aid which was taken by 4% boys in the old days finds no place in the present study.

Games

The pattern of games played by the students is interesting study as revealed by the data tabulated below :

TABLE II

SN.	Games	No. Played	Percentage	Percentage in 1952 Study
1.	Hockey	366	42.25	58.44
2.	Football	362	41.75	48.40
3.	Cricket	333	38.20	40.94
4.	Basketball	233	27.93	4.39
5.	Athletics	226	26.00	—
6.	Volleyball	128	14.80	17.56
7.	Swimming	103	11.73	7.07
8.	Tennis	98	11.25	6.40
9.	Boxing	69	7.82	3.88
10.	Badminton	68	7.70	21.72
11.	Chess/Carrom	26	2.95	—
12.	Kabaddi	24	2.76	2.12
13.	Gymnastics	21	2.48	—
14.	Kho Kho	13	1.45	—
15.	Squash	11	2.25	1.41
16.	Wrestling	3	0.34	0.77
17.	Skating	2	0.23	0.20
18.	Judo	1	0.01	—

The most popular games among the boys appear to be hockey and football closely followed by cricket and basketball. All these games are being played by 38 to 42% boys. Athletics attract 26% students, volley ball 15%, boxing and swimming about 12% each and tennis 11%. Other games are played by small minority except badminton which claims the attention of 8% boys.

The pattern of games compares well with the old study. In fifties also hockey, football and cricket were the most popular games which attracted from 40 to 58% boys. Recently basketball has gone quite high in popularity which attracts the attention of 34% more boys but the hockey has lost much of its old charm as the percentage of players has gone down from 58 to 42. Volleyball has retained its position but badminton has gone down from 22 to 8% due perhaps to the high price of the shuttle cocks. Tennis, however, has gone up from 6% to 11% inspite of prohibitive cost mainly because of emergence of Sainik Schools which patronise this game. Boxing and swimming have definitely gained popularity and the patronage now-a-days is much higher. Other games show no significant fluctuation.

Hobbies

Hobbies are the leisure time activities which engage the attention of the boys according to their interest and talents. They also depict the personality to some extent as outdoor, indoor artistes, intellectual or time-killing hobbies are taken up according to personality qualities. However, hobbies are becoming costly now-a-days and only a few can indulge in the luxury of taking up the hobbies seriously. Nevertheless young people have to have some leisure time persuits and the following table shows the list of hobbies of the 60th NDA course candidates :

TABLE III

S.No.	Hobbies	No. of Boys	Percentage	Percentage in PRW Study
1.	Reading	294	33.90	7.97
2.	Music	151	17.24	5.99
3.	Stamp Collection	107	11.95	17.29
4.	Trekking/Hiking	104	11.90	3.90
5.	Cycling	62	6.82	1.14
6.	Drawing/Painting	59	6.78	4.49
7.	Gardening	54	6.21	8.65
8.	Seeing Movies	50	5.74	—
9.	Sight Seeing/Travelling	37	4.25	—
10.	Photography	32	3.68	19.18
11.	Pen Friendship	32	3.68	0.97
12.	Model Making	28	3.20	—
13.	Writing	22	2.55	1.21
14.	Electronics	18	2.07	1.85
15.	Shooting	18	2.07	7.08
16.	Mountaineering	18	2.07	—
17.	Wood Work	16	1.84	1.20

18. Photo Collection	14	1'61	4'90
19. Coin Collection	12	1'38	3'08
20. Horse Riding	10	1'15	2'36
21. Kite Flying	10	1'15	1'57
22. Biological Collection	5	0'57	0'46
23. Fishing	5	0'57	0'58
24. Book Binding	4	0'46	—
25. Autograph Collection	3	0'34	0'86
26. Keeping Pats	3	0'34	—
27. Girl Watching	1	0'12	—
28. Stone Collection	1	0'12	0'12
29. Label Collection	1	0'12	0'75
30. Coining Nicknames	1	0'12	—
31. Sleeping	1	0'12	—
32. Talking	1	0'12	—

Reading is the most popular hobby among the young students taken up by 33'90% boys. In fact, reading is the main pursuit of the youngsters and they carry it on from class-room to home. Music is another favourable pastime pursued by 17'24% boys which may include some occasional singing also. Stamp collection and trekking/hiking are the other pursuits liked by about 12% boys each. Drawing, painting, gardening, cycling, seeing movies get equal percentage of patronage by the boys which is about 6%. Sight seeing attracts 4% boys and pen-friendship and photography come next vying with the hobby. Other pursuits are taken up by a small minority. Curiously enough, sleeping, girl watching and talking have been raised to the level of hobbies which are supposed to be respectable pastimes.

In 1952, study photography had the highest place (19'11%) but with rising cost, it has come down to 3'66% only. Stamp collection was indulged in by 17'29% boys in the past, but now the percentage has come down to 11'95. Reading has attracted highest attention of the boys in these days of tough competition and the percentage has gone up from 7'97 in the fifties to 33 at present. Students have become much more musical (11% increase) and trekking and hiking now-a-days attract the attention of 8% more boys, perhaps due to the encouragement given at the Sainik Schools. The number taking up gardening has come down from 8'65% to 6'21%. Mountaineering has caught the attention of young boys recently which was not there in the past. The patronage given to other hobbies has not significantly increased or gone down except that cycling and movie seeing has increased by about 6%.

If the hobbies are divided into indoors and outdoors, the former get overwhelmingly more patronage the ratio being 2 : 1. Similarly literary pursuits are attracting more attention as compared to works of practical

and mechanical nature. This is, perhaps not a healthy trend for the fast developing country where electronic and mechanical gadgets are playing more important part in our day-to-day life.

Position of Responsibility

If a boy shows some brightness in any sphere and displays some talent for organisation he is given some position of responsibility to manage that activity. Such achievements are the recognition of the talent in a student. The information regarding the position of responsibility held by the boys is given below.

TABLE IV

Position of Responsibility	No. of Boys	Percentage	Percentage in 1952 Study
(a) Monitor/Prefect/Class representative	379	43.33	27.84* (a)+(c)
(b) Captain/Vice Captain of a team	337	38.37	6.87
(c) President/Secretary/Editor of a group	100	10.26	—
(d) Rank in NCC/Troop Leader	232	26.66	—

* The figure represents total percentage in all extra-curricular activities.

From the table it is clear that 43.33% boys have shown their organisational worth in the class room and 38.37% have outshone in the play ground. 26.66% have held some rank of responsibility in the NCC. Whereas only 10.26% have shown their organisational ability in the cultural field. In 1950 there was no NCC and holders of the position of President/Secretary/Editor were less attracted towards the NDA. Only 27.84% boys held the position of responsibility in the extra-curricular activities in 1950 but the number has gone up considerably now to more than 80%. It is partly due to the fact that there are many more appointment holders in Sainik, Public and Military Schools. In the field of games the number of holding position of responsibility has gone up from about 7% to 38%.

Conclusion

The pattern of co-curricular activities and the leisure time pursuits of the young boys has shown a definite and significant change in the last 30 years, which partly reflects the change in the life pattern due to change of values and emphasis and partly due to availability of the facilities and resources.

In the co-curricular activities new activities have become popular in the place of old ones. Scouting, first aid and dramatics

have lost their charm completely. Now NCC Quiz contest and cultural activities have become most popular. In the field of games hockey, football and cricket are still the most popular games but basketball is the new popular entrant in the field and tennis in spite of cost, has gained more popularity. Badminton has lost some of its charm whereas boxing and swimming have caught up the attention of the boys. It is perhaps due to emergence of Sainik Schools on the educational horizon.

In the field of hobbies reading has caught the attention of larger percentage and the number of music lovers has increased. Photography is no longer popular due perhaps to high cost and stamp collection gone down in the eyes of the students. New hobbies like hiking, trekking and mountaineering have come up in the field. Patronage for cycling and movie seeing has also gone up. The indoor and literary type of hobbies are more popular than outdoor, practical and mechanical types. This does not conform to our fast changing and industrially developing society, which requires more active participation by the young population.

42% have held position of responsibility in the class room situations, 38% in the sports field, about 27% in the NCC and 10% in the cultural activities. This is definite improvement as only 6.87 boys held position of responsibility in games in the last study and total of about 28% held some position of responsibility in the extra-curricular activities. The change is generally according to the social and economic changes but spirit of industrial society has not yet been imbibed by the young population.

Suggestions

It is heartening to note that more boys are holding the position of responsibility and some of the more adventurous games and hobbies like boxing, swimming, hiking and mountaineering are catching attention of the students. However, they should be encouraged to develop more active mechanical and outdoor hobbies which could help the fast developing industrial society in general and selection in the Armed Forces in particular.

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THE BRIGHT FUTURE

CAPT. S.C. GUPTA

Introduction

Service officers in the Armed Forces have a short span career as compared to their counterparts in civil services. During this short span, they hardly get sufficient opportunities to attend any out-side courses, except the professional courses conducted by various military establishments. Thus an officer retires at a young age without adequate qualification background for civil employment, when he is at the peak of his performance and his personal commitments are at the highest. In view of the acute unemployment problem, it becomes very difficult for a service officer to compete with his more qualified counterparts in civil services. This has an adverse effect on the morale and motivation of serving officers. Keeping in mind the futuristic pattern of education, availability of qualified personnel and re-employment opportunities it is essential that a service officer is provided with sufficient opportunities during the service career to build-up his qualification and prepare for the future days. The aim of this paper is to emphasise the need for educational programmes for service officers and highlight its effects on re-employment opportunities while competing with their qualified civilian counterparts.

Necessity

Today there is a reluctance on the part of the youth of the country to join the Armed Forces. There are several reasons for this such as relatively poor prospects in the services, as compared to the attractive remuneration, easy working conditions, better comfort and better education facilities in a civilian career. The other major disadvantage of a service career is early retirement without qualifications for civil life. Hence it is a necessity that a service officer is kept at par with his counterparts by providing sufficient opportunities for him to build-up his prospects during his service.

Educating service officers or rehabilitation of officers is not matter of charity or merely a moral obligation but has to be attended to because of its deeper effects on the morale of the cadre of service officers.

Types of Entry into the Army

At present various types of entries into the Army with their educational back-ground are as follows :

- (a) *NDA*. Entry/admission to National Defence Academy is after Higher Secondary/Intermediate Standard. During the stay of 3 years in National Defence Academy, an officer attains a degree standard.
- (b) *IMA*. Entry to the IMA is after successfully completing training at NDA or through direct entry after passing graduate examinations.
- (c) *OTS*. Admission to officers training school earlier used to be after intermediate or equivalent standard which has subsequently been raised to graduate level.
- (d) *ACC*. Entry to Army Cadet college is through ranks who subsequently join IMA after achieving desired academic qualification.

Except for Technical, Medical, Veterinary or the Education branch, it is rare to find better qualified individuals seeking entry into the army, unlike in other armies.

Prestige

An army to quite a degree attracts to its ranks personnel based on its clan. A service officer today feels quite frustrated and let down when he finds his old colleagues, who were rejected for services, now firmly and comfortably settled while he, who has spent his service away from his family is likely to be on the streets and fending for himself due to the lack of academic qualifications/degree for entering the civil life.

Opportunities to Civilians

A civilian career gives better remuneration, easier working conditions/ life, better comforts plus better opportunities as against inherent occupational hazards and disturbed conditions of a service career. Some of the important factors are :

- (a) *Working Hours*. Working hours of civilian officers are generally restricted from 0800 hours to 1630 hours or 0900 hours to 1700 hours. There is adequate time available after office hours. This provides excellent opportunities for them to attend regular evening or part time classes in recognised institutions. A case in point is the number of Air Force personnel doing evening studies, but which is negligible in the Army due to commitments and urgencies of service.
- (b) *Study Leave*. Civilian officers have the facility of taking/applying for study leave which is easily granted, and its duration extends up to a maximum of two years. This time is sufficient to attend any post graduation courses.
- (c) *Scholarships*. A number of scholarships, educational grants and other facilities are provided by various Indian and foreign universities. It is always easier for a civilian officer to make use of these prevalent facilities.

Opportunities to Service Officers

Service officers, unless fortunate enough to be posted at static, establishment like Research and Development, or other semi-military

organisation, or category 'A' establishments where the working hours are restricted, are not in a position to make use of the existing facilities of evening/part time classes. Officers posted to Regiment/Battalion have to attend various evening Regiment activities or night parades. An Army Officer has the following drawbacks for acquiring higher education :

(a) *Study Leave.* Except for the technical arms, including Medical there is no provisions for service officers to get long study leave to attend long/post-graduation studies in various institutions.

(b) *Scholarships.* Similar to study leave, there are no facilities for availing various scholarships.

(c) *Movements.* Unlike civilians, most of the service officers are posted out within 2 to 3 years from one station to another. With the present state of acute shortage of married accommodation, it becomes difficult for an officer to settle down. This non-availability of accommodation and frequent movements does not give him a chance to join regular classes.

(d) *State of Officers.* Posted strength of officers in a unit is very fluid. It will be seldom that a unit will be posted full authorisation. Out of the available, most of the officers would be either on leave, courses or temporary duties. Under such circumstances it becomes difficult to spare an officer for long courses. In a country where there is chronic unemployment there should be no problem of making up the authorisation.

Civil Qualification and Equivalents

The biggest stumbling block for service officers to get a civilian job is their apparent lack of suitable civil qualification and work experience. The recent recognition of NDA passing out examination as equivalent to a degree is a step in the right direction. A number of other technical courses like Driving and Maintenance of A & B Vehicles, Workshop management, refrigeration and air-conditioning, Engineer Degree Advance civil and Electrical/Mechanical etc. should also be got recognised from various universities/institutions. The atmosphere in the country being so degree oriented/conscious, it is imperative that more and more officers are given facilities to acquire higher qualifications of their recognised equivalents. The following steps are suggested in this direction :

(a) More service training institutions be recognised as equivalent to civilian degree/diploma.

(b) More correspondence courses be allowed.

(c) Study leave for higher education be liberalised.

(d) More and more publicity and encouragement to the officers at all levels.

Magnitude of the Problem

Until past 5-6 years, Emergency Commissioned Officers and Short Service Commissioned Officers were given specialised treatment. If one takes

statistics, it will be seen that out of 894 regular officers only 11% were able to find jobs out side. For emergency Commissioned Officers, their percentage was 15% out of 1080. These percentages reveal a grim picture on the future Employment potential of released service officers with their present qualification.

Wastage Rate

The number of officers released in the past few years is as given below. (These figures are likely to considerably increase due to the release of intense recruitment during emergency period) :

1975—563

1976—615

1977—521

1978—562

1979—497

State and Service Responsibility

Today provision of facilities for higher qualification/training for resettlement falls under the term welfare. Though instructions have been issued from time to time to various institutions in private and public sectors to provide facilities to service officers no major break through has been achieved.

It has been made to believe that mass scale absorption in civilian jobs, without regard to their suitability and qualifications will endanger productivity and economic growth and as such impede the progress which is highly incorrect.

The service officers not only have the background to do well in any out-side appointments, but they could also bring a refreshing change in tonning up the administration by their result oriented and discipline approach. The induction of service officers in Ministry of Defence at Deputy Secretary and above, would prove their element of expertise so conspicuously lacking in the present/ministerial set-up. This does not require any extra qualifications/degrees.

Civilian Employees in Defence Services

More than 90% of the civilian appointments in the Defence Services, can be manned by service officers. Steps should be taken to stop the intake of such replaceable category of civilians and progressively fill up these vacancies by those presently in service and superannuated. Charity begins at home. Having a critical look at the number of civilians employed in defence services, without any offence to civilians, it does not stand to logic that a defence personnel retires so early where as a civilian in the same department can work up to 58. Here also, one does not need any extra qualifications to continue in same department. Places like Ordnance factories, Stores Depots, MES, CSD have a large number of civilians who could easily be substituted by service officers/personnel,

Public Sector Undertakings

The considerable managerial, administrative skill and experience gained by service officers during his service is not appreciated by civil authorities and those incharge of Public enterprises, who prefer degree/academic qualification. As a matter of fact there should be no difficulty in fitting them in public sectors, especially if they are given a short pre-release training in some institutions such as administrative staff college followed by a short period in job apprenticeship.

Private Undertakings

Private sector employees should also consciously search for suitable service officers due to proceed on release and after giving them initial training should be able to absorb them. Special cells should be set-up for the purpose and if necessary, should receive financial support from Government.

Comparison with Civil Services

The availability of higher posts in civil services is quite large such that civil services have a built in tier system, where at each level sufficient appointments are available or created to accommodate and provide for a reasonable promotion outlets. Moreover the openings provided in the various ministries both in central and state government make it easier for lateral induction to all class I civilian officers irrespective of their cadre. This arrangement is denied to service officers due to various reasons. Thus there is an acute disparity in the career prospects of service officers vis-a-vis their civilian counter-parts. The present cadre review though a step in the right direction, is only a drop in the ocean.

The Employment Aspect

After reaching the age of 48/50, an average army officer gets its broad side from both directions with no future to look forward in service, and nothing to fall back upon when he retires in the absence of sufficient degree/qualifications. If he is considered too old for army, he is also considered too old for industry.

In UK and USA, the army is recognised as a leading source of highly qualified executives in administrative and personnel relations, abilities required in executive positions in industry. In these countries, these are the qualities in demand by private sectors seeking top-notch talent for the task of planning, organising and controlling their operations. Unfortunately in our country, there still seems to be a belief with most industrialists that average service officer can only carry out slavishly orders given to him by his superiors and he does not understand management, organisation, administration, finance, motivation and lots of other disciplines necessary in business life. The fact that most of the latest management techniques employed in industry were first started in the army has not been generally appreciated,

It is hence pertinent to examine the possible reasons leading to service officers deliberately being kept out of secretariat appointments in the ministries. There may be some doubt about the qualifications, experience, ability of service officers to hold such appointments. It could also stem from a reservation that, the defence services should be kept isolated from fields of governmental activities other than Armed Forces.

It is true that service officers may not possess the higher educational qualifications on entry like their civilian counterparts, but their initial training equip them more than sufficiently to undertake variety of jobs and tasks. Even in academic field, the gap is being narrowed by progressive induction of graduate direct entries to service academies. The diverse experience and the mix of skill that they gain at various staff and command appointments, equip them more than adequately, to undertake any task involving management of human and natural resources. At a higher level of planning, the service officers not only ensure execution of national defence policy but are active participants in the decision-making process of national security which embraces almost every walk of life.

Reservation of Vacancies

The Government should issue orders on the reservation of vacancies for service officers in various public and private sectors like EPI, CIL, ECIL, BMEL, ITI, HMT D.G.I. etc etc. Necessary desired/required qualifications could be advertised much in advance and all out efforts be made to provide sufficient opportunities to services officers to acquire these qualifications, either by encouraging them to join correspondence courses or by giving study leave.

Recommendations

To sum up the following are suggested :

- (a) More service training institutions be recognised as equivalent to civilian degree/diplomas.
- (b) More correspondence courses be allowed.
- (c) Study leave for higher education be liberalised.
- (d) As far as possible units be posted with its authorised strength of officers.
- (e) More encouragement and publicity at all levels.
- (f) Establishment of cells at Command level to maintain an up to date details of officers with their technical/academic qualification and job opportunities.
- (g) As far as possible more and more officers should be given a chance to serve in places where facilities for higher education are easily available.

Conclusions

Presently very few service officers indeed think of their future resettlement while in the service, and begin to worry about it only when their release retirement is imminent. While serving they have little or no interest in the resettlement problems of others who are

about to leave. As an organisation the services take resettlement as a subject, where, responsibilities lie outside the purview of their daily duties. Unless the task of providing higher education academic/technical, is taken up as a normal function of command, little can be achieved to improve present situation. At present, DGR is the only organisation for resettlement. A number of training cells should be established at command level as well. These cells should have the details of various job opportunities with desired academic standard, in various private and public sectors. At the same time they should maintain a list of officers with their upto-date academic/technical qualification fulfilling the requirements or likely to fulfil, and they should be informed much in advance so that they could be provided with adequate facilities to build up the desired standard of qualification in due course of time and take up the appointments immediately after release/retirement.

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BOOK REVIEWS

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTH ASIA DURING THE 1980s

Edited by D.D. Khanna

(Published by Nava Prakash, Calcutta-6, 1979) pp 249, Price Rs. 60'00

THIS book under review contains eighteen papers, presented at a National Seminar held at Allahabad in March 1978, under the auspices of the Department of Defence Studies, University of Allahabad, and an "Introduction" by Shri Jagat S. Mehta, the then Foreign Secretary, Government of India.

The papers are : (1) India's Security Perspective in the Eighties,—by Shri P.R. Chari ; (2) India—Sri Lanka Relations in the 1980s,—by Urmila Phadnis ; (3) Himalayan Kingdoms and India's Security in the 1980s,—by Shri S.D. Muni ; (4) Pakistan—A Factor in Indian Security in the 1980s,—by Dr. B. Chakravorty ; (5) Pakistan's Nuclear Development and Policy,—by Sri D.D. Khanna ; (6) Soviet Interests in South Asia and Future of Indo-Soviet Relations,—by Prof. Bhabani Sengupta ; (7) India and South-East Asia ; The Search for a Policy,—by Prof. Vishal Singh ; (8) Strategic Developments in Indian Ocean,—by Commander (Retd.) Ravi Kaul ; (9) India's Security Needs in the 1980s,—by Shri A. N. Kakkar ; (10) Trends and Structure of Defence Expenditure in India : 1951-1977,—by Dr. P.N. Mehrotra ; (11) Indian Defence Policy at Cross-roads : A plea for public debate,—by Dr. R.V.R. Chandrasekhara Rao ; (12) Weapons Systems and India's Defence Policy for 1980s,—by Dr. K.R. Singh ; (13) Role of PGM in India's Defence during 1980s—by Prof. S.K. Bhattacharya ; (14) The Main Battle Tank (MBT) of India for 1980s,—by Lt. Col. (Retd) B. Singh ; (15) Role of Science and Technology in the changing strategic environment in South Asia,—by Col. (Retd.) R. Rama Rao ; (16) Nuclear proliferation and South Asia,—by Dr. T.T. Poulouse ; and (17) An alternative fuel cycle for the Indian nuclear programme during 1980s,—by Dr. R.R. Subramaniam.

From the above titles of the seminar papers one can easily see that a large number of issues connected with India's security in the 1980s have been examined by experts. But a full picture of the subject remains incomplete without an essay on U.S.A.'s interests and possible role in South Asia and a discussion on China, West Asia and Afghanistan as factors influencing India's security. What is more, internal unrest cannot also be excluded from any analyses of South Asia's strategic environment,

The essays compiled in this volume are highly educative and must be read by all who are concerned with India's security—soldiers, administrators, public leaders, diplomats and scholars.

Prof. D.D. Khanna deserves congratulations for organising the National Seminar and bringing out such an interesting treatise on a very important subject.

—B.C.

DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1919-1939, FIRST SERIES, VOL.
XXI: GERMAN REPARATION AND ALLIED MILITARY CONTROL 1923

Edited by W.N. Medlicott and M.E. Lambert

(Published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1978) pp 1027.
Price £ 30'00 net

THIS book contains as many as 697 British Foreign Office documents divided into two chapters besides one Appendix on the reference of the Saar problem to the League of Nations during April 24-December 16, 1923. While chapter I deals with the German reparation and the Franco-Belgian occupation of the industrially rich Ruhr, Chapter II documentates the Allied military control of Germany and German problems other than reparation, during January-December 1923.

The documents contained in this volume show British diplomacy of a high order—a policy of carrot and stick. On the one hand the British Government disliked Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr and their seizure of pledges in the already occupied Rhineland, but they refrained from taking a very tough line against the allies, excepting making strong representations against their moves, which eventually bore fruit. On the other hand, they did not openly show sympathy towards the German passive resistance to the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr. The result was that the French and Belgian Governments became cautious in their moves, lest Britain would withdraw from the Allied occupation of the Rhineland and the German reparation arrangement. Thus the "Entente" remained intact and working arrangements could be made to solve all the knotty problems. But, sometimes the British Government had to state their position clearly and strongly, if not bluntly, when they found their national interests could be adversely affected by the Allied action. They informed the French Government that they would not accept the complete separation of the Rhineland from Germany. Again, when the French insisted on their demand for sanctions against Germany's acquiescence in the German ex-crown Prince's stay in Germany, and their determination to act, if required unilaterally, the British Government gave a threat of withdrawal from the Ambassadors' Conference and Commissions

of Control. Ultimately a compromise was found out which saved the face of both.

The British Foreign Office also played a sensible role by inviting the United States Government to help in solving the German reparation problem. Thus General Dawes and Mr. Owen Young of USA were involved in the Reparation Commission's work.

The documents contained in this book give us a clear view of the British Government's thinking of those days on very tricky European problems. Students of International Law, History and Politics will find it an unsparable reference book for European politics between the two World Wars.

—B.C.

BRITISH POLICY IN THE NORTH-EAST FRONTIER AGENCY

By Manilal Bose

(Published by Concept Publishing Co, New Delhi, 1979) pp 239. Price Rs. 90'00

SECESSIONIST movements in Mizoram and Nagaland have been knotty problems for the successive governments at the Centre so long that the common citizen seemed to have developed complete apathy for even major headlines on these issues. The recent violent upheavels in Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh, added to the Assam jigsaw puzzle have evoked fresh interest in those outlying parts of our country which are loudly protesting against this age-old neglect and apathy. Mani Lal Bose, has, however, not chosen to cash in on this curiosity by churning out a timely popular book. "British policy in the North East Frontier Agency", based on the author's dissertation for a Ph.D. degree awarded by the Jadhavpur University is a standard book with a serious purpose.

Till the Chinese invasion of 1962 which revealed the vulnerability of this region and served a good cause by highlighting its strategic significance, the NEFA had remained as mysterious as Shangri-La to most of us. The only trustworthy account till then had been that of EA Dalton and George Grierson. In the wake of the Chinese invasion many works on the Frontier have come forth but they are concerned mainly with the military debacle and the border problems. The NEFA administration has published a few books exclusively on the NEFA and its tribal culture and institutions but according to Dr. Bose the available literature does not give a connected history of the Frontier people in the perspective of the British policy—a task which he has undertaken in this book.

The book is an attempt to draw a connected history of the NEFA covering in five chapters the entire period from the annexation of Assam in 1826 to the end of the British rule in 1947. The author claims it to be an

original work in the sense that it has treated the history of the Frontier from a fresh point of view, making it a comprehensive study of the relation of the Government with the Frontier tribes up to the end of the British period, emergence of the Inner Line, Outer Line and the McMahon Line, the evolution of the constitution and administration of the NE Frontier in the perspective of the land and the people.

Dr. Bose initially seems to exonerate the British of the charge of neglect of the region. He explains it away by pointing out that since there was no threat of external aggression in the hills, the defence of the Assam plain's inhabitants from the attacks of the hill tribes was naturally the main concern of the British. This has been called "a practical approach" by the author who does not seem to bat an eyelid on the utter neglect of the hill tribes and seems to provide moral support to the second class citizen treatment to the hill tribes vis-a-vis the plain's people. This impression, however, is not consistent with the author's approach in the later chapters where he candidly brings forth the inherent injustice of this selfish attitude of the British rulers.

The introductory chapter of the book gives a very lucid account of the land, people and culture of NEFA. In the subsequent chapters the evolution of the British policy that led to the creation of the Inner, Outer and McMahon Lines and the British administration's policy towards the frontier's tribes has been developed in a logical and systematic manner.

The Acts and Regulations of 1873, 1874 and 1880 and the Exchange of Notes between the British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries on the India Tibet Frontier issue have been reproduced in the appendices and provide valuable background information to the serious reader.

Dr. Bose has been able to do justice to the serious subject in an interesting manner. The book will be useful to the serious researcher, though for general reading the casual reader might find the detailed development cumbersome at times.

Complete absence of maps and sketches is a major weakness of the book. Even readers very intimately familiar with NEFA may crave for the same to get a proper grasp of the detailed treatment of the subject. Printing and get up of the book are of a high standard. The ninety rupees price tag is rather high.

—ANV.

THE MARTIAL RACES OF INDIA

By Lieut General Sir George MacMacMunn

(Published by Mittal Publications) pp 398. Price Rs. 90'00

THE present Indian reprint is as intriguing as the edition of the 1930's. The provocation for it then was the expected doze of political concession which the British military circle feared might be granted in

deference to the nationalist aspirations of our countrymen under Ghandhiji. Also, there was an already finalised plan of induction of Indians to the Combatant Arms through a Sandhurst type Indian Military Academy to be set up at Dehra Dun. And, worse still was the Peshawar jolt in 1930, when men of the Royal Garhwal Rifles (one of the leading "martial class": 2 out of a total 5 Victoria Crosses and 4 out of a total 10 Military Crosses won in France by Indians in World War I) refused to fire on their own up-countrymen: the very conception of the "martial race" theory seemed to crumble up.

The root of trouble for the Raj was the Father of the Nation and several uncomplimentary references to him are in the book. These should now count as compliments and the present reprint need not have omitted the opening paragraph of the Introduction, just because "inoculation with the Ghandi poison" is there, particularly, when a dozen such others are left intact in the text. Also, Lovat's beautiful coloured illustrations of the original edition appear now in unattractive black and white.

In pre-independence days, a good market was assured for a handbook on the "martial races" because the British Officer coming out to India had to know all about them as part of his training on man-management. The author's very own—The Armies of India—was considered to be the best. (Incidentally, an Indian who did well in this line was P.D. Bonerjee). But the purpose of his bringing out another one was much more than just a handbook on the "Martial Races". Here, an attempt was made to obtain historical justification for the continuance of British rule because of indigenous incompetence in governing on their own: ".....if false sentiment and feeble-mindedness are to lead Great Britain to let go her Imperial hold and return to the heptarchy, then India and her races may go to the devil their own way".

It is interesting to look at us through the British military eyes of the past, as the author proceeds to identify "who and what are the martial races of India". But the cat is out of the bag when he adds to it: "whom surely Baba Ghandhi never fathered". His long history loses its objectivity because of the everchanging British conception of the "martial race" had more to it than just the Indian ethnology, notwithstanding, the pedigree of its original classification traced to the white races. The reasons for inadequate physical standard resulting mainly from abject poverty over the centuries, caste pretension, religious bigotry etc. are given a historical background. These then were some of the professed factors which prevented the Rulers from casting the recruitment net wider than it did. (Of course, the most essential part of the game was to keep out people who could remotely be associated with any nationalist aspiration, hence, the need for constant review of recruitment policy. The same applied to class composition of the Army: the dominant consideration being political and administrative convenience and in that order). He, like others of his time, did not believe that it would be possible to give up caste prejudice and

pretensions—"which survived a thousand years of Buddhism, and eight hundred years of Islam"—in ever making the Army, a casteless organisation. But a neat classification of "martial races" did not quite solve the Imperial problem. There had to be the British Officer and the British soldier, otherwise, "in the Indian Army, the races of the North, would once more eat up the people of the South"! Then, there was the question whether the "martial races"—"faithful like the cat to the house rather than to the master"—would really remain unaffected by the "Ghandi madness", in the event of greater political freedom granted to Indians. Obviously, '1857' was not to be forgotten so easily. And, the military assesment is made out as if what happened in 1930 at Peshawar, "exactly tallies with... 1857". ".....the Congress seditionists were very active in peaceful happy Garhwal, and could bode no good. It does not pay in the East to disregard omens"!

The real problem about the Simon Report was how far Indianisation could be carried out without jeopardising the Raj. Also, to have Indians eventually having command over British officers could not be tolerated. The eventual policy was to be "segregation" which the author supported. Under this arrangement, Indians would only be allowed to officer certain specified units exclusively, replacing gradually senior British officers as they come up the ladder. It was ordained that Indians would be very carefully screened (comparable to what Macaulay had indicated elsewhere, as the Educational policy of the Raj: "Indian in blood and colour but English in taste, in opinions, in words and in talent") and it was presumed that "the Indian intelligentsia as a rule, save perhaps from the northern *Khatri* could never make officers....." (World War II came a few years afterwards, upsetting these calculations and a large number of Indians had to be taken in from all classes to save the Empire first).

MacMunn was a leading spokesman for the British officer, out in India. He also, did a good job for the Raj as a military historian. On the face of it, his book may be of limited relevance at the present time. But it can be both purposeful (lessons of history ?) and interesting reading, provided, one knows when to take it with a pinch of salt.

—BMB

GUIDE TO FAR EASTERN NAVIES

Edited by Barry M. Blechman and Robert P. Bermann

(Published by Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1978) pp 586.
Price not mentioned.

IT is difficult to say whether the American editors of this volume dealing with Far Eastern Navies are merely naive or whether they purposefully intend to confuse the Far Eastern reader (Could they really scramble the inscrutable oriental mind?) with typical western propagandist jargon and gobbledygook. Consider this statement.

In any case, the common perception of the relative US and Soviet Naval capabilities does accurately reflect the trend over the past ten years or so: the US Naval presence in East Asia has become smaller while the Soviet pressure and Soviet willingness to employ its Navy in political roles far from home have increased. Still the US Navy would seem to have retained an edge. And even the recent past trend in the relative size of the two fleets now seems to have levelled off, and may soon reverse. The size of the US Navy will increase in the future as the growth in US Shipbuilding appropriations initiated in the early 1970 results in greater numbers of new ships, while the Soviet Navy, facing a worsening obsolescence problem in submarines and major warships, will become smaller. Thus, from the West's perspective, the political prospect may be brighter than in recent years."

Statements such as these have caused raised eyebrows even amongst western reviewers of this book. This statement concludes the first chapter of the book which attempts to compare US the Soviet Naval strengths, missions and projections in the area. And that really sets the tone of the book. The subsequent chapters of the 1st part which deal with the navies of Japan, Taiwan, China, the two Koreas and the Philippines merely reflect their interaction with the Superpower entanglement in the region.

The second part of book contains the usual, photographs and data regarding ships and aircraft of the various navies. It is barely adequate considering that. Janes and Weyers and Breyers are far more detailed and authentic.

This book is therefore a poor substitute for the more reputed naval guides or for the plethora of writing analysing naval activities in East Asia, among other parts of the world. Its sole, claim to destruction is that perhaps for the first time a certain amount of analysis greater than John. Moore's page in Janes has been prefixed to a modest regional Janes.

—SP

ANZIO 1944 : AN UNEXPECTED FURY

By Peter Verney

(Published by BT Batsford Ltd., London, 1978) pp 265. Price £ 8.50.

THE Allied Campaign in Sicily and Italy, 1943-45 was a classic example of the use of maritime strategy, of projection of power ashore via the sea routes. In much the same manner as Pitt during the Seven Years War in the middle of the 18th century had sought to quell the continental power of France by use of amphibious assaults in far flung corners of the globe such as Quebec (Saunders and Wolfe) and Seringapatnam (Pockock) so too did Churchill envisage a campaign against the soft underbelly of Europe as a means to foreshorten the war, to draw off the pressures that Germany exerted against the Russian heartland.

This grandly designed Italian campaign however bogged itself down in the mud of Italy. The masterly Gustav Line hastily thrown up by Kesselring and his dogged step by step retreat had reduced the thrust into the soft underbelly itself in need of a left hook to save it. It therefore needed yet another use of the amphibious capability of the Allies.

"Operation SHINGLE was originally conceived as a minor complementary flanking move to the advance of the 5th Army along the Via Casilina. Wishing to exploit their air and seaborne mobility, the Allies planned the landings at Anzio-Nettuno as a means of speeding up what they thought would be a drive to Rome before the end of 1943. The entire original rationale behind the Anzio operation was based on a successful Allied advance up the Via Casilina. It was intended that when the 5th Army reached Foosinone, north of Cassino, amphibious forces and paratroops should be launched to capture Anzio and quickly overrun the Alban Hills (Colli Laziali) dominating the road to Rome.

However when the Allied armies were stopped by the Gustav Line defences, the same project was given a fresh lease of life by the intervention of Churchill. He projected such an undertaking as a means to draw off German divisions from in front of the 5th Army. Where originally it had been planned for one division only, the plan now had to cater for two, as the beachhead had to be taken and defended.

Resources such as LSTs and LCTs were made available by deferring their departure to England for OVERLORD ; some were brought to the Mediterranean from SE Asia.

These well-known Anzio facts are repeated in Peter Verney's "*Anzio 1944 An Unexpected Fury*" and so also is description of the landings and the agonising battle for the beach-head that ensued. However, despite the veracity and scope of Mr Verney's narrative, it tends to get bogged down in detail much as the landing force remained bogged down on the beach-head at Anzio.

No perceptible thread of narrative is to be seen in the various chapters of this book and as a result it tends to be dry and difficult to

assimilate. As a record of individual units and sub units it adds to the already voluminous bibliography that is available on this bloody battle. However it does not throw any new light nor does it illuminate in any novel or instructive manner any of the lessons of the amphibious operation or the containing manœuvres by the Germans. Mr. Verney provides no description or commentary on the numerous personalities involved other than to inveigh against the lackadaisical attitude of the hapless General Lucas in not breaking out of the beach-head before Mackensen dug in around him. However the author states in his introduction, "Anzio was a soldiers battle" and as his intention is to provide further dedication to their memory, the only perceptible thread of the book is a memorial to them. Otherwise, this book provides no clear proofs to his final conclusion that operation Shingle was ill conceived. Mere narrative and table of the order of battle do not give the lie to strategic or tactical conceptions. For greater analysis of the circumstances, constraints, material and personalities would have possibly led to a more acceptable justification of his conclusions, however right or wrong they may be considered.

—S.P.

VIEWS AND SUGGESTIONS ON MILITARY AFFAIRS

By Brigadier R.S. Sodhi (Retd)

(Published by the author from Chandigarh, pp 124, Price Rs. 4'00)

IT is no closely guarded secret that the Indian Army today is plagued and beset with a number of problems covering a wide spectrum of its multifarious activities due to such reasons as the introduction of new weapons systems and equipment, reduction of the tail to teeth ratio, exposure as never before to mass media and political interference, career consciousness, lowering disciplinary standards, and so on; the list is legion. More and more retired officers who joined during World War II have taken to writing on such matters. Brig. Sodhi is one such retired officer who has taken it upon himself to reduce these views to writing and to offer suggestions to remedy these problems. Unfortunately for him there is nothing that he has written which can be termed as original. Neither are his suggestions, which, to say the least, are most pedestrian. He has covered rather sketchily such mundane topics as training, administration, promotions, honours and awards at all. Who has no heard (or read) of the alleged abuse of privileges by Senior Officers? Or the injustices perpetrated in selections for promotion? Or the lacunae in the Annual Confidential Report?

The Author claims that he has not undertaken this work because he has a chip on his shoulder. But it is obvious that he does or else why the trenchant criticism of the Establishment? What is equally significant is that no Senior Officer has been asked to write a foreward when this is

standard operating procedure. The author has touched on a few vital issues like Honours and Awards for instance. Unfortunately for him such subjects are being discussed with indecent frequency and candour. Thus, the very *raison d'être* of this book stands scrutiny. In the hands of the younger and inexperienced officer this book is likely to do more harm than good.

Admittedly Brig. Sodhi has the ability to express himself well but the production and editing are substandard.

—E.D.

THE MILITARY PROFILE OF SHER SHAH SUR

By Major P. Sensarma

(Published by Nava Prakash, Calcutta-6, 1976) pp. 160. Price Rs. 35'00

SHER SHAH was a promising Indian ruler of the 16th century, who tried to supplant the Mughal rule in India by Afghan hegemony. But his life was short. Within five years of his occupation of Delhi in August 1540, he was killed in an accident while trying to take the mountain-fort of Kalinjar in May 1545. Rising from the humble position of a "Jagirdar"'s son, he showed his personal valour, organising capability and administrative acumen to become the emperor of India, out-manoeuvring Humayun.

The author, in this book, has dealt with Sher Shah's personal habits and qualities, military policy, principles of war, strategy and tactics, and composition of his armed forces. The author has tried to analyse Sher Shah's military activities according to the modern principles of War. Sher Shah, like other foreign adventurers in India, often applied cunning and treachery to hoodwink his adversaries. His policy of paying his troops in cash and not through land was instrumental in keeping them in good spirits. Had he lived longer, he could have consolidated his conquests and introduced 'better administrative reforms, destroying the Mughal hopes to restore their domination over India. He realised the usefulness of all-weather roads in administration and war, and hence built a number of trunk roads connecting the strategically important places of his empire. It is interesting to note that Sher Shah was also an innovator in the military field. He not only introduced copper-made mortars, but also employed new artillery tactics, especially in siege warfare. He also used his intelligence organisation extensively and efficiently. The author has praised Sher Shah's military leadership in the following words: "Perhaps Sher was the first man to introduce the elements of speed, manoeuvrability, surprise and attacking the enemy at several points with the enveloping tactics effectively in India. He bewildered (*sic*) all his opponents with intelligent and courageous use of all those elements. Amongst his successors, Shivaji and

Mir Jumla employed these principles very efficiently.....Sher also introduced the principle of attacking the enemy by the most unexpected and difficult route.....Perhaps Sher was the first Indian military leader to appreciate the advantage of night movement".

However, Major Sensarma looks askance at Sher Shah for his inability to organise a navy. In fact, the not-too-educated rulers of medieval India could hardly be expected to keep themselves abreast of the political and military developments taking place in other countries. Like his other Indian contemporaries, Sher Shah failed to fathom the intention of the European merchants and sailors, who frequented the Indian coasts, those days, and kept himself busy with land battles alone.

The book is a welcome addition to the literature on one of medieval India's interesting rulers, especially from the military angle. It contains a good bibliography and appendices on Sher Shah's forts and roads.

—B.C.

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